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Abstract 
This thesis includes theoretical contributions to organisational 
studies and medical sociology, drawn from a three levelled 
ethnographic case study of commissioning by General Medical 
Practitioners in the setting of the English National Health service. In 
order to locate these levels as interrelated structures, the concept of 
“field” (Bourdieu, 2005, Fligstein, 2001, Fligstein and McAdam, 
2012, Lewin, 1997 [1951]) is used. Jens Beckert (2010) has 
developed a framework in which cognitive frames, networks, and 
rules are in a relationship of irreducible interdependency. The 
definitions of analytic categories in the extant framework are under-
developed. In this thesis, the framework is empirically applied to 
add definition to the analytic category “cognitive frame”. Beckert’s 
Framework and Weick’s (Weick, 1995, Weick, 2000, Weick et al., 
2005) Sensemaking Perspective are intersected to develop a 
reciprocal relationship between the two theories. By conceptualising 
cognitive frame as a sensemaking process, insight is gained in three 
different but overlapping facets: wider contexts, temporality, and 
distributed sensemaking. At the level of an industry a cognitive 
frame can be described as a sensemaking type, which will have 
constituent sensemaking styles associated with that industries 
internal networks. When rules require organisations from separate 
industries or sectors to form partnerships then actors with different 
sensemaking types will be required to interact within one network. 
Organisational development techniques can be used to support and 
align sensemaking in both of these circumstances. Sensegivers may 
have an important role in pacing, including suspending, 
sensemaking. The thesis also contains insights for medical sociology 
in respect of how and why GPs commission as they do. These relate 
to the impact of belonging to the NHS family; differing permutations 
of changes to the profession (hybridisation, restratification, and the 
delimitation of autonomy) in GP networks; GP compliance with 
rules; and the characteristics of an inner-city GP workforce. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1  Aims of the research 
This is a thesis about the dynamic relationship between 
sensemaking, networks and rules in the empirical context of a 
Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) in the English National Health 
Service (NHS). The research questions were open and broad, 
designed to orientate investigation and open up lines of enquiry, 
rather than to delimit the study. These were: 
 Why and how did GPs enact their commissioning duties in the 
ways that they did? 
 How does sensemaking influence field change within the 
context of networks and rules? 
The first question relates to my aim to add depth and nuance to our 
understanding of why and how General Medical Practitioners (GPs) 
commission services in the way that they do. The second question 
relates to my aim to extend a conceptual framework first proposed 
by Jens Beckert in an article in Organization Studies in 2010, How 
Do Fields Change? The Interrelations of Institutions, Networks, and 
Cognition in the Dynamics of Markets (2010). I have replaced the 
term “institution” with “rule” the reasons for which I explain in 2.3: 
Selecting the theoretical framework. My aim is to extend this 
framework by providing definitional clarity for the term cognitive 
frame, and to do this by developing theory at the intersection of 
Beckert’s Framework (BF) and Karl Weick’s (Weick, 1995, Weick, 
2000, Weick et al., 2005) Sensemaking Perspective (SP). 
1.2  A reflexive comment 
Six months before embarking on this research I ended a career as a 
manger in the NHS. In the 1990s and early 2000s, I had worked 
with GPs in the CCG that I studied. My last NHS role was in a large 
mental health services provider organisation and, whilst there, I had 
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been struck by how limited others’ understanding was regarding the 
jobs that GPs were required to do. In my view no other group of 
doctors was expected to have a similar breadth of knowledge, or to 
perform as many different roles. They ran their own businesses, 
provided a clinical service to patients, commissioned secondary care 
services, and worked in interagency environments all at the same 
time. When GPs talked to me, as many had done over the years, 
they told me that this complexity could cause anxiety. They worried 
that their commissioning responsibility would compromise their 
ability to advocate for their patients. One once told me that GPs 
were people who wanted to be liked, explaining that in his opinion it 
was this affiliative personality that motivated them to become 
community-based family doctors. In my opinion, GPs navigated an 
extremely complex environment, and did this as sensitively, kindly, 
and intelligently as they were able. Reflexively I recognised the 
potential for my personal opinion to affect the reliability and 
robustness of my evidence and conclusions. In order to guard 
against bias I ensured I approached the study reflexively (see 
3.2.2) and that my data analysis process was systematic and 
thorough (see 3.5). 
I left the NHS in April 2011, encouraged by academic colleagues to 
pursue a long held ambition to “do research”. “You don’t know less 
as you get older, you know more” one of them said to me. This was 
like a light shining into the darkness of ageing. I applied for, and 
was successful in gaining, a Nottingham University Business School 
(NUBS) bursary to support my doctoral studies. This was offered in 
partnership with the Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health 
Research and Care for Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, and 
Lincolnshire (CLAHRC-NDL). CLAHRCs were a national initiative with 
the objective to transfer knowledge into practice (Kislov et al., 
2011, Rowley et al., 2012, Smith and Ward, 2015). During my PhD 
project I experienced a dual identity. On the one hand I was an 
apprentice researcher new to the world of academia. On the other I 
was an experienced health service manager with, I like to think, a 
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long-won insight into the way people who work within the NHS 
think, feel, and interact. With one foot in academia and the other in 
healthcare management, the personal challenge I have set myself 
for the remainder of my working life is to play my small part in 
bringing these two worlds closer together. 
1.3  A background note: essential terms 
In order that this thesis is intelligible to non-NHS readers, I have, 
throughout, included definitions for NHS terms and a glossary at 
Appendix 1. In addition, sections 1.3.1 – 1.3.3 are detailed 
definitions of: General Medical Practitioner and Primary Care; 
Commissioning; and Clinical Commissioning Group. 
1.3.1 General Medical Practitioner and Primary Care 
The vast majority of the population are registered with a General 
Medical Practitioner known as a GP. GPs are usually, but not always, 
independent business men and women. They have retained their 
pre-NHS status as independent practitioners, unlike hospitals that 
transferred into national ownership at the inception of the NHS in 
1948. In the vast majority of cases a partnership of GPs owns a 
business which is called a general practice. A GP is a doctor, based 
in the community, who employs a practice based team including 
nurses, practice managers, and receptionists. By definition GPs are 
generalists not specialists and illnesses are usually presented to 
them in an undifferentiated way. They treat patients with minor or 
chronic conditions, issuing prescriptions for medication and/or 
referring to other community services as appropriate. Each surgery 
has close working relationships with other community-based 
healthcare professionals such as midwives, health visitors, district 
nurses, and social workers. GPs also provide various other health 
services, for example health education advice and clinics, 
vaccinations, and medical support to nursing homes. This part of 
the healthcare system is known as primary care because it is the 
primary or first point of contact for most people in most situations. 
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The GP or other primary care professional, through the referrals 
mechanism, is the access point for hospitals and other specialist 
secondary care services, and because of this is in a position to affect 
demand for those services. 
1.3.2 Commissioning 
In the NHS commissioning is a process by which health care 
services are acquired. A commissioning body holds a budget, 
whether real or indicative, and uses that budget to acquire 
healthcare for its local population. This is usually through contracts 
with providers from the NHS and other sectors (for example 
hospitals, community services, private sector providers, and 
charities). The term commissioning tends to be used to describe 
linked activities (Ovretveit, 1994, Smith et al., 2006, Smith et al., 
2010, Woodin and Smith, 2006). The NHS commissioning process 
has existed since the introduction of the internal market in 1990 
(Currie and Brown, 2003, Parliament, 1990) when a separate third 
party payer role was implemented. The third party payer acts on 
behalf of the principal funder (citizen) to secure care from the 
provider (hospital or other organisation) (Checkland et al., 2009a, 
Ham, 2009, Ovretveit, 1994, Woodin and Smith, 2006). The process 
of commissioning is sometimes presented as a rational cycle. 
Woodin and Smith’s (2006:p279) cycle is often used, and is made 
up of five elements. 
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Figure 1: Woodin and Smith's commissioning cycle 
 
More recent representations show an increased number of stages. 
The National Association of Primary Care (2010) has a cycle of 
twelve activities under three main headings of planning, 
procurement and monitoring. Whether this rational model of a 
cyclical activity will still be relevant in the new competitive 
environment is an area currently under investigation. There is 
limited research regarding the dual imperatives to commission in a 
system that promotes competition and integration at the same time. 
In a study that examined activity in four CCGs the authors 
concluded that running competitive and collaborative systems in 
parallel has introduced complexity into the commissioning process, 
the implications of which are not yet fully understood (Allen et al., 
2014). What is for certain, is that healthcare commissioning is 
already complex, and is set to become more so. It is not a linear, 
static activity, and its definition will continue to evolve as new 
commissioning policies are implemented and interpreted. 
1.3.3 Clinical Commissioning Group 
A CCG is an inter-disciplinary group of health clinicians and 
managers, led by GPs, which holds the health budget for patients in 
a local area. Membership of a CCG is not optional for GPs; these 
arrangements came legally into force on 1st April 2013. 
commissioning
assess 
needs
plan
contractmonitor 
revise
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Commissioning by GPs is not a new phenomenon; it has existed 
since the introduction of fundholding in 1990 (Parliament, 1990). 
The fundholding scheme was abolished in 1997 by the incoming 
Labour government, but the concept of the GP, or latterly the 
General Practice, as best placed to allocate and manage resources, 
has remained in place under different names including the 
immediate antecedent to CCGs, Practice Based Commissioning 
(PBC). GP commissioning is based on two main assumptions. The 
first is that the GP is frontline and therefore best placed to plan and 
design health services. The second is that GPs can to some degree 
control the use and costs of secondary care. This allocation of 
budgets to the GP for the cost of secondary care used by his/her 
patients is intended explicitly to align cost implications with clinical 
decision making. 
1.4  Research design 
My study coincided with the implementation of the Health and Social 
Care Act (HSCA) (Parliament, 2012) herein after HSCA 2012. HSCA 
2012 contained changes to the national rules pertaining to health 
and social care. GPs became contractually required to be members 
of local CCGs. Public health duties were transferred from the NHS to 
Local Authorities (LAs). Added emphasis was given to arrangements 
for commercial competition through changes in the duties of 
Monitor, the healthcare regulator. In parallel there was a drive to 
provide closer alignment between services, referred to by the term 
integration. This was an imprecise term which could mean closer 
alignment of health services, or of health and social care services. 
The empirical setting for my study was an urban CCG made up of 
over sixty general practices serving a population of approximately 
300,000 people. I conducted a single site case study using 
ethnographic methods including direct and participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews. I designed a three level embedded 
case study comprised of an Operational Practice Level (OPL), a 
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Strategic Collaboration Level (SCL), and an Inter-agency Strategic 
Partnership Level (ISPL). This three-level design allowed me to 
observe GP commissioning as enacted through operational referral 
and prescribing decisions, their arrangements to collaborate with 
other practices to procure secondary care services, and their 
arrangements to commission in partnerships with other agencies. 
This was an ambitious study, but everything in my own experience 
and conversations with GPs had led me to conclude that 
understanding the impact of acting in this multi-levelled 
environment was key to comprehending how and why GPs 
commissioned in the way that they did. 
1.5  Thesis outline 
The thesis is organised into nine chapters, including this one. 
Chapter Two is a review of the relevant literature. First, I critically 
review the literature in the fields of Sociology of the Professions 
(SoP) and Medical Sociology. Next I present my arguments for 
selecting BF to theorise my findings. Following on from this, I 
critically review BF and its early applications in order to establish my 
rationale for contributing additional definitional depth to the analytic 
category cognitive frame. Finally, I present my rationale for 
developing this definition via a reciprocal relationship with SP using 
the analytic co-ordinates wider contexts, temporality, and 
distributed sensemaking. 
Chapter Three, is a description of the methodology and methods for 
the study. It includes an outline of the use of Case Study Research 
methodology with ethnographic methods. It also includes details of 
how the site was selected, how the research was conducted, the 
processes of data analysis, and the display of data throughout the 
thesis. 
Chapter four is a preamble to the three data chapters. In it I explain 
the use of the concept of “field” within BF, and also give background 
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to the three levels (OPL, SCL, and ISPL) which constitute the 
empirical field for this study. 
Chapters five to seven are presentations of the three empirical case 
studies, each including a discussion and summary of the theoretical 
implications of the findings. 
Chapter eight is a discussion of the findings presented in the three 
preceding chapters, and an extrapolation of the implications for the 
theoretical development of SP and BF. 
Chapter nine is the conclusion, including: the theoretical 
contributions; and a description of the limitations of the study, the 
implications for health policy and practice, and potential areas for 
further research. 
1.6  Theoretical contributions of the study 
The theoretical contribution of the thesis is at the intersection of BF 
(Beckert, 2010) and SP (Weick, 1995, Weick, 2000, Weick et al., 
2005). Beckert’s argument is that networks, institutions (or rules), 
and cognitive frames are in a dynamic and irreducibly 
interdependent relationship in a field. Beckert integrates these 
forces to analyse field change at a macro level. Weick’s 
sensemaking has been mainly developed at micro levels when 
individuals respond to a problem or a crisis. By developing a 
reciprocal relationship between the two theories, SP has extended 
to the macro level, and the concept of cognitive frame has been 
given a descriptive definition. The theoretical contributions derived 
from this study are presented in terms of their implications for SP 
and BF individually. These contributions address underdeveloped 
areas of wider contexts, temporality, and distributed sensemaking 
in SP, and an under theorised concept of cognitive frame in BF. 
1.6.1 Contributions to Sensemaking Perspective 
I propose the following contributions to SP. 
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The concept of a sensemaking type is potentially useful in 
understanding how networks interpret rules, respond to tensions, 
and succeed or fail in achieving collective action. A type is a shared 
perspective on the nature of cues that workers in a particular 
organisational context will seek to identify when making sense of 
new rules or contexts. At such times, new rules are interpreted 
through the lens of the established sensemaking type. In some 
circumstances a new rule may imply a change in type. In others 
new rules are interpreted in a field of multiple sensemaking types in 
the same network. The consequent ambiguity in either circumstance 
can trigger sensemaking. Tensions in sensemaking may be a stage 
in resolving ambiguity, or may be ongoing especially in networks 
with multiple sensemaking types. 
Even when an industry has a shared sensemaking type, there will 
be co-existent variances in how that industry’s sub-networks 
interpret rules. I have conceptualised these differences within an 
overall type as sensemaking styles. Styles both reflect the networks’ 
history, and effect its future-orientation, and distribution of actors. 
Sensemaking, in wider contexts, is an active distributing process. 
Networks are adaptive; distribution patterns alter according to the 
implications of the sensemaking project. Various active processes 
were associated with distribution, including sensegivers spanning 
network boundaries; networks splitting to take differentiated 
positions; networks taking time out to reflect; and a uni-
professional network retreating to reflect. 
Sensemaking is paced over time. Not all actors share a time 
horizon. It is not necessary for sense to be made by all actors 
before action can commence. Leaders, at times when they 
themselves are interpreting new rules, can suspend sensemaking 
amongst networks of followers. This is achieved by socially skilled 
leader-facilitators diminishing resistance by diverting the attention 
of the wider network onto, in this case, the call to professionalism. 
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1.6.2 Contributions to Beckert’s Framework 
Where SP is extended by using BF to face the macro level, in a 
reciprocal relationship BF is extended by using SP to face the micro 
level. This extension is in the form of a description of the analytic 
category cognitive frame, and is summarised in the following points. 
Cognitive frame is not a fixed entity. Rather it is an ongoing process 
of sensemaking situated in the actors’ context of rules and 
networks. 
Cognitive frame in an industry context is conceptualised as that 
industry’s established sensemaking type. This type is shared 
amongst actors and can be a unifying force both within and between 
field levels. When a rule is introduced that implies a change in 
sensemaking type then a reframing process will be initiated, and 
this will be enacted using the lens of the pre-existing frame. 
The concept of a cognitive frame as a sensemaking type at industry 
level does not explain how the networks that comprise that industry 
interpret rules. Within the overall cognitive frame of an industry 
with multiple networks there will be differences in sensemaking, 
which is conceptualised as differences in sensemaking style. Style is 
a combination derived from legacy, future-orientation, and the 
distribution of the actors. 
In fields with more than one industry or sector, multiple cognitive 
frames may mean that alignment of actors towards the goal of 
collective action is difficult to operationalise. In these circumstances, 
the emphasis may be on understanding and accommodating 
differences, or on legitimising a lead cognitive frame. 
Tensions between sensemaking styles or types can exist within or 
between field levels. This may be a stage in a process towards the 
development of a shared cognitive frame within a field, or it may 
reflect a redistribution of power in a field change. The distribution 
and/or redistribution of networks and actors within networks is in 
itself an active process which is triggered by cognitive reframing. 
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Patterns of distribution are created by actors as they interpret new 
rules. In a field with distributed networks this cognitive reframing 
can be a managed process. In these situations, OD is important. 
This can take various forms, depending on the nature of the field 
rule that is being interpreted. 
1.7 Contributions to Medical Sociology and 
healthcare practice and areas for further research 
Whilst the primary purpose of a PhD is to make theoretical 
contributions as outlined in 1.6 above, in addition this thesis offers 
insights for healthcare practice and Medical Sociology in respect of 
how GPs commission and why they enact the role as they do. 
One important finding was the impact of belonging to the NHS 
Family. The NHS Family network had an important stabilising effect 
but also limited the interpretation of new rules. Despite its apparent 
importance in shaping the field it remains a fluid and undefined 
concept. I suggest its mechanisms are an important area for further 
research, the outcomes of which should be used to inform public 
policy as more traditional NHS organisations move into new 
business models, and more NHS functions transfer to LAs. 
A further important finding was the differing patterns of 
hybridisation, restratification, and the delimitation of autonomy in 
GP networks. More research is indicated on the effect of multiple 
developments within the profession and the variations that this 
creates as GPs adopt these changes. 
A third important area was that GPs did not appear to critically 
engage with the role. Despite some initial grumbling, doctors 
responded to new rules compliantly. Leaders synonymised 
compliance with professionalism (Evetts, 2003, Evetts, 2006). GPs 
collectively appeared to be compliant, and orientated towards 
improvement and sustainability of services for patients, without a 
strategy to safeguard their own interests. 
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Fourthly, this was a study of an inner-city area. This workforce had 
characteristics of ethnic heritage and vocation that were inner-city 
specific and this inevitably affected how doctors made sense of their 
role. In addition to their own personal attitudes, inner-city GPs 
reported feeling overwhelmed with the social problems of their 
patients meaning it is difficult to make the space and time to think 
proactively and critically. 
1.8 Conclusion 
In this introduction I have set out the main elements of the thesis, 
including research design, the thesis outline, and the main 
contributions to theory, medical sociology, and practice. The 
following chapter is a review of the relevant literature. 
..
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter is designed to reflect the developing nature of my PhD 
project. My approach to theorising was developed in parallel with 
data analysis, explained further in Chapter Three: Methodology and 
Methods. In first year of a full-time PhD project in NUBs, a literature 
review is produced to include the identification of theoretical gaps 
that the study has the potential to address. The subsequent 
fieldwork, analysis, and presentation of findings should be the basis 
of a theoretical contribution to those gaps. 
For me, this initial year coincided with the NHS preparing to 
implement the HSCA 2012. New laws implied fundamental structural 
changes; for example, NHS providers must now secure business in 
open competition (Collins, 2015), and increasingly the control of 
healthcare was to be democratised including the transfer of 
statutory public health duties to LAs (2012). In response to the 
structural nature of these rule changes my first literature review 
was a critique of Robert Alford’s SIT and its subsequent applications 
in the English NHS. SIT was a heuristic framework used to analyse 
the dynamic relationship between separately identified structural 
groups of doctors, managers, and patients or citizens. In these early 
stages, and before entering the field, I anticipated that my 
theoretical contribution would be to SIT. 
During the second and third years, as I began to produce and 
analyse field data and identify early findings, I revised my initial 
intention to theorise using a purely structural framework. As my 
reading of SoP and Medical Sociology progressed, discussed in 
sections 2.2 and 2.3, I realised that a pure structural analysis would 
be outmoded. The structure of the profession, and associated 
sociological thought, was changing. Doctor-manager hybrids 
occupied new leadership roles, meaning the profession had 
restratified and increased regulation meant a reduction in clinical 
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control and autonomy. As underlying structures changed, actors 
were engaged in a process of interpretation. This necessitated the 
identification of a framework with the capacity to integrate 
structural and interpretivist perspectives (see 2.3). First I 
considered institutions theory, specifically Scott’s (2014) concept of 
three pillars, a model which integrated regulative (structural), 
normative (combination of structural and interpretive), and cultural-
cognitive (interpretive) processes. The problem for me was that 
Scott’s model lacked a pillar by which to theorise the impact of 
networks, which appeared to shift and adapt as part of the 
interpretation processes in my early findings. In the end, I adopted 
a framework developed by Jens Beckert in How Do Fields Change? 
The Interrelations of Institutions, Networks, and Cognition in the 
Dynamics of Markets (2010). Beckert integrated institutions (rules), 
networks, and cognitive frames into one framework. BF had the 
potential to support the analysis that, inductively, my data 
indicated. It is a new framework however, untried empirically and 
underdeveloped theoretically. Turning this to advantage, there is an 
opportunity for extension, and for me to do this as the theoretical 
contribution of my doctoral project. 
My next decision was how to construct this theoretical contribution. 
Beckert used the terms cognitive frame and cognition 
interchangeably. From this point on I use the term cognitive frame 
for reasons of consistency, and also because my interest is in how 
networks of actors share ways of thinking, not individual cognition. 
Section 2.4 is a critique of BF and its applications leading to the 
identification of an opportunity to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the term cognitive frame. 
The last decision was how to theorise this understanding. My 
starting point was to explore the intellectual roots of Beckert’s own 
thinking, which he attributed to Karl Weick’s Sensemaking 
Perspective (SP) (1995, 2000, Weick et al., 2005). Section 2.5 is a 
discussion of the main tenets of SP and how these might be applied 
and developed within BF. Fortuitously for me, scholars had seen the 
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need to take stock of sensemaking literature. Three separate critical 
appraisals had recently been published (Brown et al., 2014, Maitlis 
and Christianson, 2014, Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015). In terms of 
my own theoretical contribution, here was a timely opportunity not 
only to extend BF, but to do this in such a way as to respond to the 
reviewers’ suggestions regarding the future direction of the SP. 
I conclude the chapter in section 2.7 by identifying two research 
questions arising from the critical review of the literature and the 
parallel process of analysis of empirical findings. 
2.2 Relevant debates in Sociology of Professions and 
Medical Sociology 
2.2.1 Professions as an evolving concept 
The empirical focus of this study was the enactment of the 
commissioning role by doctors. Relevant literature was located in 
medical sociology which was in turn located in the field of SoP. 
The term “profession” has traditionally included those occupations 
which are both knowledge and service based, and into which 
individuals are admitted after higher/further education and the 
completion of further specific vocational training/experience. 
However, the concept of “profession” is contested and shifting, and 
has historical dimensions. 
Early sociologists conceptualised professions as occupations that 
helped to maintain a stable social order by conforming to a shared 
value system. Tawney (1921) conceived of a community focus that 
acted as a counterbalance to individualism. Carr-Saunders and 
Wilson (1933) described professionalism as a force for stability and 
freedom that mitigated the encroachment of new emerging public 
and private bureaucracies. In this early period professions were 
regarded as having shared normative values focused on serving the 
“common good” (Evetts, 2003). The field continued to develop, and 
by the 1950s and 1960s academics were treating professions as a 
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“socially-grounded normative order” (Dingwall and Lewis, 1983:p2). 
Professionals formed moral communities (Durkheim, 1957) that 
willingly complied with that community’s terms of engagement. 
Functional links between the professions and the rest of society 
were made, most famously by Talcott Parsons (1951) who argued 
that capitalism, social order, and the professions were all 
interrelated in order to maintain the stability of a values-based 
social order. This consensus that the professions were orientated 
towards the common good, and a force for social stability was not to 
endure however. 
The focus of SoP changed in the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting the 
move in sociology as a whole to a more critical position. Professions 
were understood to be powerful, privileged, self-interested 
monopolies. Critical theorists (Freidson, 1970a, Freidson, 1970b, 
Johnson, 1972, Larson, 1977) argued that professions achieved 
dominance within their sphere(s) and could act with autonomy. 
Johnson described professionalism as a successful ideology which 
had entered the political vocabulary of a wide range of occupational 
groups in their claims and competition for status and income 
(Johnson, 1972:p32). Larson (1977) devised the concept of the 
‘professional project’. The outcome of the successful professional 
project was a ‘monopoly of competence legitimised by officially 
sanctioned “expertise”, and a monopoly of credibility with the public’ 
(Larson, 1977:p38). Later Abbott (1988) would develop the idea of 
professions protecting their own interests by controlling their own 
jurisdictions. In this period, the idea of “professionalism” as a 
normative value serving the common good was viewed with 
scepticism. Instead, professions and the concept of professionalism 
began to be understood as an ideology used to protect the interests 
of the powerful elites that constituted the profession’s membership 
(Evetts, 2003). 
In the mid-1980s, there was a shift away from this idea of 
professions promoting their own interests. Instead sociologists 
began to describe an attrition of autonomy and dominance. (Allsop 
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and Mulcahy, 1996, Freidson, 1988, Harrison, 1999, Harrison and 
Ahmad, 2000, Mechanic, 1991). Professions appeared to be less 
able to exercise occupational control of work (Freidson, 1994) or to 
retain control over regulation (Macdonald, 1995). Evetts (2003) 
summarised the shift as a time when professions became 
responsive rather than pro-active: 
“More generally, it has turned out that radical governments could 
successfully challenge the professions. Professions do sometimes 
initiate projects and influence governments but as often professions 
are responding to external demands for change, which can be 
political, economic, cultural and social”. (Evetts, 2003:p403) 
This was a change in the nature of the relationship between the 
professions and the state. 
This, along with an expansion of knowledge-based occupations 
(Murphy, 1988), contributed to a reassessment of the concepts of 
professions and professionalism by scholars in the 1990s. Evetts 
(2003, 2006) argued that it was during this period that there was 
an epistemological change in that “professionalism” replaced 
“professions” as a valued concept. The adoption of the concept of 
“professionalism” across a wide range of occupations was used to 
encourage normative behaviour amongst workers. Professionalism 
in the workplace implied compliance with external controls, and it 
was on this basis that an increasing number of occupations, 
including that of managers, now aspired to be described as 
professional: 
“[Professionalism] is used increasingly as a marketing device in 
advertising to appeal to customers (Fournier, 1998) and it is used 
in mission statements and organizational aims and objectives to 
motivate employees. It is an attractive prospect for an occupation 
to be considered a profession and for occupational workers to be 
identified as professionals”. (Evetts, 2003:p396) 
The aspiration of workers to be labelled “professional” created an 
appeal that facilitated a values-driven compliance with 
organisational bureaucratic, hierarchical and managerial controls 
such as performance targets, accountability frameworks and other 
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such mechanisms. The term “professionalism” had become a 
values-based normative force with an impact on the behaviour of 
workers. 
This shift in meaning underpinned a new analysis of traditional 
middle-class professions and their attitude to their own market 
position and interests. Scholars proposed that professions could be 
public value orientated whilst also maintaining their own interests. 
Saks (1995) argued that the pursuit of self-interest and public 
interest were compatible endeavours. Freidson (1994, 2001) argued 
that professionalism had its own logic which had distinct advantages 
over market and bureaucratic forms of control. Professions were 
less able to secure occupational controls over their practice and 
knowledge-base (Freidson, 1994) and were subject to increasingly 
neo-liberal bureaucratic controls such as “strict organizational 
regimes, with planning and control, performance measurement, 
quality models, strategic frameworks, and divisional structures” 
(Noordegraaf, 2007:p776). All professions, including that of 
medicine, increasingly undertook management roles. Llewellyn 
(2001) introduced a metaphor of “two-way window” to describe this 
role duality; individual professional managers were required to face 
into two worlds simultaneously. The term “hybridisation” has 
become the more common descriptor used by scholars to describe 
this emerging and complex development (Kirkpatrick et al., 2009, 
McGivern et al., 2015, Noordegraaf, 2007, Waring and Currie, 
2009). 
In summary then, the debates in SoP relate to the contested and 
evolving concept of “profession” itself, and the organisational 
contexts in which professions operate. Early sociologists argued that 
the existence of the traditional professional groups served to 
maintain a stable social order and formed moral communities. This 
shifted in the 1970s and 1980s when critical theorists cast 
professions as dominant elites who protected and promoted their 
own interests. This has shifted again since the mid-1980s with the 
advent of managerialism and an associated attrition of professional 
19 
 
influence, and autonomy. There has been a shift in the 
epistemology of “profession” from a community of members (which 
may or may not protect its own interests), to “professionalism” as a 
behaviour that is compliant with organisational and political 
expectations. Scholars have argued that as a result new roles and 
hierarchies have developed in response. Key amongst these are 
hybrid forms of manager-professionals who operate in new 
hierarchies. Of interest in this thesis is how these new roles are 
enacted, and what their impact is on the wider network of 
professionals. The empirical focus of this thesis is medicine. The 
next section is a discussion of how these debates in SoP have been 
positioned in the intellectual field of Medical Sociology. 
2.2.2 GPs as commissioners in Medical Sociology 
GPs through consultations, referrals, and prescriptions have always 
allocated NHS resources. The explicit alignment of this, with cost-
control was first introduced in the fundholding scheme, and has 
continued in commissioning policies ever since. This explicit link 
between clinical practice and financial management is an example of 
hybrid doctor-manager role; the development of which has taken 
place over a period of decades. 
“Numerous evaluations” of primary care commissioning have taken 
place (Smith et al., 2005 p1397 - 1399). These have, however, 
focused on process and organisation (Coulter, 1995, Curry et al., 
2008, Greener and Mannion, 2006, Greener and Mannion, 2008, 
Mannion, 2008, Mannion, 2011, Smith et al., 2004, Williams et al., 
1997). By contrast, we know very little about the experience of GPs 
as enactors of this new role as it has developed. 
In this section, I trace the development of commissioning, and 
reflect on how this links to debates in SoP. The importance of the 
historical context in order to understand current issues and 
dynamics in healthcare is widely recognised (Harrison and Ahmad, 
2000, Harrison and Lim, 2003, Mannion, 2008, Miller et al., 2012). 
As already described in the introduction to this chapter, I embarked 
20 
 
on this thesis intending to use SIT (Alford, 1975); a widely used 
heuristic in Medical Sociology (Currie et al., 2012), in order to 
explore the relationships of doctors and management. Whilst SIT 
was developed in the US, it has been applied to the English NHS 
over a twenty-eight year period (Allsop, 1984, Checkland et al., 
2009b, Ham, 1981, North, 1995, North and Peckham, 2001, 
Wistow, 1992). Its repeated use over time means that it provides a 
chronological thread to explore the developing relationship between 
management and doctors, specifically GPs in later applications. 
SIT was first articulated in Robert Alford‘s Healthcare Politics: 
Ideological and Interest Group Barriers to Reform (1975). It was 
empirically situated in the US private health insurance model of 
healthcare, and of its time sociologically. Written in the critical 
theory period of SoP, Alford saw doctors as a professional elite 
operating with structurally embedded dominance. Management or 
bureaucratic interventions were an attempt to delimit and 
rationalise this dominance. The data was a retrospective analysis of 
the reports of a series of commissions of investigation on New York 
City’s hospitals between 1950 and 1970 (p.xiii). Alford argued that 
doctors and the bureaucrats who sought to control them each 
pursued their own interests whilst at the same time repressing the 
interests of patients. He argued that this repression was constructed 
through a dynamic triangle of relationships in which doctors were 
dominant (“professional monopolisers”), the managers attempted to 
assert power over doctors through standardisation and bureaucracy 
(“corporate rationalisers”), and in the process patients’ interests 
were repressed. Alford formed arguments that were almost certainly 
influenced by contemporaneous thinking in sociology and political 
science. Niskanen (1971) had recently produced his seminal text in 
which he argued that bureaucrats served their own interests by 
maximising their own utility. Five years earlier Eliot Freidson had 
published two important works (Freidson, 1970a, Freidson, 1970b) 
in which he had argued that professions occupied a position of 
dominance, conferred by the state, and asserted without effort: 
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“The foundation on which the analysis of a profession must be 
based is its relationship to the ultimate source of power and 
authority in modern society – the state. In the case of medicine, 
much, but by no means all, of the profession’s strength is based on 
legally supported monopoly over practice.” (Freidson, 1970b:p83)  
Freidson’s work in the same period almost certainly contributed to 
Alford’s un-evidenced assumption of medical dominance within the 
healthcare context, and Niskanen’s to his negative opinion of 
bureaucrats as self-legitimising and self-justifying. In line with the 
contemporaneous concept of “professions as ideology” (Evetts, 
2003) the emphasis was on how doctors achieved and maintained 
dominance through strategies such as the commodification of 
sickness (Johnson and Ruane, 1977, Navarro, 1978). 
When SIT was used again it was six years later in England in the 
context of a social insurance healthcare model. Here, scholars took 
a more positive view about the contribution of managers. Where 
Alford had cast “bureaucrats” as self-serving and self-legitimising, in 
England the intervention of managers was seen by policy makers 
and academics alike as a desirable and necessary development. The 
NHS had been introduced in 1948. Up until and through the 1970s 
the NHS had administrators (not managers) who had a “diplomatic” 
role to provide support to the doctors who were uncontestably in 
charge (Harrison, 1982, Harrison and Lim, 2003). Some six years 
after Alford, Ham (1981) published a study which used SIT to 
describe the power dynamics in an acute hospital. He argued that 
doctors dominated resource allocation processes, and that money 
was spent according to their interests, both in terms of their 
personal remuneration and also the prioritisation of services to be 
funded. He argued that the rationalising effect of management was 
a desirable challenge to the self-interested actions of doctors. 
Ham was supportive of contemporaneous public policy. The Griffiths 
Report (1983) introduced a general management function, including 
the creation of Chief Executive equivalent positions at district, 
regional, and hospital level, as well as an objective setting and 
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performance review cycle, and mechanisms for budget 
management. Following the introduction of general management 
SIT was again used as a framework to analyse its impact. Allsop 
(1984) described general management as a new corporate 
rationaliser: 
“.....politicians, administrators, at central and local level, and some 
professionals whose main objective is to achieve greater co-
ordination and integration of health services, and to achieve 
improvements in the planning and delivery of health services.” 
(Allsop, 1984:p9) 
Like Ham before, Allsop was pro-management and supportive of the 
introduction of rational planning and increased national 
coordination. 
Despite the introduction of these new managerial arrangements, 
medical power and autonomy remained a live issue in health service 
policy and research during the 1980s and early 1990s, with 
consensus that the powerful dominance of the profession needed to 
be curbed (Coburn, 1993, Gabe et al., 1994, Harrison et al., 1989, 
Hunter, 1991, Hunter, 1994, Willis, 1983).From the mid-1990s 
onwards if and how this dominance could be limited became the 
prominent problem with which scholars engaged. They concluded 
that despite the Griffiths reforms medical autonomy remained in 
place (Gorsky, 2013, Harrison, 1988, Macfarlane et al., 2012, Pollitt 
et al., 1991), summarised below: 
“Although general management has been widely accepted in the 
service, and seems to have resulted in some improvements to 
management processes, there has been no substantial change in 
organizational culture. We conclude that the impact of the Griffiths 
model of management has been limited in comparison with the 
continued influence of medical autonomy and financial limitations” 
(Pollitt et al., 1991:p61) 
If the Griffith’s reforms had not succeeded in curbing medical 
dominance then other solutions would be tried. During the 1990s 
new mechanisms to increase the accountability of doctors were 
introduced. One of these was the first involvement of GPs in 
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procuring healthcare for their patients. In 1991, the GP Fundholding 
scheme commenced as one element of an internal market (1990) 
which separated out purchasers (GP fundholders and health 
authorities) from providers (hospitals and other healthcare 
organisations). Fundholding, and its variants multi-funds and non-
fundholding, was intended to incentivise GPs to control demand for 
services by allowing them to retain savings generated as a result of 
their proactive management of referral and prescribing levels. The 
link between GPs’ clinical practice and the NHS budget became a 
matter of policy. SIT was applied once more by Nancy North (1995) 
in the first of a number of applications of SIT to the changing 
relationship between doctors and management in primary care. In 
North’s analysis GPs, through the mechanism of fundholding, were 
now the corporate rationalisers. In other words previously dominant 
doctors were now occupying a rationalising role, in an early example 
of a hybrid role that encouraged the ‘colonization’ of managerial 
priorities in professional practice (Ackroyd et al., 2007, Currie and 
Croft, 2015). For North, the Department of Health was now 
dominant in a new era of centralised control. 
In 1997 there was a change of government, and Tony Blair became 
Prime Minister. The hallmark of the early Blair period was the 
standardisation of the quality and range of health services, for 
example through the use of targets, national service frameworks, 
and national clinical guidelines. This standardisation programme was 
set out in the white paper The New NHS; Modern and Dependable 
(Department of Health, 1997). The Conservative’s market-based 
fundholding scheme was abolished in 1998, but the enduring project 
of GP -hybrids had begun. One of the intentions was the 
delimitation of medical autonomy (Allsop, 2006, Checkland and 
Harrison, 2010, Dixon-Woods et al., 2011, Harrison and Lim, 2003, 
Kuhlmann et al., 2013, Salter, 2007) which would be addressed by 
involving doctors in guiding and regulating their own colleagues in 
partnership with general managers. 
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During the subsequent three terms of the Blair government, three 
different arrangements were put in place. The first of these, Primary 
Care Groups (PCGs), was ostensibly focused on the quality of 
primary care itself rather than commissioning secondary care 
(Department of Health, 1998, Secretary of State for Health, 1997). 
North and Peckham (2001) once more used SIT to analyse the 
structural relationship between doctors and management. PCGs 
included designated roles for executive GPs including responsibility 
for the control of indicative prescribing budgets for a group of 
constituent practices. For the first time some GPs were “policing” 
(p432) others in a move to delimit clinical autonomy. This had the 
potential to extend to other clinical matters such as clinical 
governance. The term “fledgling corporate rationalisers” (p429) was 
used to encapsulate this incorporation of management duties into 
the role of lead GPs. 
Even though PCGs were to be relatively short-lived, the precedent 
for management of the profession by the profession was 
established. Health Authorities were abolished on 31st March 2002. 
The second arrangement during the Blair period for engaging GPs in 
management was Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). These were new 
statutory bodies which inherited secondary care commissioning 
duties from health authorities, and responsibilities for direct service 
provision from community trusts. Each PCT had a Professional 
Executive Committee including, and usually led by, GPs. In the early 
days of PCTs, GPs did not hold budgets as in fundholding - now 
considered to be inequitable due to its voluntary nature and to incur 
high transaction costs. At this point GPs were involved in 
commissioning, rather than accountable for it. 
In somewhat of volte-face (Mannion, 2008 p718) the third 
arrangement for GP engagement in management during the Blair 
government was introduced. Practice Based Commissioning (PBC) 
(Department of Health, 2004) was a policy intended to put GPs in 
control of resource allocation, and GPs, as in fundholding, were 
transparently accountable for the costs of their referrals. PBC was 
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enacted using a new payment system called Payment by Results 
(PbR) (Department of Health, 2002) where hospitals were paid for 
completed activity rather than paid a pre-negotiated block sum. SIT 
was applied again (Checkland et al., 2009b) to explore the impact of 
PBC and PbR. GPs reported that hospital doctors and managers had 
colluded to maximise income under PbR and were “gaming” (p615). 
Staff were being encouraged to code clinical activity in ways that 
would produce higher payments to the hospital. Checkland et al. 
argued that power structures were no longer differentiated into 
doctors and managers. Rather, hospitals were dominant and PCTs, 
doctors and managers together, provided rationalising challenge. 
The dominant-challenger dynamic had changed: 
“In this article we abandon this implicit assumption that 
professional monopolists and corporate rationalisers are immutable 
analytical categories, thereby liberating us to ask more general 
questions about structural interests.” (Checkland et al., 
2009b:p610) 
This was a disruption of the SIT triangle of doctors, managers, and 
patients in a relationship of dominance, challenge, and repression. 
In empirical terms, the implication is that the structural mechanism 
that separated doctors from managers no longer existed. In 
response to centrally organised policies significant changes to the 
role of doctors had become established and embedded. As a result, 
commissioning doctors appeared to be aligned structurally to their 
respective organisations in management relationships, rather than 
collegiately to their profession. 
This adoption of management roles by GPs was a similar process of 
hybridisation to that which was occurring in other branches of 
medicine and other professions (Kitchener, 2000, Kuhlmann et al., 
2013, Noordegraaf, 2007). Scholars began to describe the onset of 
entrepreneurial forms of clinical engagement (McDonald, 2009, 
McDonald et al., 2009a, McDonald et al., 2008). Managers and 
doctors combined to regulate the profession. (Davies and Harrison, 
2003, Harrison and Lim, 2003, Kirkpatrick et al., 2008, Kitchener, 
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2000). New leadership structures had developed within the 
profession based on internally organised hierarchies. Lead doctors 
joined with managers to guide and monitor the “rank-and-file” in a 
process of restratification (McDonald et al., 2009b, Sheaff et al., 
2002). Even though new forms were being described in Medical 
Sociology, there remained a tendency to focus on the “what?” 
rather than “why?” or “how?” Scholars have called for a move away 
from this and its attendant focus on dominance and the challenge to 
dominance in a continuation of the use of a conflict model 
(Kuhlmann and Von Knorring, 2014, Numerato et al., 2012). 
Thomas and Hewitt (2011) as a result of a study of a CCG in the 
North West of England have specifically argued that a more nuanced 
approach is needed that shifts from the conflict model to a 
consideration of why GPs did or did not engage in management 
tasks, and how they interpreted their new roles. 
Two papers that do consider the experience of GPs use evidence 
from the same dataset. The National Primary Care Research and 
Development Centre (NPCRDC) published a Department of Health 
funded evaluation of PBC based on data collected in five PBC 
consortia in 2007. Methods included observations, interviews, and 
document analysis. In a NPCRDC report Practice-based 
Commissioning: theory, implementation, and outcome, Coleman et 
al (2009) explored why GPs would or would not engage in 
commissioning. The importance of personal aspiration was 
identified: 
“A necessary condition ……is for GPs to ‘buy in’ to the concept of 
going beyond their traditional roles.” (Coleman et al., 2009:p18) 
The researchers identified that this “buy-in” could be created by a 
combination of direct and indirect incentives including, importantly, 
the opportunity to create and develop services. In a separate paper, 
Coleman et al. (2010) reanalysed the same data using SP to 
examine how actors interpreted the commissioning role. The 
authors concluded that local histories or “legacies” were a major 
determinant in how policy changes were interpreted and enacted. 
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Previous experiences of commissioning especially fundholding, and 
the relationship with the local authority were identified as legacies 
that affected the enactment of PBC. 
It is important to better understand the experiences and 
motivations of GPs as they commission. To this end, ethnographic 
studies, such as the one presented in this thesis, become 
increasingly relevant. In the next section I discuss how questions 
were devised from SoP and Medical Sociology in order to orientate 
the study. 
2.2.3 The identification of research questions 
Drawing on the preceding review, in the next paragraphs I 
extrapolate issues from SoP and Medical Sociology in order identify 
research questions. These are in the areas of changes to the 
profession, and history and legacy. 
2.2.3.1 Changes to the profession 
As with the other traditional professions, in medicine the appeal of 
“professionalism” (Evetts, 2003) had facilitated a move to compliant 
behaviours responding to the expectations of employing 
organisations. According to the literature, two major adaptations to 
accommodate and reinforce this change were the emergence of 
hybridised doctor-managers, and a re-stratification in the 
organisation of the profession into a hierarchy of leaders and rank-
and-file. 
GPs are expected to enact the unique management role of 
commissioning. Not only are they required to manage their own 
services, but they also have responsibilities in the planning and 
procurement of secondary care health services. In order to gain 
insight into the experience and motivations of doctors as they enact 
these roles, a number of questions can be extrapolated from the 
literature including: 
 What is the impact of hybridisation, restratification, and the 
delimitation of autonomy in combination?  
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 Are all doctors making sense of these changes in a similar 
and/or compatible way?  
 Why have leadership structures evolved as they have, and 
what do they depend upon for their legitimacy?  
 “Buy-in” (Coleman et al., 2009) is important, but how is this 
secured and nurtured?  
2.2.3.2 History and legacy 
Academics have recognised the importance of analysing the 
historical development of commissioning. GPs appear to have 
formed legacies which inform their approach to enactment. Coleman 
et al. (2010) have argued that previous experience of 
commissioning reaching back as far as fundholding in the 1990s is a 
major influence in how GPs interpret their commissioning duties 
when new organisational forms are introduced. In order to gain 
insight into the impact of commissioning legacies, the following 
questions are relevant: 
 Why is history important and how does it influence how GPs 
decide to act in the future? 
 How do legacies interlink with sociological arguments 
regarding changes to the profession? 
Changes to the profession, and history and legacy, became the 
basis of that element of my coding structure derived from Medical 
Sociology, discussed further in Chapter 3: Methodology and 
Methods. They, along with three empirically derived codes (see 
3.5.3.1.2) combined into the first of two over-arching research 
question used to focus of the study: 
 Why and how do GPs commission in the way that they do? 
My next step was to determine the theoretical approach to the 
exploration of these areas. This is the topic of the next section. 
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2.3 Selecting the theoretical framework 
As early findings emerged it became evident that an analysis based 
on SIT would not facilitate the telling of the story that was 
beginning to be revealed in the data. It increasingly appeared that 
groups of doctors interpreted the requirement to commission 
differently, evidenced in a heterogeneous pattern of adoption of 
changes to the profession’s structure. These differences correlated 
to differences in historical relationships and experiences. I needed 
to use a framework that would integrate an interpretivist and a 
structural analysis. This process of data-analysis which led to this 
research decision is described fully in Chapter 3: Methodology and 
Methods. 
The first step was to explore the use of a major integrating 
framework in the area of Institutional Theory. This proved to be an 
important step towards identifying the framework that I would 
ultimately use. Scott, in his seminal work Institutions, and 
Organizations; Ideas, Interests, and Identities (2014[1995]), 
proposed an integrated model organised as three pillars of 
institutions. Each pillar represented a distinct element within an 
overarching framework. His composite definition for these pillars 
reads: 
“Institutions comprise regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life.” p56 
Within this definition he has identified three concepts – regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive – upon which his framework is 
based. Scott’s model was created by reviewing the work of 
institutional theorists, and organising their contributions into the 
three pillars. In the paragraphs below, I briefly define Scott’s three 
pillars, before critiquing his model with regard to its usefulness in 
the context of my own study. 
The regulative pillar (p59-64) refers to those institutional 
processes designed to set rules, and to monitor and/or sanction 
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activities. Sanctioning processes may be informal (shaming, 
shunning) or formal and assigned to specialist roles. Examples of 
formal processes in the healthcare context would be financial and 
clinical audit processes, professional regulation, and statutory policy 
requirements. Formal rule systems operate through obligation, 
precision, and delegation. The primary mechanism of control in 
these systems is coercion. In reality, though, incentives are used. 
Individuals conform to laws and rules in pursuit of attendant 
rewards, or the avoidance of penalties. The institutional logic 
underpinning the regulative pillar is an instrumental one. 
The Normative Pillar (p64-66) refers to those processes that both 
define goals or objectives and also how they should be enacted. The 
normative pillar includes value-based conceptions of “the preferred” 
or “the desirable”. Rules can be normative, in that they are 
prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory. They define legitimate 
means to pursue goals or interests. Some values and norms apply 
to the whole collectivity, whilst others may apply only to certain 
groups. This is the basis of specialist roles, and role construction 
which can be formal (for example a job description) or informal (for 
example sharing out chores in a family). Normative systems are 
usually thought of as constraining behaviour, but they can also 
empower and enable social action. The institutional logic is one of 
appropriateness as opposed to the regulative logic of 
instrumentality. 
The Cultural-Cognitive Pillar (p66–70) refers to those shared 
conceptions that create the frames through with meaning is made. 
This pillar relates to the internal representation of a person’s 
environment. Symbols – words, meanings, gestures – shape the 
meanings we attribute to objects and activities. Meanings arise in 
interaction and can also be maintained and transformed. For Scott, 
cognitive related to information-processing activities such as 
evaluations, judgments, predictions, and inferences. Cognitive 
processes span a wide array of information-handling functions. 
These include: determining what information will receive attention; 
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how it will be encoded; how it will be retained, retrieved, and 
organised into memory; and how it will be interpreted. The cultural 
element of the pillar refers to those symbolic systems that are 
considered to be external to individual actors. Cultural theorists 
differ from normative theorists in that rather than stressing 
obligation, they point to templates and scripts for action. 
Scott’s model went some way to addressing the deficits that I had 
identified by using a structural theory. It was an integrating theory 
which enabled an analysis with a structural and interpretivist 
distinction. The regulative pillar would enable me to consider the 
impact on structures that resulted from the new rules in HSCA 
2012. The normative pillar would enable me to consider the impact 
of a changing profession. The cognitive-cultural pillar would allow 
me to consider the impact of local histories and interpretations by 
individual actors. 
However as I attempted to apply Scott’s model, I became 
increasingly dissatisfied with its usefulness in the context of my 
study. This was for two reasons. The first was that it felt contrived 
to separate normative and cognitive-cultural forces in this study. 
The changes affecting the profession were too closely coupled with 
the processes of local interpretation. I was trying to make a device 
work for its own sake rather than for the purposes of telling the 
story of the lives of the GPs in the study. The second reason was 
that I was increasingly recognising the importance of networks, and 
the pattern of those networks within and across the three levelled 
field. The nested nature of my analysis included a landscape of 
interrelated networks. I needed a way to map the relationships 
between groups within levels, and across levels. What’s more, 
networks appeared dynamic, forming and reforming, as new rules 
were enacted. I needed to add networks into the analytic weave. 
During the period in which I considered Institutional Theory, I found 
an article by Jens Beckert How Do Fields Change? The Interrelations 
of Institutions, Networks, and Cognition in the Dynamics of Markets 
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(2010). Beckert integrated rules, networks, and cognitive frames 
into one framework. The following section is a critical review of BF, 
including considerations of how I might contribute to its 
development. 
2.4 Beckert’s Framework 
Beckert is a German scholar whose academic interest is in the area 
of economic sociology. In order to better understand the dynamics 
of markets, Beckert developed a framework predicated on the 
“irreducibility” of three “structural forces” (p606) – networks, 
institutions, and cognition. The essence of his hypothesis, in his own 
words, is: 
I argue that networks, institutions, and cognitive frames are 
irreducible and that one important source of market dynamics 
stems from their interrelations. The structures lead to the 
stratification of fields by positioning actors in more or less powerful 
positions. At the same time, actors gain resources from their 
position which they can use to influence institutions, network 
structures, and cognitive frames. To simultaneously consider all 
three social forces in market fields and their reciprocal influences 
allows us to consider their interrelations as sources of field 
dynamics. While it might be useful to distinguish the three 
structural forces analytically, any approach that does not take into 
account all the forces influencing action remains necessarily 
incomplete in its analysis and is in danger of drawing a distorted 
picture of the embeddedness of economic action and the dynamics 
of market fields. (Beckert, 2010:p606) 
Beckert’s was a conceptual rather than an empirical project. His 
intention was to describe the dynamics within markets, and thus to 
address the inadequacies of a segmented approach which, he 
argued, can at best only ever give an obscure picture. A change in 
one of the forces will lead to changes in the others, forming 
constant momentum, through a system of mutual influence (p608). 
In the article, the argument is established through a critique of 
perspectives that have either focused on or prioritised one of the 
forces, and thus not explored the dynamics of their mutual 
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influence. He made his case in two ways. Firstly, he criticised those 
approaches that focused on one of the structures and thus 
neglected the others, for example network analysts paid scant 
regard to the impact of formal institutions; and historical 
institutionalists and cultural analysts underestimated network 
structures; structural determinism did not do justice to agency and 
so on. Secondly, he criticised attempts at integration where the 
distinct separateness of the structures was lost in the process, for 
example the integration of cognitive frames into sociological 
institutionalism had conflated institutions and cognitive frames. 
Beckert argued that it is by understanding social networks, 
institutions, and cognitive frames as individually distinct whilst in a 
dynamic relationship with an irreducible mutual impact that the 
“multidimensionality of social structures” (p608) could be 
understood. It is these interrelations that, Beckert argued, are 
disrupted and reshaped during times of change. In particular he was 
interested in how these forces act to both destabilise and stabilise 
markets as they “emerge, reproduce and change” (p605). In order 
to make it possible to conceptualise his argument, Beckert used the 
mechanism of “field” (Bourdieu, 2005, DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, 
Fligstein, 2001, Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, Lewin). In broad 
terms, a field was a way to conceptualise a boundaried arena of 
social and occupational interaction “where actors develop mutual 
expectations with regard to each other’s behaviour” (Beckert, 
2010:p609). Chapter Four: Introduction to the empirical chapters; 
Castlefield as a “field” includes a description of the use of “field” in 
this thesis. Having first presented his ideas in the abstract, Beckert  
then tested his own concept by considering it in relation to two 
field-based scenarios. The first was post war German banking and 
the emergence of shareholder value, where he drew on Beyer and 
Höpner’s (2003) analysis of changes to capitalist market 
arrangements. Beckert argued that institutional reforms (new 
permissions encouraged sell-off of stocks owned by companies), 
cognitive orientation (towards shareholder value) and changes in 
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network structures (decoupling of the financial sector with industry 
and societal concerns) resulted in a changed financial sector, and a 
dismantling of the arrangements that bound industrial firms, banks 
and insurance companies together. The second was the 
transformation of American industry from the use of an expansion 
model primarily based on vertical integration to one primarily based 
on diversification, drawing on Fligstein’s account (Fligstein, 1990, 
Fligstein, 1991). A change in cognitive frame (diversification would 
lead to new markets), institutional changes (The 1950 Celler 
Kefauver Act made mergers that increased concentration of 
business lines illegal), and the resulting changes in inter-firm 
networks resulted in diversification as the main expansion model. 
Searches of Scopus (Elsevier) and Web of Science databases (latest 
access 23rd September 2015) yielded fifty separate citations of 
Beckert’s paper; a clear indication that the framework is attracting 
scholarly interest. Whilst BF may be gaining traction, it remains 
relatively new and its limitations and areas for potential 
development were as yet unidentified. 
BF was predicated on the argument that it was essential to 
eliminate the conflation of cognitive frames, networks, and 
institutions. If this analytic distinction was core to the framework, 
then it would be crucial to have clarity on the separate and distinct 
nature of the categories. Whilst this may be the case, it was an 
aspect of the framework that Beckert left open for further 
development. He considered the categories only briefly, each one 
discussed in one or two paragraphs (p610). Network structures 
were the spatial relationship between both organisations and 
individual actors. Institutions were those regulative institutional 
rules which allowed and supported some behaviours whilst 
discouraging others. Cognitive frames were ways to mentally 
organise the social environment, and operated as a source for cue 
extraction for sensemaking. A further insight was his substitution of 
the term cognitive frame with “local cultures”. 
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“This understanding of markets as fields encompasses 
conceptualizations that view markets as realms of interaction 
structured by institutions or by networks or by local cultures” 
(Beckert, 2010:p609) 
The outline nature of Beckert’s definitions left open an opportunity 
for subsequent scholars to sharpen them through empirical testing. 
Beckert’s own application of his framework was at the macro-level 
of market dynamics. The retrospective nature of the application 
resulted in a static quality. BF required testing in organisational 
settings in order that its dynamic nature might be more fully 
understood. 
My next step was to explore if and how the framework had 
developed since its original publication. Thus far authors of two 
papers have applied BF empirically. The first application is in 
Evolutions in the Literary Field: The co-constructive forces of 
institutions, cognitions and networks (Childress, 2011). This was a 
retrospective application of the framework to a development in the 
publishing industry. Childress examined the circumstances where 
Andrew Wiley, the literary agent, launched Odyssey Editions. This 
caused upheaval and conflict in the publishing world, especially in 
terms of whether pre-existing publication rights on back titles would 
still remain with those publishing houses that had rights to hard 
copy printing. In his use of BF Childress redefined the three analytic 
categories (p117). Cognition was defined as “evolving roles”. 
Institutions became “industry wide norms and patterns of belief”. 
For networks he drew on Granovetter’s (1985) “institutional 
embeddedness” concept where actors are both socially networked, 
and atomised and rationally self-interested at the same time. The 
second application was A qualitative and quantitative evaluation of 
the Advancing Quality pay-for-performance programme in the NHS 
North West (McDonald et al., 2015). This was a study of the 
implementation of programme to align financial incentives with 
hospital performance at 24 hospitals. In this application, recognising 
the need for analytic clarity, the authors began by defining the 
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categories. In the original BF the term “social network” (p605) was 
used to describe the position that organisations and individual 
actors occupy in a space; the focus being on networks where actors 
had personal contact, and where conversations could influence 
decision making. McDonald et al. extended this definition to include 
networks based on interdependency of function where the actors 
may well never meet or speak to each other. Beckert’s use of the 
term “institution” referred to external regulatory and legal 
frameworks which served to boundary the actions of individuals and 
organisations. McDonald et al. extended this definition to also 
include other formal rules such as directives associated with 
initiatives and policies. The term “institutions” was replaced by 
“rules” (p16). Beckert’s definition of cognitive frame (the mental 
organisation of the social environment) was not altered. The 
application of this adapted version of BF allowed the authors to 
show that new rules required new network structures, and that 
these interacted with existing network structures. In terms of 
cognitive frames, the focus was on what type of activity was 
required to achieve a shift in the way that people thought. The 
authors found that shifts in cognitive frames depended on 
discussions and the opportunity for actors to re-conceptualise. Part 
of this process was enacted through new networks, such as a 
collaborative learning events. The effect of emotion on cognitive 
frame was also explored; supportive emotionally based relationships 
with colleagues in a parent organisation in the United States were 
shown to have had a positive impact on confidence of actors 
implementing the AQ rule, and also the transparent sharing of 
comparative scores had an emotional impact producing increased 
levels of motivation to succeed. 
Table 1 below summarises the different definitions that have so far 
been used in BF. 
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Table 1 Definitions of Beckert's analytic categories 
Analytic Category Beckert (2010) Childress (2011) McDonald (2015) 
Institution/Rule External regulatory 
and legal 
frameworks which 
serve to boundary 
the actions of 
individuals and 
organisations.  
Changed the 
definition to 
“industry wide 
norms and 
patterns of belief” 
more akin with 
definitions of 
“cognitive frame” 
in Beckert and 
McDonald.  
Replaced the term 
institution with rule, 
and includes formal 
policies and 
directives as well as 
external regulatory 
rules.  
Cognition/Cognitive 
Frame 
The mental 
organisation of the 
social environment, 
and the way in 
which actors 
interpret structures 
in terms of the 
implications for 
their behaviour. 
Uses the phrase 
“evolving roles”. 
Concurred with 
Beckert with the 
addition of emotion 
as part of 
interpretive process, 
not just cognitive 
schema.  
Network The spatial 
relationship 
between both 
organisations and 
individual actors. 
Beckert uses the 
term “social 
network”, and 
refers to networks 
where actors have 
personal contact.  
The socialisation of 
individuals should 
be neither over nor 
under emphasised, 
rather actors are 
both socially 
networked, and 
atomised and 
rationally self-
interested at the 
same time. 
Extends the 
definition to include 
networks based on 
interdependency of 
function, where the 
actors may never 
meet or speak to 
each other. 
From these early applications it is evident that whilst ever analytic 
categories remain under defined the framework will be vulnerable to 
the re-conflation of the categories, the distinction between which is 
at the core of Beckert’s argument. Childress in particular has 
undermined the framework by replacing Beckert’s definition of 
institution as monitoring and regulatory arrangements, with a 
behaviourally based concept including “norms and patterns of belief” 
similar to the normative pillar in Scott’s (1995, 2014) model of 
institutions. For Beckert this would fall within the definition of 
cognitive frame. McDonald’s substitution of “rule” is a helpful 
clarification, serving to mitigate potential confusion arising from the 
various uses of “institution” in academic and simple descriptive 
writing. For the purposes of this thesis, the term “rule” is adopted. 
In the above paragraphs I have argued that the usefulness of BF is 
dependent on the clarity and depth of the definitions of its analytic 
categories, and have shown how those definitions have been 
interpreted by subsequent scholars. I have indicated that I intend to 
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adopt Macdonald et al.’s (2015) definition of institution and to 
substitute the term “rule”. In addition, the definition of “network” to 
mean spatial relationships based on interdependency of function is 
one that I will adopt without further adaptation. It is the category 
“cognitive frame” that I intend to problematise in this thesis, as 
Beckert’s own definition is based on a number of assumptions that 
require empirical testing. First of these is the assumption that, at 
times of change, actors follow “social norms” and adopt “how-to” 
(p610) behaviours in an obedient, uncomplicated manner. Extant 
evidence suggests that change is met with resistance especially 
when actors are faced with the requirement to reappraise 
organisational meaning (Labianca et al., 2000). A further 
assumption is that consensus exists regarding the direction of field 
change. In the case of commercial markets it may be the case that 
all actors concur on the desirability of growth and profitability. 
However, field changes in markets may not always mean the 
advancement of profit; and not all fields are profit-driven. Finally 
there was an assumption that actors will always pursue their own 
interests, linked to related assumptions that they would know how 
to do this. Each of these assumptions fall within the category of 
cognitive frame. BF could usefully be developed by a descriptive 
definition of this category. My study had the potential to contribute 
such a definition since my empirical questions (see section 2.2.3) 
were about the interpretation processes of GPs as they implemented 
the HSCA 2012. 
Having established my aim to make a theoretical contribution in the 
form of definitional anchorage and clarity to the analytic term 
cognitive frame in BF, my next step was to locate my starting point 
for this definition. This is the subject of the next section. 
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2.5 Cognitive frame and Sensemaking Perspective 
2.5.1 Sensemaking, networks and rules 
My starting point was Beckert’s own limited description. He argued 
that cognitive frames were rooted in concrete reality (Edelman et 
al., 1999, Jackson, 2005), that actors used “taken-for-granted” 
scripts (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and that these scripts reflected 
socially anchored cognitions (Dimaggio, 1997). These are however 
characteristics of a cognitive frame, not active interpretation 
processes. My aim was to define cognitive frame as a separate force 
constantly affected by and affecting networks and rules whilst 
remaining distinct and independent. Whilst Beckert’s case examples 
do not explore the processes connected with the mutability of 
cognitive frames, he does refer to Weick’s sensemaking (Weick, 
1995, Weick, 2000, Weick et al., 2005) as a theory which would 
account for it. 
Whilst my primary project is to extend BF, inherent in this is a 
corresponding contribution to ideas about sensemaking. I begin this 
by outlining the development and main tenets of the Weickian SP, 
including its properties, the type of occasions that trigger the 
process, and what makes sensemaking likely to fail or succeed. 
Weickian sensemaking is rooted in the work of earlier scholars. An 
early contributor was Garfinkel (1967) who used “sensemaking” to 
describe everyday practices of actors as they interacted, 
interpreted, and took account of their experiences. Also in the late 
sixties Polanyi (1967) used related terms of “sensegiving” and 
“sense-reading” to conceptualise how people gave meaning to the 
spoken word. Sensemaking was first proposed as a useful theory in 
organisational studies in the late 1960s (Maitlis and Christianson, 
2014) in Weick’s The Social Psychology of Organizing (1969). In this 
work sensemaking is described as process of response to often 
unexpected variations or discontinuities in events. Actors enter 
recursive cycles of discussion and/or actions in attempts to 
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determine the right way to respond to and enact the changes that 
they were experiencing. During the 1960s and 1970s, at the same 
time as SoP scholars began to challenge functionalist concepts that 
professions were driven by moral value, the wider sociological 
context was increasingly emphasising a social constructionist 
perspective (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), with a corresponding 
shift to a focus on cognitive processes. This was reflected in SP 
research as scholars began to focus on cognitive processes. Louis 
(1980) considered the concept of “surprise” as a violation of 
expectations that could trigger sensemaking. Kiesler and Sproull 
(1982) considered how stimuli from the environment were noticed, 
interpreted, and incorporated. Daft and Weick (1984) and Starbuck 
and Milliken (1988) considered the effect of “cues” and why some of 
these were noticed more than others. 
It was against this backdrop that Weick published his seminal work 
Sensemaking in Organizations (1995). In it he presents a summary 
of research to date, drawing on this to propose a sensemaking 
paradigm consisting of seven properties. These properties together, 
Weick suggests, enable action in a given context. First, 
sensemaking is linked to our identity. Who we understand ourselves 
to be, and how we relate to the world around us, is the source of 
how we make sense of the world. Secondly, for Weick, sensemaking 
is always retrospective. We understand our present experiences 
according to memories of past experiences, and we draw upon 
these for causal reasoning and expectations about future events 
when we are confronted by change. Thirdly, sensemaking is enacted 
and this is limited according to what we are able to perceive as 
sensible. The environment we inhabit, especially how we were 
socialised, will affect our ability to make sense. Fourthly, 
sensemaking is a social process dependent on the interaction and 
thought processes of individuals. Fifthly, sensemaking is ongoing 
and continuous; it happens in the midst of events. Sixthly, 
sensemaking is a process that builds on cues. Cues are filtered in a 
process that Weick calls “bracketing” where some cues are noticed 
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and others disregarded. We notice cues through sense and 
perception, and give them cognitive substance by speaking and 
writing. Seventhly, sensemaking is based on what is plausible rather 
than what is accurate. 
In Chapter 4 of Sensemaking in Organisations Weick identifies 
sensemaking triggers in the organisational context. The first of 
these is ambiguity, and the second is uncertainty. Weick argues that 
whilst both act as triggers, the mechanisms are different. Ambiguity 
creates confusion, a state where there is a lack of clarity and often 
high complexity. Ambiguity is associated with unclear goals 
resulting in difficulty in making sensible suppositions. Uncertainty, 
by contrast, is a state of ignorance (Milliken, 1990) resulting in an 
inability to predict due to lack of knowledge of other changes (state 
uncertainty), of impacts (effect uncertainty), or about how others 
will react (response uncertainty).To remove confusion from 
ambiguity, agents need clarified information (via social interaction), 
whilst more information is needed to counter uncertainty. 
In their review of organisational sensemaking Maitlis and 
Christianson (2014) provide an overview of what contributes to 
successful sensemaking in organisations. Some of these were 
especially relevant in the context of this study. Sensemaking is 
successful when actors are motivated to make or adopt changes. 
This happens most successfully when those leading change have 
made adaptations in their own roles and can convince others that 
the proposed changes are of value, acting as collaborative leaders 
and sensegivers (Denis et al., 1996, Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). It 
is in this way that new organisational order is created, and new 
strategies become plausible. Sensemaking and sensegiving can fail, 
and this can compromise the success of a strategic change 
initiative. In Yu et al.’s (2005) longitudinal study post-merger 
integration process in a large health care system showed that the 
senior team became preoccupied with too narrow a set of cues 
relating to administrative integration and allowed their attention to 
be distracted from patient care. Nag et al.’s (2007) study of an R&D 
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organisation showed a failure to adjust to a market-orientation 
because actors were so attached to the pre-existing organisational 
identity showing the difficulty in changing an approach to 
sensemaking. Another reason for failed sensemaking was described 
in Mantere al.’s (2012). In this study a proposed merger was 
abandoned after leaders had successfully convinced workers that 
the change was of value. In this case employees struggled to return 
to the status quo when the change program was cancelled.  
In the study, these sensemaking concepts, and the reasons for 
successful and failed sensemaking, would provide some of the basis 
upon which I would derive a definition of “cognitive frame”. I would 
also draw on three important critical reviews of SP that helped 
identify where my contribution would be positioned. These are 
discussed in the next section. 
2.5.2 Current debates in Sensemaking Perspective 
Since Weick first proposed his framework, sensemaking has 
developed in various directions. My starting point was to understand 
the current debates in sensemaking literature, specifically its 
application in organisational studies. My job in this respect was 
made easier in that three recent papers drew together the latest 
thinking about the uses, limits, and areas for further development of 
sensemaking (Brown et al., 2014, Maitlis and Christianson, 2014, 
Nag et al., 2007, Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015). Sensemaking 
literature is far from homogenous. The wide and varied academic 
interest means that theorising has become fragmented, and it is in 
response to this that these reviews were undertaken. There is not 
even agreement on whether sensemaking is a theory, a framework, 
or a perspective (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). Already and 
throughout this thesis I have adopted the term Sensemaking 
Perspective (SP). 
Brown, Colville and Pye (2014) published Making Sense of 
Sensemaking in Organization Studies in the journal Organization 
Studies. These authors aimed to understand the key debates that 
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“fracture the field” (p1). They based their review on the eight most 
cited papers with a key word “sensemaking” from the journal 
Organization Studies (Abolafia, 2010, Alvesson and Karreman, 
2001, Bolander and Sandberg, 2013, Brown, 2004, Malsch et al., 
2012, Vlaar et al., 2006, Weber and Glynn, 2006, Zilber, 2007). The 
tensions they identified were fourfold. Firstly, despite Weick’s 
starting point that sensemaking was social there was no consensus 
amongst subsequent scholars regarding whether it was a collective 
process or rooted in individual cognitive schema. Secondly, there 
was divergence of opinion amongst scholars about whether 
sensemaking was a routine activity or was confined to times of crisis 
or puzzlement. Thirdly there was no absolute position on whether 
sensemaking was always retrospective or could also be a 
prospective future-orientated process. Finally there was no 
agreement on whether teams or groups shared understandings. 
Having identified tensions and inconsistencies in the existing body of 
literature, the authors suggested areas for further development. The 
first suggestion was the development of new areas of non-
language-based sensemaking including emotion/mood, moral 
awareness, metaphor, and embodiment. Secondly, the areas of 
politics and power were currently underdeveloped. Thirdly, the 
temporal nature of sensemaking including its future orientation was 
an area for further theorising. Finally, they argued that the SP 
should be further developed in relation to mundane and ongoing 
situations rather than one-off and crisis events. 
Maitlis and Christianson (2014) published their chapter 
Sensemaking in Organisations: taking stock and moving forward in 
the Academy of Management Annals, which they described as an 
“overview of the field”. Their analysis was structured to identify 
areas of difference and debate and then to discuss the implications 
of tensions in the literature. They observed that in early uses 
sensemaking was presented as a purely cognitive process in which 
actors constructed cognitive schemas (Labianca et al., 2000), new 
schemas (Bingham and Kahl, 2013) or changed interpretive 
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schemas (Bartunek, 1984). From 2000 sensemaking had been 
increasingly conceptualised as a social process rooted in language 
and the creation of shared narratives (Brown et al., 2008, Currie 
and Brown, 2003, Humphreys and Brown, 2002). The chapter 
includes a typology of specialised forms including market 
sensemaking (Kennedy, 2008) and prosocial sensemaking (Grant et 
al., 2008) amongst others. They concluded by discussing areas 
where SP is underdeveloped and identify areas for further evolution. 
These were: sensemaking and its reciprocal relationship with 
emotion; the temporal nature of sensemaking especially in relation 
to the lack of scholarly consensus regarding whether sensemaking is 
continuous or episodic; distributed sensemaking; and wider 
institutional contexts. They also identified the need for different 
methods including participant observation, embedded case studies, 
mixed methods, mathematical modelling, and social network 
analysis. 
Sandberg and Tsoukas published Making sense of the sensemaking 
perspective: Its constituents, limitations, and opportunities for 
further development (2015) in the Journal of Organizational 
Behavior. This was based on a review of papers in nine leading 
journals in organization and management science. The authors set 
out to critically review key concepts, to account for gaps at the 
conceptual level, and to develop SP in a new direction. The authors 
suggested five key areas in this latter respect. Three were focused 
on intrinsic concepts of SP. First of the three was the opportunity to 
challenge the dismissal of the possibility of prospective 
sensemaking. Second, the notion of “process” remained relatively 
vague especially in terms of the conflation of the creation and 
interpretation processes. Third the concept of sense itself was 
overlooked. The final two related to the nature and range of 
empirical studies that had been undertaken using SP. First, only a 
few studies have taken into account wider institutional contexts 
such as history, culture, and industry. Second, uses of SP have 
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tended to focus on language and cognition, at the expense of 
embodied sensemaking, perception, and emotion. 
In table 2 below I summarise the scholars’ suggestions for 
developing SP further: 
Table 2 Potential areas for the further development of Sensemaking 
Perspective 
 Suggestions for development  
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enacted”. 
Embedded case studies to 
be used to capture 
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contexts.  
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Politics and power.  
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of information are 
able to construct new 
meanings. 
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The separate stages of the 
process (creation, 
interpretation, and 
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unhelpful distinctions 
between the categories.  
The intra-action of 
sensegiving and 
sensemaking, and the 
importance of anticipation. 
The link between 
sensemaking and 
innovation, change, and 
learning and the 
emergence of “novel 
accounts”. 
Temporal work in multi-
levelled case studies. 
 
Three of the areas identified have particular relevance at the 
intersection of SP and BF, and act as analytic co-ordinates for the 
development of a definition of cognitive frame in this thesis. 
First of these is contexts. All of the reviewers identify wider 
institutional contexts and more mundane routine situations as an 
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area for further development. At the same time, the macro-level 
focus of the extant BF is lacking a dimension to explain 
interpretation and enactment. From here on in, I use the term 
“wider contexts” to label this area. 
The second is the temporal aspects of sensemaking, including 
prospective sensemaking, which was identified in two of the three 
reviews of SP. Maitless and Christianson (2014) specifically 
identified temporal work in multi-levelled case-studies. From the 
Medical Sociology literature I had identified history and legacy as 
important factors in how doctors’ interpreted their roles. From here 
on in, I use the term “temporality” to label this area. 
The third is distributed sensemaking, which is identified in two of 
the three reviews. I have already discussed the importance in my 
data of the spatial relationships of actors in the form of networks. 
Networks are the landscape in which multiple actors engage in 
distributed sensemaking. Understanding the mechanisms associated 
with this would form a contribution to BF and the interface with SP. 
From here on in, I use the term “distributed sensemaking” to label 
this area. 
My three analytic co-ordinates were thus decided, and were to be: 
wider contexts, temporality, and distributed sensemaking. In 
sections 2.5.3 -2.5.5 I consider each of these areas in turn. Even 
though I will consider each separately, in practice they intermesh 
and overlap. For instance a wider context by definition is likely to 
involve greater numbers of actors, who will in turn be distributed 
within that context. 
2.5.3 Wider contexts 
BF was developed in relation to the mechanism of markets at the 
macro-level. By contrast, sensemaking literature has for the most 
part been focused on individuals and their action during time-limited 
events. This focus was often further narrowed to unexpected crisis 
events. In the words of Weber and Glynn (2006) 
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“This theoretical distance may be related to criticisms of 
sensemaking that claim the theory overlooks the role of larger 
social, historical or institutional contexts in explaining cognition. As 
a theory of seemingly local practice, sensemaking appears to 
neglect, or at least lack an explicit account of, the embeddedness of 
sensemaking in social space and time.” (Weber and Glynn, 
2006:1639) 
Despite Weber and Glynn making this argument nearly ten years 
prior to this thesis, this continues to be an area identified for further 
development in the recent reviews. 
There are earlier studies that use a multi-levelled approach. Kaplan 
and Orlikowski (2013) studied five simultaneous strategy projects in 
one organisation facing a crisis in its industry, and Maitlis (2005) 
studied three different British symphony orchestras to identify four 
forms of sensemaking: guided; fragmented; restricted; and 
minimal. Balogun and Johnson (2004) considered the impact of 
large scale one-off planned change initiatives. There remains, 
however, an absence of studies that examine sensemaking across 
operational and strategic functions in single or multi-organisational 
context. 
It is because the process of sensemaking is located in the individual 
in the extant literature that sensemaking in wider contexts has not 
been problematised. In wider contexts actors are organised in a 
networked distribution. A major study of networks in healthcare 
(Ferlie et al., 2010) contributed a typology of networks (p.143-145) 
which identified that these vary in: complexity of context; whether 
they are mandated, hybrid, or organic; the level of resources; the 
degree of formality (including formal roles); the number and 
diversity of stakeholders; and the extent to which they could access 
process and management support. Furthermore these networks 
were overlapping and interlocking, each with a pattern of political 
and professional affiliations. This was an important dimension where 
change initiatives take place in the context of an industry with its 
own legacies and embedded culture (Coleman et al., 2010, Segar et 
al., 2014). 
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Using Beckert’s argument, rule change and networks go alongside 
sensemaking. Putting these concepts together would enable me to 
contribute ideas about sensemaking in wider contexts. Maitlis and 
Christianson (2014) identified that there are sensemaking “forms” 
(for their full list see appendix 2). For the purposes of this thesis, I 
replace “form” with “type” to avoid confusion with Maitlis’s (2005) 
use of the term form to differentiate four distinct social processes of 
organisational sensemaking (“guided, fragmented, minimal, and 
restricted” ). Actors in the NHS have developed a prosocial type 
(Grant et al., 2008) with a shared expectation that actors will take 
care of each other and each other’s interests. One of the new rules 
contained in HSCA 2012 was a requirement to adopt competitive 
approaches to the procurement of healthcare, which implied a 
change in inter-organisational relationships to mirror a competitive 
market with winners and losers (Kennedy, 2008). Jones et al. 
(2013) argue that this requirement to operate a market triggered 
coping strategies rather than a full adoption of competitive 
behaviours. One way that this can potentially be understood is to 
use the concept of sensemaking type, and to explore what happens 
when new rules create ambiguity and/or confusion regarding how 
actors should respond. The concept of sensemaking type can also 
be used to add to understanding about the dynamics between 
actors when representatives of multiple organisations, with multiple 
sensemaking types, are required by rules to work together. Using a 
concept of sensemaking type(s) manifested in networks at times of 
rule change was a way to both explore sensemaking in wider 
contexts and to add description to Beckert’s category cognitive 
frame. 
2.5.4 Temporality 
In Weick’s model sensemaking was always retrospective, and 
related to the process of cue extraction. Actors extracted cues from 
the environment as a precursor to creating a version of sense. 
Sense was only made when the cues had been reflected on, and the 
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version of sense implied was considered to be plausible. This 
plausibility, in Weickian sensemaking, had to be in place before 
enactment could take place. It was this act of reflection prior to 
enactment that caused Weick to describe sensemaking as always a 
retrospective process. For Weick sensemaking was a recursive 
activity; an “infinite stream of events and inputs that surround any 
organizational actor” (Weick et al., 2005:p411) akin to the 
“redrafting of an emerging story”(Weick et al., 2005:p415). This 
concept of an evolving story was central for those scholars who see 
sensemaking as a process of language and narration. In contrast, 
others have argued that sensemaking can be future-oriented 
(Gephart et al., 2010, Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013). Gephart in 
particular, in the ethno-methodological school, argued that in 
sensemaking is a continuous process without beginning or end and 
that the past, present, and future were considered simultaneously 
(2010). 
These positions each reflect the tendency towards a micro-level 
focus of the extant SP literature. Processes of reflection, for 
example, must be located at the level of an individual or a small 
group. In this thesis, sensemaking is an active process in a dynamic 
relationship with networks and rules; it is located in a wider context 
discussed in 2.5.3 above. This has implications for the temporal 
nature of the sensemaking process. In a wider context, where 
actors are distributed across levels and networks, the enactment of 
day to day business involves sensemaking over longer time periods. 
In BF, the simplistic assumption that actors follow “cognitive ‘how-
to’ rules” (Beckert, 2010:p617) implies that past experience 
provides a blueprint for future action. If and how this works as a 
sensemaking mechanism alongside networks and rules is something 
I intend to problematise in this thesis. 
NHS workers share an embedded shared history; historical 
continuity is a feature of organisational culture (Segar et al., 2014). 
In wider contexts, such as the commissioning field in this study, 
there is an opportunity to test the impact of legacies on 
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sensemaking. In the data legacies appeared to impact on future-
orientated sensemaking, and this in turn appeared to be linked to 
the mood that the network adopted in response to new rules. There 
is evidence to support mood as both shared and contagious 
(Barsade, 2002). Legacies impacted on levels of optimism, 
pessimism, or anxiety across whole networks. SP scholars have 
increasingly emphasised the importance of emotion (Maitlis et al., 
2013), which has become a widening research area (Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996, Huy, 2002, Kiefer, 2005, LÜScher and Lewis, 2008, 
Maitlis, 2005, Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010, Sanchez-Burks and 
Huy, 2009, Vince and Broussine, 1996). In organisational studies SP 
literature the focus has tended to be on negative emotion and the 
impact on resistance to change. Brown and Starkey (2000), for 
example, have argued that at times of organisational change 
sensemaking was based on the defence mechanisms of actors, and 
these had an important emotional element being triggered when 
people felt threatened. There has been a study that challenges this, 
questioning the validity of labelling negativity at times of change as 
emotional. Balogun et al. (2010) problematised the term 
“resistance” and questioned why it was used. Their findings 
suggested that some emotions were seen as acceptable (for 
example commitment, enthusiasm, the emotional repertoire of 
quality, innovation) and others were seen as unacceptable. 
This thesis does not include an examination of the impact of 
emotion per se, but it is a necessary factor to consider when 
exploring the impact of legacies, future-orientation, and the nature 
of resistance, all of which are features in the empirical chapters and 
discussions. By exploring the link between sensemaking, legacies 
and anticipated futures within a distributed networked field, I aim to 
draw out the underlying influences on the dynamics of field change 
across a multi-levelled environment. 
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2.5.5 Distributed sensemaking 
Sensemaking in wider contexts and distributed sensemaking are 
directly related concepts. Distributed sensemaking remains an 
under-developed and under-theorised area, with existing studies 
(Fisher et al., 2012, Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2006, Stigliani and 
Ravasi, 2012) tending to conceptualise it as a language-based, 
cognitive process, again linked to one-off situations, and where the 
distribution is of a number of individual actors. In a discussion of 
sensemaking and complexity, Weick uses an unexpected outbreak 
of disease in the West Nile (Weick, 2005) to identify the 
circumstances in which different actors held pieces of information 
which only made sense when put together (in this case in the form 
of the correct diagnosis of the disease). Distributed sensemaking 
has therefore been conceptualised as the process of bringing 
together individuals each of whom holds a different slice of 
information. 
By linking the concept of distributed sensemaking and BF it is 
possible to explore how sensemaking happens in wider contexts 
with multiple networks. The concept of distributed sensemaking is a 
potential tool by which to explore how tensions within and between 
sensemaking types in networks affect collective action. SP literature 
has tended to be focused on the impact of senior leaders (Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996, Gioia et al., 1994). Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) 
used the term “sensegiving” when describing a linear process in 
which senior managers directed others through stages of 
envisioning, signalling, revisioning and energising. Scholars have 
recently broadened the scope to consider the impact of middle 
managers.(Balogun and Johnson, 2004, Balogun and Johnson, 
2005, Huy, 2002) describing their role in mediating between top 
managers and employees on the frontline to affect both cognitions 
and actions (Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010). Lockett et al (2014) 
have argued that it is more than a position in a hierarchy that 
makes for an effective sensegiver; social status and social capital 
are also likely to be important. Maitlis and Christianson (2014) 
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included a summary of sensemaking concepts which include: sense-
breaking (Pratt, 2000:p464, Vlaar et al., 2008), sense-demanding 
(Vlaar et al., 2008, Weick, 1969:p40), sense-exchanging (Ran and 
Golden, 2011:p421), and sense-hiding (Monin et al., 2013:p262, 
Vaara and Monin, 2010:p6). Given that SP has tended to have been 
applied at the micro level, then these concepts also have been 
developed in relation to that level. Change that affects a field with 
many actors distributed in multiple networks needs to be managed 
and organised. It is likely that in this wider context approaches to 
sensemaking will be different from those used in micro-level 
contexts and/or one-off events. 
Organisational development (OD) is important in the enactment of 
rule change in networks. OD has been described as “a system wide 
application and transfer of behavioural science knowledge to the 
planned development, improvement, and reinforcement of the 
strategies, structures, and processes that lead to organization 
effectiveness” (Cummings and Worley, 2009:1-2). Sensemaking 
scholars have written about OD in relation to planned large scale 
change initiatives (Bartunek et al., 2011). OD techniques are 
commonly used by public sector organisations, and by studying how 
OD is used in a longitudinal multi-levelled change it will be possible 
to explore its impact on a distributed pattern of actors. 
Sensemaking in a wider context is organised in networks. Are 
patterns of distribution apparent? What approaches to sensemaking 
employed in a distributed wider context? What are the implications 
of this for existing concepts of sensemaking? These are issues that I 
explore further during this thesis. 
2.6 Conclusion: research questions 
Section 2.2.3 sets out the first research question: 
 Why and how did GPs enact their commissioning duties in the 
ways that they did?   
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This question was overarching, with two constituent dimensions 
derived from SoP and Medical Sociology literatures. These were: 
changes to the profession; and history and legacy. These formed 
two thematic codes in data analysis as described in detail in Chapter 
3: Methodology and Methods.  
In order to theorise this empirical question, I intend to use BF in 
combination with Weick’s SP. This is incorporated into the thesis as 
a second overarching question: 
 How does sensemaking influence field change within the 
context of networks and rules?  
In addressing this second question, I aim to contribute a descriptive 
definition of the analytic category cognitive frame in BF. In order to 
do this I conceptualise sensemaking in a dynamic relationship with 
networks and rules. I explore this relationship using three analytic 
co-ordinates: wider contexts, temporality, and distributed 
sensemaking. 
The next chapter is a consideration of the methodology and 
methods used to address these research questions. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology and Methods 
3.1 Introduction  
I graduated from Sheffield University in 1985 with a degree in 
English Literature. I have always had a love of stories since my 
English literature days, and have built many of my work techniques 
on drama, narrative, characterisation, and plot. Ellis and Böchner 
(1996:p18) describe the researcher as “storyteller” using “narrative 
strategies to transport readers into experiences and make them feel 
as well as think”. During the writing of this thesis I aimed to present 
my data in such a way that it would tell a story. I wanted the study 
to be useful, and this firstly meant understandable to the people it 
would affect. Ellis and Böchner (1996:p28) describe the need to 
“not only to write about [people who work in health services] but to 
write to them as well”. 
The empirical fieldwork was undertaken as an attachment to a CCG 
which was a direct descendent of a Health Authority where I was 
director of commissioning almost fifteen years ago. There were 
potential pitfalls arising from my recent NHS past especially with 
regard to bias. I would need to address this issue upfront and 
seriously if my conclusions were to be considered valid. The study 
for me was a personal journey, during which I learned about my 
own reasons and reasoning; emotions and preferences, and values 
and prejudices. I learned how to reflect upon these in order to 
understand how they affect my relationship to and interpretation of 
the world. Related to this was my decision to use the first person 
where it felt natural to do so. After all “my subjectivity [is] the basis 
for the story I [am] able to tell” (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992:p104). 
It was crucial that this subjectivity was a declared and examined 
one, helping to produce a “thick description” of NHS commissioning 
(Geertz, 1973). I have endeavoured to use my past experience to 
enhance quality along the lines described by Easterby-Smith who 
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argued that “proximity to the life worlds of those studied” is a 
measure of quality in qualitative research (2008:p423). 
In response to a CLAHRC advertisement for a PhD to look at 
Commissioning and Mental Health I submitted a research proposal 
to examine how commissioning addressed the needs of vulnerable 
people. At the outset I thought of the project as a way to help solve 
a practice problem, with little understanding of what a PhD really 
involved, and with scant awareness of what a “theoretical 
contribution” comprised. I wanted to explore how the multiple levels 
of organisation of commissioning in the NHS affected how services 
delivered to vulnerable people. I had left a job as a primary care 
trust Chief Executive in 2003 as a consequence of taking up carer 
responsibilities, and had negotiated a move into the local mental 
health trust. During my time in the trust I had been struck by the 
degree of frustration expressed by psychiatric staff regarding 
referrals and care undertaken by GPs. I realised from my own 
experience as a primary care manager that this seeming lack of 
understanding of mental health was linked to the case-mix of 
patients that presented in GP surgeries. My informed impression 
was that GPs managed a complex clinical environment with a skew 
towards caring for elderly people and children. As I thought more 
about this complexity I increasingly felt it was important to try and 
unpack how it affected clinical practice, specifically the treatment 
and care of vulnerable people. Rather than use the labels mental 
illness or mental health I used the term “vulnerable” in order to 
encompass those dimensions that might not be technically classed 
as illness such as addiction, behavioural and personality disorders, 
and low level coping problems which were a significant population 
as far as the GPs were concerned. 
The first empirical research decision I made was to conceptualise GP 
commissioning as being at three levels. In this way I would be able 
to separate GPs as referrers, as service planners, and as partners in 
inter-agency arrangements. These levels formed the basis of the 
nested case study that I eventually conducted. As already outlined 
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in Chapter Two: Literature Review, the focus of my study shifted as 
my immersion into the field deepened, and data analysis began to 
yield early findings. There were several pivotal research decisions 
that were made as the study evolved, and without exception in all of 
these theorising and analysis were intertwined. 
This chapter is an account of the methodology and methods of the 
study. Silverman says that the most important question any 
researcher should ask is “what kind of focus on my topic do I want 
to achieve?” (Silverman, 2010:p13). The focus here was twofold. 
The first aim would be a contribution to the generation of theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). A second aim was to produce knowledge out of 
this theorising which would be useful and relevant in the world of 
practice and policy. Methodology and methods would need to 
support these aims. 
3.2 Choosing a methodology and methods 
Before I made my methodological choices, the core philosophical 
issue of how to approach the production of meaning and knowledge 
needed to be confronted. Was I a realist, or an interpretivist, or 
somewhere between the two? (Cunliffe, 2011, Hammersley, 1992, 
Morgan and Smircich, 1980). 
During my studies of English literature and subsequent lifelong 
reading I had been particularly interested in point of view, and how 
individuals construct different versions of the same events. Works 
such as Ulysses (Joyce, 1998), To the Lighthouse (Woolf, 2000), 
and A Chain of Voices (Brink 1983) are not so much stories as a 
sequence of perspectives about the same events or locations seen 
from different vantage points. People interpret and construct 
meanings all the time, but, for me, this does not extend to a pure 
relativism where the world only exists because human beings are 
here to interpret it. Martyn Hammersley wrote on this problem:  
“Faced with this apparent contradiction within ethnography, there 
are two obvious candidate solutions: to apply either realism or 
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relativism consistently across the board, to both ethnographic 
method and to the social life that is studied….neither of these is 
satisfactory.” (Hammersley, 1992:p45) 
He continued to make the point, linking it to purpose: 
“If it is true that what ethnographers produce is simply one version 
of the world, true (at best) only in its own terms, what value can it 
have?......In the words of one of the advocates of anti-realism, we 
may have to conclude that “there are as many realities as there are 
persons” (Smith John, 1984). If this is so, what is the point in 
spawning yet more versions of “reality”, especially given the 
relative costs of ethnography compared with, say, armchair 
reflection?” (Hammersley, 1992:p49) 
Given that one of my aims was to have practical application of my 
findings in the real world, I needed an ontology that allowed for a 
real world in the first place. Pawson and Tilley recognised that the 
positivist-interpretivist polarity was too bluntly drawn, and that 
concepts of realism can be developed to position between the two 
ends (1997:p55). Miles, Huberman and Sabaña (2013), whom I 
drew on for data analysis, also recognised this problem. They 
believed that social phenomena exist not only in the mind, but also 
in the world, and that it is possible to examine these social 
phenomena to find reasonably stable relationships amongst the 
messiness of human interaction. It is possible to identify sequences 
and patterns that can be described as the underpinning constructs. 
They describe their epistemological position in the paragraphs 
below: 
“We label ourselves pragmatic realists. We believe that social 
phenomena exist not only in the mind but also in the world – and 
that some reasonably stable relationships can be found among the 
idiosyncratic messiness of life. There are regularities and sequences 
that link together phenomena. From these patterns, we can derive 
the constructs that underlie individual and social life. The fact that 
most of these constructs are invisible to the human eye does not 
make them invalid. After all, we all are surrounded by lawful 
physical mechanisms of which we’re, at most, remotely aware……… 
“……….Our tests do not use the deductive logic of classical 
positivism. Rather, our explanations flow from an account of how 
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differing structures produced the events we observed. We want to 
account for events, rather than simply document their sequence. 
We look for an individual or a social process, a mechanism, or a 
structure at the core of events that can be captured to provide a 
causal description of the most likely forces at work.” (Miles et al., 
2013:p6) 
Hammersley also shared these views, based on the acceptance that 
people constantly interpret, but also that their interpretations reflect 
real and potentially shared experience. He developed a concept of 
“subtle realism” (1992:p51-54).The word “subtle” differs from 
“pragmatic” in that he emphasised the need for detailed checking 
and triangulation of information. I determined to share 
Hammersley’s position and adopt a “subtle realist” point of view. 
So, having determined my ontological and epistemological position, 
my next choice was the methodology I would employ. There were 
several main influences on this. Firstly, my former working life 
needed to be central, especially in regard to its effect on my study. 
Secondly, pragmatically, I had pre-existing friendships and 
networks upon which I could draw not least of all in regard to 
access to study sites. This needed to be turned to methodological 
advantage as I had a unique opportunity to occupy, as researcher, 
the world I previously lived in as manager. Thirdly, the methodology 
should allow for a realist ontology whilst accepting that individual 
perspectives and interpretations were important as was the case in 
subtle realism. Taking these facts together, and based on 
descriptions of what qualitative methods work best for which type of 
situation (Creswell, 2007, Creswell, 2009, Cunliffe, 2011, Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, Hammersley, 2012, 
Silverman, 2010, Thorpe and Holt, 2008), my decision was to 
combine CSR with an ethnographic data collection strategy. CSR 
would allow me to exploit my advantage in terms of access, and 
ethnography provided a framework for me to be reflexive, and to 
participate as I observed the field in order to tell its story. Each of 
these elements is discussed further below. 
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3.2.1 Case Study Research methodology 
As already explained in Chapter One: Introduction, I think of GP-
commissioning as happening at three levels. I designed my 
fieldwork to enable observation at and across these levels. 
CSR methodology is designed to study a specific area in-depth, and 
to describe and explain the case in its present day context by 
investigating a number of dimensions, over a certain period of time, 
and through a number of methods (Gomm and Hammersley, 2000). 
This could not be achieved through a historical investigation, since 
contemporary events were the focus of interest (Yin, 2009:p11). 
CSR was compatible with ethnography, specifically participant 
ethnography, which is discussed in the next section. 
The choice of CSR methodology was on theoretical rather than 
representational grounds. Even at the point of deciding to use CSR I 
was conscious that issues of generalisabilty of the findings were 
likely to be raised. Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña emphasise that 
case studies are about the minute detail and the story that it tells:  
“Because case study researchers examine intact settings in such 
minute detail, they know all too well that each setting has a few 
properties it shares with many others, some properties it shares 
with some others, and some properties it shares with no others.” 
(Miles et al., 2013:p34) 
Later in section 3.3, I describe how I made the decision to use a 
single case study and the implications of this for generalisability of 
my findings and conclusions. 
3.2.2 Ethnography and reflexivity 
Having decided to undertake a case study, the next decision was 
about the design and conduct of data collection. Scholz and Tietje 
(2002:p241) described the “experiential case encounter” where the 
researcher participates in the case. My past as a manager made it 
inevitable that my own history, opinions, and emotions would be 
present, so my data collection strategy needed to take this into 
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account and to turn it to advantage. Michael Agar in The 
Professional Stranger says: 
“New issues abound, but they still boil down to the same old 
problem of one human being trying to figure out what some other 
humans are up to”(Agar, 1996:p2) 
He went on to use the term “halfie” anthropologist (Agar, 1996:p21, 
Fox, 1991) to describe the state of being half a researcher and half 
a part of the world being studied. All ethnographers find themselves 
in this position to some extent, but for me I was also part of the 
history of the world I was about to study. I had to learn to practice 
the art of de-familiarising myself with a familiar world. Wolcott says: 
“We console ourselves that where ethnographers once sought to 
make the strange familiar, today’s ethnographer more often needs 
to make the familiar strange” Wolcott (2010:p96) 
An advantage of using ethnographic methods was that I could 
embrace and examine this familiarity, whilst at the same time 
developing distance as I consciously identified and reflected upon 
my subjectivities. Agar (1996:p7) described this as “the paradox of 
professional distance and personal involvement”. It would also give 
me a way to handle the divisions I would feel within myself. I would 
be returning to a territory I had left behind and to some extent felt 
rejected from, personal feelings would emerge, creating a tension 
between the professional researcher on the one hand, and the 
personal ex-NHS manager on the other. This division of self was 
described by Bott (2010) in relation to her research on time-share 
selling and lap dance clubs. 
“What I had not anticipated beforehand, nor fully appreciated 
during data collection, was the sensation of being so divided 
between my ‘personal’ and ‘professional’ ‘selves’; only on reflection 
do I really recognize the significance of the divide.(Bott, 
2010:p170) 
“Who are you to do this?” asks Agar (1996:p91-103) warning that 
“Ethnography is really quite an arrogant enterprise”. In practice, 
and especially to start with, I found this thinking about myself a 
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difficult thing to do. It felt self-indulgent and ego-based. As an NHS 
manager the “I” is buried. Managers strive to the “we” or the “it”. 
There are exceptions to this, but in the most part they aim to 
promote standardisation and compliance. Reflexively I recognised 
this in myself, ironically noticing that this was a key component in 
why I found reflexivity itself to be counter-intuitive. In the end I 
realised how crucial it was; if I could not escape being a “halfie” 
then I would exploit it, and build it centrally and absolutely into my 
approach. 
As an ethnographer it was appropriate to employ both participant 
and direct observation, augmented by other methods. A happy co-
incidence of participation was that my empirical work would be 
enjoyable, possibly even therapeutic. I had found leaving the NHS 
difficult as well as freeing. Denzin (1997:p.xiv) describes 
ethnography as a “moral, allegorical, and therapeutic project”, and I 
began to see how this could be so for me. Ethnography would allow 
me to construct a version of events which included my personal 
examined self. 
“When ethnographers like me make texts, try as we may to report 
and represent accurately, we necessarily invent and construct the 
cultures we write about. We cannot help but read something into 
what is there, because we are there with it” (Ellis and Bochner, 
1996:p20) 
This would be built into the design and process of the study. I would 
talk to people along the way, share texts, and let them help me find 
ways to control my opinions. Essentially my study would be a 
reflexive exercise that would result in a story (Agar, 1996:p17). 
Auto ethnographic vignettes could be used to increase 
“representational richness” (Humphreys, 2005:p840). Agar’s The 
Professional Stranger was updated in 1996 to include a new chapter 
describing how ethnography had changed since its first publication 
in 1980. He distinguishes between old “encyclopaedic” ethnography” 
and newer “narrative” ethnography based much more on telling 
stories (Agar, 1996:p9). Agar metaphorically described the old as a 
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disc floating above whereas the new was like picks on a guitar. Like 
a piece of music a narrative ethnography depended on showing 
where the links are in such a way that those who read it feel 
something “snaps some connection together” (Agar, 1996:p15). I 
decided to use ethnographic methods with the intention of writing a 
narrative ethnography which would help practitioners “snap 
connections together” as they enacted their day to day working 
roles. 
3.2.3 Why not quantitative methods? 
My study uses qualitative methods only. I did consider whether a 
quantitative dimension would enhance my analysis, but in the end 
concluded that this would not be the case. Because I already knew 
from my life in practice that GPs contained their language and 
emotions as a result of the potential for others, especially patients, 
to give heightened significance to their messages, I knew that data 
would exist in the realms of the tacit, inferred, and even absent. In 
order to understand the impact of the commissioning role on these 
doctors it would be necessary to look in depth at how they used 
cues to make sense of the continual changing context of events, 
policies, and expectations (Weick, 1995) in order to develop a 
shared understanding of their context. The implication of this for my 
study was that I would be seeing the formation of meanings as they 
emerged. This was not a basis for “systematic and standardised 
comparisons and in accounting for variance” (Silverman, 2010:p13). 
The material did not lend itself to the testing of structured 
hypotheses, or the relationships between defined variables. The aim 
of the study was not, for example, to compare the spending plans 
CCG one, two, and three, or to explore the co-variance of two forms 
of HWB as they set priorities. Rather it was an exploration of a 
developing area, with an eye to how individual histories and 
motivations affected the enactment of new commissioning roles. 
The data simply would not be amenable to quantitative analysis. 
Further, the field included such a variety of individuals, groups, and 
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agencies, that it would be impossible to determine sample frames 
and strategies (Silverman, 2010). 
3.3  Study Design 
3.3.1 Overview 
In this section I describe the initial design work prior to entering the 
fieldwork site. In practice, the study continued to be designed as 
empirical findings emerged and the theoretical framework was 
refined. The key text I used to guide the design was Yin’s Case 
Study Research, Design and Methods (2009). Yin’s intention when 
writing the book was to enable case study researchers to apply 
rigour in order that their findings and conclusions could be credited 
with increased validity. 
At the initial design stage, my research questions were derived from 
SIT and were designed to interrogate the topic identified in my 
initial research proposal, which was the commissioning of services 
for vulnerable people. I wanted to investigate the pattern of 
complementary and conflicting interests between GPs and others. I 
expected to find that GPs were putting their own interests before 
those of patients, and that this would be explained as a structural 
phenomenon. Using SIT as my heuristic, I investigated my 
predictions which were, in fact, proved to be wrong in the early 
stages of analysis. 
3.3.2 Case Selection 
Before embarking on the detail of my study design, first I had to 
decide what my “case” would be. I had various options available to 
me. I could undertake a single case study at a large urban CCG. I 
could attempt to compare cases by studying two (or more) large 
urban CCGs. Finally I could study a geography of one large urban 
and several smaller suburban and rural CCGs. Table 3 below 
presents the detailed considerations prior to decision. It should be 
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acknowledged that, in truth, serendipity played its part (Wolcott, 
2010:p44-65). 
Table 3 Site selection considerations 
Site Configuration  Research Design Implications  
Single large urban 
CCG with 
boundaries 
coterminous with 
local authority 
Feasible to observe across all three levels of commissioning. 
Single LA for HWB, eliminating potential blocks to access due to 
councillors’ reluctance to be compared with another area. 
Minimal travelling time between sites allowing increased focus on 
data collection. 
Organisations had retained the same boundaries through 
reorganisation, minimising organisational flux, thus allowing stable 
opportunities for observations. 
CCG and LA were keen to host the research. This had been tested 
with an inter-agency executive level group who had given in 
principle agreement to the study at the point the PhD was 
commenced. 
Concerns about generalisability would be raised by the research 
community and might affect chances of publication. This could be 
countered by arguments about richness and quality of data. 
Reflexivity would need to be built in as core to design, due to 
previous roles held in the organisation. 
Two large Urban 
CCGs 
Still feasible to observe across all three levels of commissioning, 
but range and amount of observation in each site would be 
reduced. 
Data collection time would be reduced due to need to build 
networks across two areas, and increased need for travel. 
Findings would include comparisons, increasing strength for 
generalisability. 
Whilst links existed between the 2 CCGs, working relationships 
between the LAs were competitive and distant. Permissions to draw 
comparisons between LAs are difficult to negotiate due to political 
sensitivities. 
Reflexivity would be more complex as I had different levels of 
knowledge, relationships, and prior experience in each area. 
There was little enthusiasm from potential host site for expanding 
the scope of the study from my main host site.  
One Urban CCGs; 
and 7 (or sample 
<7) small suburban 
and rural CCGs 
Impractical to observe across all three levels as a single handed 
PhD researcher. 
Data collection time would be severely compromised due to need to 
build networks across two areas, and increased need for travel. 
Findings would include comparisons, increasing strength for 
generalisability. 
The sites would stretch across two second tier local authorities- one 
Conservative, one Labour – there was an expressed reluctance to 
have comparisons drawn. 
Reflexivity would potentially be more interesting, but also more 
complex as I had different levels of knowledge, relationships, and 
prior experience in each area, including having previously held a 
Director role on the patch. 
There was little enthusiasm for expanding the scope of the study 
from my main host site. 
I was conscious that as a PhD researcher, I would be single-handed. 
Feasibility was a legitimate concern, and I knew that to secure the 
best chance of seeing across all three levels of the commissioning 
spectrum would depend on having good day to day relationships 
with participants and becoming part of the team. When weighing 
the factors shown in table 3, it was clear that the most appropriate 
and practically feasible option was the single site case study in an 
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urban area, mainly because it would give the best quality of data 
across the multi-levelled field (Yin, 2009:p47). Being split over 
multiple sites would mitigate against this. This did however raise an 
important concern regarding generalisability. Would just looking in 
one place give me data with sufficient power to extrapolate 
messages with wider applicability? The critical points to balance 
were multiple sites for comparison, or a single site for depth of 
analysis. I concluded that “thoroughness of its analysis” would be 
the best strategy for validity (Radnor, 2002:p40). In any case a 
sample of a few would be unlikely to be representative of others 
(Stake, 1995:p4), leaving me still with the issue of generalisability 
but with data quality also compromised. The perspective of MacLean 
et al. is that “the real issue is not that of generalisability but that of 
transfer” (2002:p202), and the best way for me to produce 
transferable knowledge was to make it the best it could be. I also 
drew from the ethnographers on this issue. Wolcott described his 
supervisor’s reaction to one of his early attempts: 
“By page 31, Spindler had seen enough generalisations. He started 
changing my every use of the word “they” to “he” to try to get me 
back on track. But reading half a page later he gave up on that 
approach and issued a directive in the margin: “Don’t generalize. 
The heart of ethnography is singularity”  (Wolcott, 2010:p17) 
I would best discover the state of commissioning through observing 
its specifics in depth. As Wolcott continued:  
“The argument for comparison is the belief that it can make a study 
stronger or more “scientific”. What tends to happen instead is that 
those larger Ns serve as denominators: they reduce the time that 
can be devoted to each individual case. If you do three “little” 
cases, each one will get one-third as much attention as the one 
might have had if you had focused exclusively on it. That’s okay if 
you want to look for a range of possible practices – but there goes 
context, for you are likely to find that you are doing little more than 
conducting a small survey (and let me assure you that ethnography 
is a very inefficient way to conduct a survey!) (Wolcott, 2010:p98) 
It would seem reasonable therefore that insights could be used to 
extrapolate theory if I ensured my methods were detailed and 
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thorough. I opted for a single site and began to negotiate access. 
Having said all this, it is still likely that the single case nature of the 
study could be considered a limitation. In addition to the 
methodological arguments for the power of in-depth cases described 
above, I return to this theme in my conclusions chapter by critically 
reviewing my own conclusions as to validity and generalisability. 
3.3.3 Protocol design and approval, including research ethics  
A main building block of Yin’s (2009) CSR is the creation of a 
comprehensive and precise study protocol, which gives clarity on 
what would happen in what timeframe. The protocol effectively 
delimits the study by setting boundaries across four parameters: 
the setting, the actors, the events, and the processes (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
The protocol for this study, included a description of the single site 
case and its three levels. It included provision for additional data to 
be collected in the seven neighbouring rural/suburban CCGs, two 
local authorities, the mental health trust, and the community 
services provider, and other local non-statutory partner 
organisations. It delimited the study time period to eighteen months 
from October 2012 to April 2014. This was subsequently extended 
to the end of September 2014. A variety of data collection 
strategies were included. Based broadly on Stake’s (1995) 
embedded case study model, where embedded means a number of 
methods used in a single case study, the proposed methods 
included participant and direct observations; a personal reflexive 
journal, and fieldnotes; interviews including unstructured, semi-
structured and focused; and document analysis. At the time the 
protocol was written thirty to fifty participants were anticipated. In 
the end sixty-one signed consent forms were filed for observations, 
and a further twelve for interviews. 
The protocol was the document upon which university sponsorship 
and business school research ethics committee approval was based. 
In addition NHS Research and Development approval was secured. 
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In addition to outlining the parameters of the field work, the 
protocol also described arrangements to ensure the research was 
conducted to expected ethical standards. Participant Information 
Sheets (PIS) were included for approval. There were two versions: 
one for observations, and one for interviews and focus groups. 
Outlined in the PIS were the aims, scope, status, and time period of 
the study. It explained that the participant had been invited to take 
part because they had a role in commissioning, that participation 
was entirely voluntary, and that it was possible to withdraw from 
the study at any time, although data already collected would not be 
erased. It described what participation entailed, and clarified that 
there would be no payment as the study would take place during 
normal working hours. It indicated that the CCG had given its 
support for the study to take place, and gave assurance that 
reporting would be anonymised, that the site would not be 
identified, and that information would be kept confidentially. It 
described arrangements for encrypting and password protecting 
electronic data. Only I, the Chief Investigator, and regulatory 
authorities would have access to the data, all of whom were bound 
by a commitment to confidentiality. Personal data would be retained 
for three months following completion of the study. Other data 
would be kept securely for seven years. Reports and published 
literature would be shared with participants in order that there 
should be a chance to assess its accuracy and value. Finally, it 
included details of a CCG contact from whom further information 
could be obtained, or to whom complaints could be addressed. If an 
individual agreed to participate then consent was obtained via 
Informed Consent Forms (ICF). Like the PIS there were two 
versions of ICFs included in the protocol; one for observations, and 
one for interviews and focus groups. Duplicates were signed by both 
myself, and the participant, each retaining a copy for our records. 
Once consent was attained, the participant’s name was entered on a 
register which was kept securely, and a pseudonym was assigned. 
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3.3.4 A developing theoretical framework  
The pre-agreed protocol included broad details of the process of 
data collection, and how this would be timetabled. In practice the 
stages of the study were identified and structured in an iterative 
fashion as themes and opportunities for participation and 
observation began to emerge. The initial research questions 
operated as an outline conceptual framework which developed in an 
emic, abductive manner. The research focus and questions became 
honed and progressively inductive through a series of abductive 
shifts. This is what is sometimes called “progressive focusing” 
(Parlett and Hamilton, 1976, Scholz and Tietje, 2002, Stake, 
1995:p9). Sometimes a funnel metaphor is used, to describe how 
an initial openness of approach is gradually narrowed as the 
emerging picture begins to take shape (Agar, 1996:p7). In his book 
Case Study Research Yin (2009:p130) emphasises that research 
design should “follow the theoretical propositions that led to the 
case study”. At the design stage, I followed this principle and, as 
described above, developed a protocol based on SIT. As my 
observations and analysis progressed I realised that an adjustment 
of my theoretical framework was indicated, as is very common in 
grounded ethnographic studies. Before describing the details of my 
fieldwork and data analysis in sections 3.4 and 3.5 below, in the 
following paragraphs I describe how the theoretical focus and 
related design of the research developed. 
As already described above, the initial research proposal was to 
investigate the commissioning of services for vulnerable people, and 
by the time I had produced my first literature view in May 2013, I 
had determined to do this by using SIT. At the point I produced my 
first methodology and methods chapter in May 2014, I was seven 
months into my field work and was observing, analysing, and 
writing in a recursive process. By this point, as insights from the 
data began to be harvested, it was becoming increasingly apparent 
that a structural differentiation of patients, managers, and doctors 
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did not correspond with findings. Furthermore such an analysis 
would hinder the telling of the story that was beginning to be 
revealed. As will be explained in more detail in section 3.5, 
differences in the SIT categories of dominance, challenge, and 
repression could just as easily exist between groups of GPs as 
between GPs and managers. My initial expectation that I would find 
evidence relating to the repression of the interests of vulnerable 
people gave way to a more subtle and nuanced questioning strategy 
relating to the experience and action of GPs as they undertook their 
commissioning role. Although in the end I relocated my contribution 
to BF at the interface of SP, nevertheless, the SIT phase study was 
pivotally important in the identification of field dynamics. 
The approach I used was increasingly emic, allowing theory to 
emerge from the data using grounded theory techniques (Bryant 
and Charmaz, 2007., Cohen et al., 2011:598-603, Creswell, 2009, 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Goulding, 2005). Although I had started 
with a structural framework, in response to the data-content, I 
made an abductive shift, described in 2.3:Selecting the theoretical 
framework, to include an interpretivist element in theorising, and to 
refocus the study on the experience and motivation of GPs. 
3.4 In the field: The nature and collection of data 
In this section I describe the conduct of the fieldwork. First I 
describe the timeline and phases. Following this, I describe my 
approach to sampling. Next I describe the nature and extent of 
observations. Finally I describe how I used interviews to triangulate 
the findings from the observations. 
3.4.1 Timeline  
The study was divided into four distinct phases. I have called these 
phases Establishment, Early, Middle, and Late. The Establishment 
Phase included the pre-entry and induction stages when I 
established my basic knowledge and presence in the CCG. The Early 
Stage included the use of concepts from SIT. Following first cycle 
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coding and analysis this shifted to the Middle Stage which included 
the use of concepts from BF. The final stage was focused on 
validation and triangulation of earlier findings. My main form of data 
collection was observation, both direct and participative. I used 
various methods to acquire and record the data including document 
analysis, a reflexive journal, and field-notes. I also conducted semi-
structured interviews both to explore themes and to validate 
observations. The stages and methods are mapped in the Gantt 
chart in table 4 below. 
71 
 
Table 4 Study stages and corresponding data collection methods 
 Establishment  Early  Middle  Late  
 Stage 1  
Pre entry 
June – Sept 
2012 
Stage 2 
Induction  
Oct – Nov 2012 
Stage 3 
Participant and direct observation 
and first analysis (SIT and empirical 
codes) 
Dec 2012– May  2013 
Stage 4 
Continued observation and second  
analysis (BF) 
June 2013 – March 2014 
 
Stage 5 
Validation of findings: focused 
observation and interviews 
March – Sept 2014 
Document 
Analysis  
     
Reflexive 
Journal 
     
Observation  
recorded in 
Fieldnotes  
     
Participant 
Observation  
     
Initial semi-
structured 
interviews to 
explore ideas 
and themes 
     
Focused 
interviews to 
validate and 
refine 
observation 
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3.4.2 Access to data 
In order to conduct my study I needed arrangements to access 
data. Alongside collecting observational and interview data, I 
collected a library of documents. Some were national policy 
documents and directives, some were local plans, strategies and the 
like. The bulk of the documentary data was in the form of agenda 
and papers for meetings, and it was through these that I could 
observe the unfolding of “plot”. A key reason to look at documents 
was because they revealed underlying ideologies, approaches, 
values, and interests (McCulloch, 2011). Essentially, the approach 
to assembling my library of documents was no more complicated 
than writing lists of things I wanted to see, and obtaining them. 
For observations, the sampling was focused on the identification of 
projects/initiatives and groups which I would observe, rather than 
on individual people, as this was a study of organisational dynamics. 
Sampling was purposive and reflected a process of funnelling 
(Ericson 1986) whereby my investigations started broadly and then 
became narrower and more focused. 
For interviewees, sampling was purposive, and was generated 
through contacts made in the process of participant, and to a lesser 
extent direct, observation. 
On occasions where it was impractical or impolite to interrupt 
proceedings for the purposes of gaining consent (for example 
observations of events were often in rooms containing fifty plus 
people, or of meetings of senior people where an insistence on 
form-filling would be to disregard organisational etiquette). I 
ensured that the meeting leader made participants aware of the 
capacity in which I was present, and advised that they could object 
to the use of data that related to them. No-one did object. 
Whenever it was possible to take formal written consent a PIS was 
circulated in advance or given out at the meeting. I took signatures 
onto ICFs. My study file contains 61 signed ICF for observations 
which break down as 10 Executive GPs; 26 rank and file GPs, 9 
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practice nurses, 2 nurse managers, 4 practice managers, 7 CCG 
managers, 2 lay members, and 1 hospital doctor. A further 12 ICFs 
are on file for interviews (see Appendix 3). 
3.4.3 The nature and extent of observations 
The principal method of data collection was observation. Gold 
(1958) developed a classic categorisation of observation into four 
types, based on a spectrum. Complete participation is when the true 
identity and purpose of the observer is concealed. A participant as 
observer (now known as participant observation) is where the 
observer participates in the day to day activities of the field but 
there is mutual awareness that this is a “field relationship”. An 
observer as participant describes the one visit encounter. Finally, 
the complete observer (usually now known as direct observation) is 
where the observer aims simply to watch, and ideally to be 
forgotten about by those he or she is watching. Observations I 
made during the study were sometimes direct such as watching 
meetings, and sometimes participant. The ratio of direct to 
participant observation was constantly shifting along what Glesne 
and Peshkin (1992:p40) describe as the “participant observation 
continuum”. 
During my time in the field, the majority of my observation time 
was from just being around the place. I recorded day to day events, 
and conversations in a research journal. I made friends, participated 
in social activities, and became a confidante for a number of people. 
In total I was located in the CCG for over a year, and have over 300 
recorded hours of informal observation time when I was located as 
a member of staff in the CCG offices. In addition I spent 202 hours 
of time observing in meetings (see table 6 below). 
In section 3.4.1 above I described how the study divided into four 
phases which I termed establishment, early, middle and late. In 
sections 3.4.3.1 – 3.4.3.4 below I outline the approach to 
observations in each of these phases. In section 3.4.3.5 I provide 
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the detail of networks observed, type of participation, participants, 
and how this related to the study phases. 
3.4.3.1 Establishment phase (June 2012–November 
2012) 
The establishment phase consisted of time in preparation before 
entering the field, and the early period of induction to the field. 
In the pre-entry stage I began to explore websites relating to the 
study site and make connections with potential participants, but did 
not formally begin to visit the field on a regular formal basis as a 
participant observer. During this stage I began to understand or 
“facet” the case (Scholz and Tietje, 2002), gathering basic 
knowledge, sourcing relevant documents, identifying key players, 
and identifying and examining major issues. One specific exercise I 
undertook in this pre-entry stage was to analyse the publically 
available committee papers for the HWB into a summary document. 
In the induction phase, which began in September 2012, I began to 
establish a presence in the CCG, to undertake exploratory 
observations, and to negotiate permission to observe meetings. I 
was allocated a desk in an open plan office in CCG headquarters, 
and became one of the team. In order to gain access I had offered 
to be useful and undertake pieces of work to help out with day to 
day pressures. I was asked to work on the CCG OD plan for the 
company secretary. OD in this plan included those activities 
designed to bring the new CCG organisation into being, and to 
establish it as a collaborative of its member practices. Also as part 
of my negotiation of access to HWB I had shared the summary 
analysis of papers that I referred to above. Officers responsible for 
administering the HWB recognised its usefulness and I was 
consequently asked to prepare the preliminary audit for a peer 
review exercise. Fortuitously these were both projects that gave me 
an overview of key networks that I could potentially observe, and, 
since I had been helpful, generated goodwill going forward. 
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3.4.3.2 Early phase (December 2012–May 2013) 
At the early stage, and guided by the SIT dynamic of relationships 
between doctors, managers, and patients, I negotiated the 
opportunity to observe situations where it was reasonable to 
anticipate this dynamic could be seen. My hosts were helpful in this 
respect, and asked me to lead the CCG response to the NHS Annual 
Planning Guidance, Everyone Counts (NHS Commissioning Board, 
2012), as a participant observer. In order to formulate a response 
to this guidance lead managers would work with commissioning GPs 
to produce plans that responded to local patient need. To this end, I 
held weekly meetings with four assistant directors of 
commissioning, and found myself the centre of a hub of activity to 
co-ordinate the CCGs statement of priorities in the form of a “plan-
on-a-page”; it was a national requirement that each CCG’s complex 
set of priorities should be displayed on one side of A4. This required 
a distillation exercise involving wide consultation, providing me 
access to a wide range of meetings and contacts with 
commissioning managers and GPs. 
As well as undertaking the Everyone Counts planning task, I also 
began to undertake direct observations in a number of key 
networks. These are detailed in the summary tables in section 
3.4.3.5 below. 
3.4.3.3 Middle phase (June 2013–March 2014) 
During the early phase I had collected, coded and analysed data 
simultaneously, and had begun to realise that SIT codes were not 
consistently applied in occupational groups. It was during this stage 
of field work that I made the shift from SIT to BF. In response I 
refined my sampling strategy in order that I could observe the 
interplay of networks, rules and cognitive frames. My data collection 
strategy continued to rely on both participant and direct 
observations. I arranged to participate in the Integrated Care 
Programme (ICP) which was a project to coordinate health and 
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social care services. I also arranged to directly observe meetings 
where new competition rules were being assimilated. 
3.4.3.4 Late phase (April 2014–September 2014) 
By the late stage, I had identified major themes and how they 
related to the BF categories. The research focus at this point was 
one of probing, testing out concepts with participants, and 
validation or modification. The main research method at this point 
was interviews (see 3.4.4). I continued to use direct observation to 
check the validity of theoretical constructs. In order to do this I 
revisited key networks such as the CCG Professional Cabinet (PrC), 
and the Governing Board (GB). 
3.4.3.5 Summary and breakdown of observations 
In this next section I summarise the field work in tabular form. In 
table 5 I detail the main networks, and how they related to the 
three levels of the case study. I also show how networks relate to 
the various study phases. In table 6 I give a breakdown of 
observations by level, hours, participation and observation type.  
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Table 5 Main networks and relevant study phases 
Local Medical 
Committee 
This was a GP professional network independent of the 
CCG. GPs pay a statutory voluntary levy to their LMC 
which then acts to represent their interests in local 
planning and policy matters. 
Middle  
Facilitated 
Learning Events 
(FLE) 
These events had the same constituency as the Total 
Members (TM) meetings. The content was focused on GP 
and practice staff learning. The events that I attended 
followed a format where staff groups were separately 
taught about their distinct role in emergency care. 
Middle  
GP-groups The CCG divided its practices into four GP groups. These 
met monthly. Each group organised differently. These 
groups were variously attended by GPs, practice staff, 
and CCG managers. 
Early and 
middle  
Governing 
Board 
This consisted of CCG managers, executive GPs, lay 
members, and independent clinicians from hospital and 
community services. This was the overview body for 
CCG, and business relating to strategy, governance, and 
procurement was signed off here. 
Early, middle, 
and late 
Health and 
Wellbeing Board 
This was a statutory committee of the local authority. It 
included senior representatives of local agencies whose 
work impacted on health and wellbeing. 
Early, middle, 
and late 
Integrated Care 
Programme 
This was a sub-programme of the HWB. It consisted of a 
programme board, a programme team, and various 
workstreams. 
Middle and 
late 
Planning and 
Prioritisation 
Committee and 
planning teams 
The CCG had a network of “planners” which included 
commissioning managers, finance staff, and GP 
executives. The Everyone Counts planning guidance was 
responded to in this network. 
Early  
Professional 
Cabinet 
This consisted of executive GPs and CCG directors. It 
was the key meeting where the manager to doctor 
discussions would take place.  
Middle and 
late 
Total Members 
Meetings 
This was a CCG wide arrangement whereby all practices 
met together, and took part in setting the strategic 
direction for the CCG. It would typically be attended 150 
+ practice staff.  
Early and 
middle  
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Table 6 Observations by level, hours, participants, and type 
Meeting/network Observations Participants  Type of 
observation 
Operational Practice Level (66 hours) 
Guru GP group 8 Gurus meetings, 
including 4 ordinary 
meetings, 1 AGM and 3 
practice managers 
meetings. 
GPs 
CCG managers 
Direct with an 
element of 
participation 
arising from 
presenting 
Everyone 
Counts, and 
involvement in 
Integrated 
Care 
Principled 
Collaboration GP 
group  
4 meetings GPs 
Practice nurses 
Practice managers 
CCG middle managers  
Chamber GP 
group 
4 Meetings  GPs 
Practice nurses 
Practice managers 
CCG middle managers  
New World GP 
group 
5 meetings including 1 
focus group  
GPs 
Practice nurses 
Practice managers 
CCG middle managers 
Strategic Collaboration Level (84 hours)  
Total Members 2 meetings GPs (100 +) 
Practice nurses 
Practice managers 
CCG middle managers 
Direct  
AQP 3 Events GPs (100 +) 
Practice nurses 
Practice managers 
LMC managers 
CCG senior managers 
Direct and 
participant   
Professional 
Cabinet 
4 meetings Executive GPs 
CCG senior managers 
Direct with 
participation 
relating to 
Everyone 
Counts 
Governing Board  8 meetings including one 
AGM and one 
development session 
Executive GPs 
CCG senior managers 
Lay members 
Independent nurse and doctor 
Direct  
Facilitated 
Learning Events 
2 Events  GPs (100 +) 
Hospital doctors 
Direct  
Creation of CCG 
Organisational 
Development 
Plan 
Desk based activity CCG senior manager Participant 
Everyone 
Counts Planning 
Process 
Planning and 
Prioritisation 
Committee 
1 Initiation meeting 
2 Resource allocation 
and prioritisation 
committees 
6 team meetings with 
managers 
Executive GPs 
CCG senior managers 
CCG middle managers 
 
Participant 
Interagency Strategic Partnership Level (52 hours)  
Health and Well 
Being Board  
4 meetings Full board membership Direct  
Integrated Care 
Programme 
1 CDG event 
7 ICP meetings  
3 Process and 
Procedures Group  
ICP programme team, 
including LA, Castlecare, and 
GP representatives 
Participant 
HWB peer and 
follow up 
Organisational 
Development 
sessions 
4 4 meetings 
5 3 sessions. 
Full HWB board membership Participant  
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3.4.4 Interviews and direct questioning 
Because my study was so dependent on observation and therefore 
dependent on my interpretation of those observations, it was 
crucially important to use another method for triangulation. Radnor 
describes the need for interviews to supplement observations: 
“Watching and listening can give us a sense of the social life of 
others. We can begin to recognize patterns of behaviour and the 
quality of relationships by observing the interactions between 
people. But if we want to understand what makes them do what 
they do then we need to ask them.” (Radnor, 2002:p48) 
I asked direct questions in order to validate my interpretations of 
participants’ ideas. I did this at all stages of the research, although 
the bulk of formal transcribed interviews took place in the late stage 
of the study. Semi-structured interviews took place throughout the 
study with the majority between April and September 2014. A 
schedule of interviews with dates is provided at Appendix 3. 
Glesne and Peshkin (1992:pp81-82) in a chapter called Making 
Words Fly describe how high quality interview data depends largely 
on the human relationship and listening. Because I was known to 
people in the field it was important that I be reflexive in conduct 
and subsequent analysis of interviews. I was conscious that as an 
ex-manager there was a danger that interviewees would endow me 
with authority. In order to counter this, I consciously emphasised 
that I was there to mine their views and opinions rather than to give 
approval or disapproval. I encouraged interviewees to share what 
they really thought, not just what they thought was appropriate to 
their occupational role or what they thought I wanted to hear. I 
conducted the interviews as discussions, especially when asking 
questions of someone who had a tendency to reserve opinions. 
In the early stage I undertook four interviews. Two of these were 
spontaneous, unstructured, and non-directive, and initiated by the 
interviewees. A GP with an interest in training, development, and 
safe-guarding issues (Dr Lovett in future chapters), and a research 
orientated practice manager self-selected to be interviewed in this 
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way. These were akin to informal chats, recorded in writing, rather 
than digitally, and were useful in informing the development of lines 
of inquiry. I also conducted formal recorded and transcribed 
interviews with the director of finance and a primary care manager 
at this stage. For these I used general questions from the topic 
guide that had been included in the protocol approved by the 
University and NHS included at Appendix 4. This was derived from 
SIT and was focused on interests and the relative influence of 
doctors, managers, and patients in the commissioning process. 
For interviews in the middle and late stage of the study I prepared 
in-depth individual topic guides based on emerging theoretical 
constructs and which took into account the position of the 
interviewee in relation to these constructs. Whilst remaining within 
the parameters of the agreed study protocol, I used the interviews 
to probe further the major empirical themes of: the establishment 
of new organisations, history and legacy, changes to the profession, 
competition, and integration (see section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 below). 
3.5 Data processing and analysis 
3.5.1 Guiding sources, and training 
Guiding principles for the analysis of data were drawn from Miles, 
Huberman and Saldaña’s Qualitative Data Analysis; A Methods 
Sourcebook Edition 3 (2013), a revision of Matthew B. Miles and A. 
Michael Huberman’s (1994) original seminal textbook. This later 
sourcebook was updated by Johnny Saldaña following the deaths of 
the original authors. It incorporated recent developments in 
qualitative research techniques, including the advancement of 
computer aided data analysis, whilst remaining faithful to the ideas 
in the earlier work. In addition, I also referred extensively to 
Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). 
My analysis was undertaken using version 10 of NVivo, a qualitative 
data analysis software package. I received initial training in the use 
of NVivo from both CLARHC- NDL and Nottingham University 
81 
 
Business School. I became an active member of a LinkedIn NVivo 
user group, and a regular attendee at the NVivo drop-in workshops 
run by the university’s Graduate School. 
3.5.2 Data processing and preparation 
My study was of a single case using qualitative methods. On both 
these counts the power of my data would need to be firmly 
established if my findings were to be successfully defended. This 
was something that I was aware of from the outset. To this end I 
ensured that I was thorough and systematic in three ways. Firstly, I 
recorded my observations conscientiously and in detail. Secondly, I 
followed an ongoing systematic discipline of data analysis. Thirdly I 
asked direct questions of participants in order to probe further 
developing concepts (see 3.4.4 Interviews). 
My tools for capturing observational data were simple, consisting of 
pens, pencils, and spiral bound notebooks. I used the same 
notebooks to create two types of notes. The first were jottings of 
observations which I would work on further within a few hours 
whilst events remained fresh in my memory, converting initial 
jottings into fully fledged stories. Before starting the study, Writing 
Ethnographic Fieldnotes (Emerson et al., 1995) was an invaluable 
read. I recorded chance interactions, as well as observations of 
formal situations. In my observational jottings I included 
descriptions of buildings, the fabric and equipment of rooms, views 
from windows, the clothes people wore, and rituals around food and 
refreshments. The same note books were also my personal research 
journal in which I recorded thoughts, ideas, and feelings. More often 
than not I worked on the jottings and wrote the journal at my desk 
in the offices of the CCG. I created the fieldnotes notes in Microsoft 
Word. Somehow the ambience helped me to capture the essence of 
my experience, as well as making me look busy when not working 
on the content of one of my participant observation projects. It was 
during this reflexive and reflective process, immersed in the 
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minutiae, that themes began to take shape. This is how 
ethnography works, says Wolcott: 
“The precursor to finding themes is to identify patterns of 
behaviour, and the precursor to that are the minute observations of 
specific instances of behaviour. – the little vignettes that we enter 
into our daily fieldnotes.” (2010:p40) 
An awakening for me was that there were so many things that as a 
manager I had previously failed to notice. I had the feeling of 
entering a familiar world with new eyes.  
Interviews were recorded digitally, and then transcribed in full as 
Microsoft Word documents. Interview transcripts and fieldnotes 
were uploaded into the NVivo database, as were the field 
documents that I had collected. I would then further reflect using 
the memo and annotations functionality of Nvivo in order to create 
“analytic notes” (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992:p49). These analytic 
notes were informed by my journal entries. 
3.5.3 Structuring and coding the data  
3.5.3.1 Sources, and first and second coding cycles  
For the purposes of data analysis I used coding concepts from Miles, 
Huberman and Saldaña (2013). The structure of my NVivo data 
base and subsequent coding progressed through several iterations, 
and was done in parallel with my data collection. As already noted 
in Chapter Two: Literature Review, data analysis and theorising 
were interwoven processes. 
The first analytic step was to decide the main categories of the 
NVivo database. Experts advised to use the function “sources” as 
the basic building block. The list of sources should be simple and 
remain constant in order to anchor the more flexible processes of 
analysis. My four “sources” were OPL, SCL, ISPL and Interviews. 
The next step was to attribute data to the sources. There were 
analytic decisions to be made even at this point. For example were 
CCG-wide meetings of all GPs to be classed as OPL or SCL? Was the 
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ICP an OPL, SCL, or ISPL source, since it had ramifications at all 
levels? I decided that activity that could be separated into its GP 
group dimensions would be coded at OPL, undifferentiated CCG-
wide activity would be coded at the SCL, and activity accountable to 
the HWB would be coded at ISPL. 
I began the analysis with a fine-grained reading. This was a 
cumulative process, extra sets of notes being regularly added as the 
fieldwork progressed. I used coding techniques from Miles et al. 
(2013:p73-81). I began by coding holistically (large chunks of 
data), and simultaneously (applying more than one code to each 
chunk of data). The codes used in the first cycle were a combination 
of descriptive and values codes. Descriptive codes are a label to 
identify a topic or category. Value codes relate to actors’ values, 
attitudes, and beliefs. 
3.5.3.1.1 First coding cycle: Codes derived from Structural 
Interests Theory 
My initial intention, as described in Chapter Two: Literature Review, 
was to develop theory based on the SIT pattern of dominance-
challenge-repression between doctors, managers, and patients. 
Drawing heavily on Yin’s (2009) case study analysis technique of 
‘pattern matching’, I had derived a matrix using a combination of 
descriptive and value codes. The codes are identified and defined in 
table 7 below. 
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Table 7 Structural Interests Theory codes 
Main codes Definition Sub codes 
Descriptive Codes: occupational groups 
Doctor 
 
Relating to doctors including medically qualified 
managers 
 
Manager 
 
Relating to non-medical managers  
Patient Relating to patient representatives, or staff 
specifically advocating for the patient 
 Patient view point 
 Advocate view point 
Values Codes: relative influence  
Dominance 
 
A dominant group would be secure, and would 
not need to actively assert dominance. Evidence 
for dominance would be those situations when 
decisions and outcomes favoured the interests of 
a dominant group without effort expended to 
achieve this 
 Outcomes favouring 
a particular group or 
network  
 Behavioural or 
attitudinal indications 
of assumed 
dominance 
Repression 
 
Evidence of repression would be occasions where 
a group appeared to have had little or no 
influence on the outcome of decisions. In addition 
members of that group may appear unheard, and 
may express feelings of frustration or 
powerlessness 
 A decision outcome 
unfavourable to the 
groups interests  
 Attempts to influence 
with little or no 
impact.  
 Attitudes of 
frustration 
 Attitudes of passivity  
Challenge 
 
Evidence for challenge would be those 
circumstances where one group of actors openly 
critiqued and/or required change of another 
group. 
 Questioning and 
critique of another’s 
opinion or position 
Yin’s model works on the basis of testing predictions, and my 
predictions were as follows. Firstly, I anticipated finding evidence of 
the repression of patients’ interests. Secondly, I anticipated finding 
examples of GP-strategies to protect their own financial and/or 
workload interests. Thirdly, I anticipated that I would identify 
patterns that correlated to distinct categories of manager; doctor; 
and citizen or patient, and that doctors would be either challenging 
or dominant. 
I investigated the correlations of the descriptive and values codes 
across the three levels, using NVivo query capability. There was no 
correlation of doctors and dominance at the SCL and the ISPL. The 
only level at which doctors attracted the code dominance was at the 
OPL where the GP groups Gurus and Chamber attracted the label 
repression whilst the GP group PC attracted the label dominance. In 
other words, in those instances where doctors were coded as 
dominant it appeared to be in relation to other doctors rather than 
managers or patients. At the ISPL doctors at the HWB were labelled 
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repression whilst LA members were labelled dominant. There was 
overlap between the codes repression and challenge linked to 
doctors at all levels. 
The correlation between the codes repression and doctor was an 
unexpected finding, as was the relationship of dominance and 
repression between groups of doctors. Also unexpected was the 
absence of doctor dominance other than at the OPL, and then only 
in relation to other doctors. 
These unexpected findings triggered an abductive shift from SIT to, 
eventually, BF (see 2.4). At the time I noticed these patterns I was 
not yet in a position to determine a new way to theorise. The 
second coding cycle described in the next section was an important 
next step in this respect. 
3.5.3.1.2 Second coding cycle: descriptive codes derived 
from the empirical setting and Medical Sociology literature 
My second coding cycle was the application of descriptive codes 
derived from my empirical observations, and my reading of the 
Medical Sociology literature. I had already identified two further 
descriptive themes from the Medical Sociology literature (see 
2.2.3). The first of these was the importance of history and legacies. 
The second was the main changes to the profession i.e. hybridity, 
restratification and the delimitation of clinical autonomy. 
Coding was systematic, but also fluid in that ideas and insights were 
simultaneously captured in memos and annotations which led to the 
identification of three further codes. These were establishment of 
new organisations, competition, and integration. Data labelled 
establishment of new organisations related to the processes to set 
up the CCG, the HWB, and associated structures. For the codes 
competition and integration it is useful to use examples from the 
data to illustrate, especially since these data include instances of 
confusion or ambiguity with the potential to trigger sensemaking. 
These examples are shown below. 
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Competition 
The code competition was originally identified through a process of 
open coding. One of the rules introduced in the HSCA 2012 was the 
extension of competitive procurement processes. It was apparent 
that the ambiguity associated with the co-existence of imperatives 
to compete and to co-operate caused confusion, concern, and even 
fear. There was an ever present awareness of the perceived 
inappropriateness of European competition law, designed to control 
anti-competitive processes at the level of large-scale industry, 
applying to the small general practice businesses. There was a 
general sense that competition was not the best mechanism to 
secure health care. Some examples of the reaction to competition in 
the data are shown below: 
Competition data example 1  
Dr Strong: Okay.  (Sighs).  I think that it is a problem, a problem 
that is brewing.  The bureaucracy around competition, tendering, 
awarding even fairly basic contracts by getting a quite qualified 
provider is causing problems in the supply side.  It’s too complex 
for small practices, and that’s evidenced by the fact that it’s just 
simply not applying, so there’s a range of services that they’re 
either now not providing or not being paid for providing.  So that’s 
making life hard for those small practices, making life hard for 
patients of those practices and there’s a huge overhead in 
procurement, and it’s been estimated the Government takes up 10 
percent of the total costs of the service that you’re trying to 
procure and I think that it is, I know why we’re doing it, I can 
understand the legal reasons, I understand all the procurement 
rules and laws and so on, but I think that it is [swearword], 
bureaucratic, wasteful, inefficient, unnecessary.  A completely 
different model of running health services if I were Health Minister 
(StrongInterview) 
Dr Strong is an executive GP with a long-standing involvement in 
GP commissioning. This extract shows a concern that competition 
was too complex for small practices, and that the competition 
initiative was inefficient and costly. 
Competition data example 2 
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Dr Whitbread: “Dermatology, an interesting consequence of the 
modern world. It was being suggested that the staff move onto 
TUPE contracts. Consultants don’t want to move to [the treatment 
centre].” (NWfocusgroup1) 
Dr Whitbread is the GP chairman of the CCG. This example shows 
that there were concerns regarding the interface of the NHS and the 
private sector, especially in relation to employment. NHS staff did 
not want to leave NHS employment. 
Competition data example 3 
Dr Johnson: “Where Drs are less skilled at using business speak, 
then what they say doesn’t get heard. This cluster has a practice 
development focus, whilst also concerned with affordability.  Both 
practices are very focused on the future of society. This includes 
the multi-ethnic focus that is central to both our ethos.” 
Practice manager: “We are not afraid of AQP……..hear the fear of 
competition.” (NWfocusgroup1) 
Dr Johnson is a GP who attends meetings of a small GP-group called 
New World. This extract shows actors talking about the fear of 
competition generally, illustrated in this case by a denial. 
Competition data example 4 
Since the AQP process there were lots of little providers dotted 
about everywhere. There was a lot of worry about this in the room, 
especially regarding continuity of records. How would a scan be 
compared to an earlier or later picture? The mood of the meeting 
became one of agitation during this item. The key worry though 
was access to previous scans, and electronic communication. (PC 
fieldnote 1) 
This extract shows worry about the operational implications of 
services being provided outside of the NHS, especially with regard 
to diagnostic results. 
Integration 
The code integration, like competition, was originally identified 
through a process of open coding. It was apparent that actors saw 
integration as a panacea. Whenever there was a need to simplify or 
streamline services the word “integration” would be used indicating 
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that actors saw it as a panacea to solve all problems to do with the 
need to co-operate across organisational or professional boundaries. 
Because the term was used non-specifically there was data that 
suggested confusion about what integration meant. There was also 
data that suggested suspicion that the term could be used to 
obfuscate a hidden intention to cut costs. Some examples of data 
are shown below: 
Integration data example 1 
For the fourth time I heard Sarah do the integrated care 
presentation. She began by saying this is the only way of 
addressing the needs of the elderly and people with LTCs. The idea 
is that people would manage at home, get help when they needed 
to, and would come out when they were ready to. “We need to 
reconfigure teams, simplify processes, make access easier, and be 
more proactive. We need to be less task focused, and buck passing, 
and more holistic” (PC fieldnote 1) 
Sarah is the project manager for the ICP. This is an example of 
integration being seen as a solution for multiple problems, when 
there was no real evidence that it would work out that way. 
Integration data example 2 
Sarah gave a presentation about integrated care “It’s such a huge 
transformational change”. Dr Kerala commented that the groups 
were health dominated. “Will this process help hospital discharge?” 
he asked. Sarah confirmed that this was the hope “The hospital 
transition is part of the vision”. Dr Whitbread pointed out the link 
with Efficient Economy, a programme to deliver nationally required 
savings across the health and social care community. “This is a 
delivery programme for EE” confirmed Sarah. Dr Whitbread added 
“It’s a substantive change, how will we explain it to our patients”, 
and “all the change streams in the system…..there’s a slight risk of 
lots of things happening and not being co-ordinated”. Tramell (a lay 
member who used to be a LA member) pointed out the risk of a  
“knock on effect of the City Council budget cuts……anything the 
Council Officers don’t believe is a statutory duty will get cut”. Cat, 
who has a background in working with general practice, 
commented that working with “64 independent practices is a bigger 
problem”. (GBfieldnote2) 
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Sarah is giving a presentation about Integrated Care to the GB. Dr 
Kerala is the GP executive lead for integrated care. Cat is the CCG 
Chief Executive. In this extract integration is put forward as a 
solution for hospital discharge problems. There is also an 
acknowledgement that there are risks attached, that it will be 
complex to involve all the practices, and that it will not necessarily 
be well funded, particularly given the LA needs to save money. 
Integration data example 3 
Cllr Lennon:  “All I get is some tablets from the Doctor, I don’t need 
to get integrated care. I can have as many tablets as I like now I’m 
60” (HWBfieldnote8) 
This is an example of a LA member being unconvinced that 
integration was necessary, and was an indication to me that it was 
not seen by all as the solution to all service co-ordination problems. 
 
I was particularly interested to explore the impact of competition 
and integration existing as contemporaneous policy directives. 
During the coding process, further sub-codes were applied as I 
identified more subtle distinctions in the data. The codes are 
identified and defined in table 8 below. 
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Table 8 Codes derived empirically and from Medical Sociology 
Descriptive 
Code  
Definition Sub codes  
Establishment 
of new 
organisations 
Relating to discussion that focused on the 
mechanics of setting up new structures and 
networks in response to the new rules 
associated with HSCA 2012 
 CCG establishment 
HWB establishment  
Changes to the 
profession 
 
Relating to how the GPs as a profession were 
organising, rewarding, and monitoring its 
leaders and members. 
 Clinical leadership 
 Clinical autonomy 
 Restratification,  
 Hybridisation, 
History and 
legacy 
 
Evidence or absence of evidence of the impact 
of history  
 Fundholding legacy  
 Non-fundholding 
legacy 
 NHS Family  
 History of migration 
Competition Relating to the introduction of or the response 
to market based commissioning mechanisms. 
This included data relating to new initiatives 
introduced by HSCA 2012, and also pre-
existing examples of competition in the 
procurement of health care initiatives.  
 HSCA 2012 initiatives 
 Pre-existing initiatives 
 Responses and 
attitudes of actors to 
competition  
 
Integration 
 
Relating to the inter-dependency of services, 
and inter-organisationally based delivery of 
services. At the time of my research 
Integration was a contested phrase. It was 
taken to include integration of health and 
social care services. For the purposes of 
coding, I also included those occasions when 
health services were interdependent between 
separate health care organisations, including 
between GP surgeries.  
 Health and social care 
integration 
 Primary and secondary 
health systems 
integration 
 Integration across 
primary care and 
primary and 
community health 
services  
At the OPL I began to see a correlation between the patterns of 
dominance and repression and patterns of professional changes in 
the GP-groups. PC attracted the label dominance, and also had a 
high degree of restratification. The Gurus attracted the label 
repression and not restratification or hybridisation. Repression, 
dominance, and challenge also appeared to correlate to the nature 
of the legacy that the group shared. At the ISPL, GPs attracted the 
label repression, whilst Public Health and LA members attracted the 
labels dominance and challenge. 
3.5.3.2 Moving forward with data analysis: transforming 
aggregate patterns to theoretical inferences 
3.5.3.2.1 Implications of first and second coding cycles 
The analysis using the SIT concepts of dominance, challenge, and 
repression had revealed important insights into the relative 
influence between doctors, and between doctors and other actors. 
Furthermore these relativities were correlated to differences in 
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legacy and the implementation of changes to the profession, as 
doctors responded to new rules. If SIT was not to be the basis for 
theorising, then the next step was to decide what the theoretical 
framework would be. The way I approached this was to step back 
from analysis and review the emerging story first by level, and then 
by code. 
3.5.3.2.2 Theoretical Inferences by case study level 
What follows is a series of three tables (9-11), one for each level of 
the nested case study. Each table includes a summary of the data 
content by second cycle codes: establishment of new organisations; 
history and legacy; changes to the profession; competition; and 
integration. The SIT categories are now longer presented as 
separate codes; instead instances identified as dominance, 
challenge, and repression are now incorporated under the five 
second cycle headings. Alongside each data summary are 
associated theoretical inferences. I have used writer’s prerogative to 
present these by using the terminology of BF, although at the time 
they were initially identified I used words like “group” and “meeting” 
instead of network, and “policy” and “directive” instead of rule. My 
intention in using BF language at this stage is to make transparent 
the rationale for the choice of theoretical framework. 
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Table 9 Operational Practice Level theoretical inferences 
 Summary of data content Theoretical inferences 
E
s
ta
b
lis
h
m
e
n
t 
o
f n
e
w
 
o
rg
a
n
is
a
tio
n
s
 
CCG establishment did not result in 
change to GP group networks. 
 At the operational level, pre-existing 
networks endured rule change. 
L
e
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There was an OPL-wide shared legacy of 
belonging to the “NHS Family”. 
 
Within this, GP-groups each had 
differentiated shared legacies. These 
legacies related to  
 Fundholding  
 Non-fundholding legacy 
 History of migration 
The GP group with a non- fundholding 
legacy appeared dominant especially in 
relation to the network with a fundholding 
legacy. In the Gurus group there were 
examples of doctors feeling powerless and 
overwhelmed linked to the legacy of small 
practice business units. 
 Networks reflected established 
relationships between people who had 
worked together in the past. 
 In turn these related to previous 
experience of responding to rules 
together. 
 Some networks/legacies had more 
influence than others. 
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Linked to legacies, see above, GP group 
networks had different patterns of 
adoption of changes to the profession. 
 The distribution of actors within 
networks was a product of the 
different patterns of hybridisation, 
restratification and the approach to 
clinical autonomy. 
C
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Competitive processes were not enacted 
at this level.  
 
Tightly coupled relationships within and 
between NHS networks prevailed despite 
separate commissioner-provider roles. 
 Competition rules not enacted at 
operational level.  
 Tightly coupled relationships prevailed 
despite rule change that implied 
separation. 
In
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Data coded as “Integration” at OPL related 
to access to services for referring GPs. 
These were other NHS services (including 
community services) rather than health 
and social care integration. 
 At the operational level, integration 
meant the daily interface with other 
services and the practices. 
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Table 10 Strategic Collaboration Level theoretical inferences 
 
Summary of data content Theoretical inferences 
E
s
ta
b
lis
h
m
e
n
t o
f 
n
e
w
 o
rg
a
n
is
a
tio
n
s
 
Data included discussions in meetings, as 
well as specific OD interventions to enact 
the establishment of the CCG. The 
arrangements in the new CCG replicated 
those of the outgoing PCT as far as the 
rules allowed. 
 The establishment of the new 
organisation was enacted at this level. 
 Time was set aside to discuss new 
rules, and to reinforce new and 
existing network arrangements. 
 OD interventions were important. 
 Networks remained intact as far as the 
rules allowed. L
e
g
a
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Within the CCG leadership team, GPs and 
managers conceptualised the “NHS as a 
system”. This aligned with the legacy in 
the non-fundholding GP-group (PC). It 
was also linked to the NHS Family legacy.  
 The historically embedded network of 
the NHS Family and the wider NHS 
system were important. 
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Executive GPs leaders were distinguished 
from the rank and file in a stratified 
arrangement. These leaders encouraged 
compliance. Rank and file GPs might 
grumble, but did not resist. Certain 
Executive GPs exerted greater influence 
than others. This was evidenced through: 
their relative influence in priority setting 
related to Everyone Counts; and their 
prominent leadership roles in OD 
interventions designed to influence the 
rank and file. GPs from the dominant GP-
group (PC) had the greatest influence. 
 An elite group of hybrid leaders 
encouraged compliance from rank and 
file doctors. 
 Leaders communicated expectations 
about how followers should respond to 
rule change. 
 Verbal expressions of resistance were 
antecedents to compliance with the 
expectations of leaders. 
 Members of one GP group appeared to 
exert more influence than members of 
the others. 
C
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Doctors were identified has having an 
inherent conflict of interest resulting from 
dual commissioner-provider role  
Doctor-leaders and managers adopted 
differentiated positions during 
implementation of the competition rule 
with doctors challenging managers on the 
appropriateness and efficacy of 
competition. 
When rank-and-file doctors were required 
to compete they retreated into a uni-
professional network to consider 
implications. Initial challenge gave way to 
compliance.  
 Actors within networks actively 
adopted differentiated positions when 
considering the impact of competition 
rule, including separation of doctors 
and managers, and uniprofessional 
retreat of GPs. 
 Dual roles of provider and purchaser 
were identified as conflicting. 
 Doctors showed little resistance when 
competition rules impacted them. 
 
In
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When problems in service continuity arose 
as a result of competition, these were 
solved by co-operative efforts across NHS 
Family. 
The NHS Family network was actively 
nurtured using OD interventions, which 
stressed the integrated interdependent 
nature of healthcare. 
 The NHS Family network provided a 
counterpoint to the competition rule 
and was the basis for co-operative 
problem-solving. 
 Tightly coupled relationships of the 
NHS Family network were actively 
nurtured using OD. 
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Table 11 Interagency Strategic Partnership Level theoretical inferences 
 
Summary of data content Theoretical inferences 
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Two predecessor committees were 
merged into the HWB giving the 
impression of continuity. However 
responsibilities and individuals changed 
There were examples of specific OD 
interventions to establish new 
arrangements. These included an 
external peer review, and internally 
instigated development sessions. There 
were also items about set-up at the HWB 
itself. 
 Pre-existing networks were merged and 
changed, giving the impression of 
continuity were in fact this was disrupted 
significantly. 
 Time was spent on establishment 
including external and internal OD 
interventions. 
L
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Actors had no shared legacy. Even 
though some individuals had previous 
experience of working together, the new 
rules had disrupted the organisational 
forms that underpinned this, for example 
Public Health was transferred to the LA. 
 The multi-agency partnership consisted 
of individuals with either an absence of 
or a disruption to networks with shared 
legacies.  
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The distinction between GPs and PH 
doctors appeared to be lost to partners. 
All doctors were simply “medical”. LA 
members challenged the perceived 
dominance of the “medical model” on the 
basis of democratic legitimacy. LA 
members were the dominant interest 
when it came to resource decisions. 
In strategic discussions at the HWB, GPs 
were relatively passive (compared to OPL 
and SCL) tending to follow the lead of the 
DPH. 
In contrast, in the ICP, GPs took an 
active role in designing systems to 
integrate health and social care acting as 
hybrid manager-clinicians. Despite active 
involvement, geographically based 
networks were put in place, despite 
objections from GP leaders. 
 Democratic representatives challenged 
the medical model of the doctors. In fact 
the LA members established themselves 
as the dominant group having most 
influence over resource allocation 
decisions  
 GPs were passive in multi-agency 
strategic discussions. 
 In contrast, when planning to 
operationalise those strategies, GPs 
enacted hybrid doctor-manager roles 
and engaged enthusiastically in service 
design 
 GPs had limited influence in strategic 
and operational decisions.  
C
o
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Competition did not feature in discussions 
at either the HWB or in the ICP. The 
focus was on integration. 
 Rules with significant relevance in 
individual agencies would not necessarily 
have relevance in a multi-sector setting. 
In
te
g
ra
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There was significant overlap with 
“Changes to the Profession”. 
Data coded fell into two main areas. 
1) Discussions about the integration of 
organisational strategies, including 
examples of agreed joint priority areas 
and associated action plans. 
2) Integration of health and social care 
services. This was a joint priority area, 
and was enacted using project 
management in a set of focused networks 
with a project manager who “brokered” 
disagreements. 
Integration meant two things: 
 Integration of strategies, including 
priority setting in multi-sector network.  
 Integration of operational services. This 
was coordinated by individuals placed to 
“broker” disagreements  
See also “Changes to the Profession” above.  
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3.5.3.2.3 Theoretical inferences by code 
The next stage was to consider the inferences by code across the 
levels, which I discuss below. Each section begins with a tabular 
presentation of the theoretical inferences for that code. 
Establishment of New Organisations 
Table 12 Theoretical inferences: establishment of new organisations 
OPL SCL ISPL 
 At the operational level, 
pre-existing networks 
endured rule change. 
 The establishment of the 
new organisation was 
enacted at this level. 
 Time was set aside to 
discuss new rules, and 
to reinforce new and 
existing network 
arrangements. 
 OD interventions were 
important. 
 Networks remained 
intact as far as the rules 
allowed. 
 Pre-existing networks 
were merged and 
changed, giving the 
impression of continuity 
were in fact the rule 
change meant that 
networks were 
significantly 
reconfigured. 
 Time was spent on 
establishment including 
external and internal OD 
interventions. 
A review of the data associated with the code establishment of new 
organisations revealed different approaches at each of the three 
levels. At the OPL the establishment of the new organisation did not 
result in a change to networks, with the implication that changes in 
rules do not affect networks at all levels, in this case, a rule change 
implemented at the strategic level did not result in changes at the 
operational level. The establishment of the new CCG was enacted at 
the SCL, were it was the focus of significant activity, including 
protected time to discuss new rules and to reinforce network 
arrangements. Internally driven OD activities were important in 
supporting this process. As far as possible, pre-existing networks 
were preserved. At the ISPL, a significant amount of activity took 
place to establish the HWB. The merger of previously existing 
committees meant that at first glance it appeared that networks had 
been preserved, however in fact the new rules had required 
significant reconfiguration of responsibilities and networks. OD 
interventions were used, including external interventions, to support 
establishment. The theoretical implications of this were:  
 Rules were not enacted at all levels.  
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 Structures were preserved through rule change where 
possible, although sometimes changes to networks could be 
obscured by this seeming continuity.  
 Where networks were changed by rules, then OD processes 
were used to reinforce these changes. 
 The nature of the OD processes differed between levels. 
History and legacy 
Table 13 Theoretical inferences: history and legacy 
OPL SCL ISPL 
 Networks reflected 
established 
relationships between 
people who had worked 
together in the past. 
 In turn these related to 
previous experience of 
responding to rules 
together. 
 Some networks/legacies 
had more influence than 
others. 
 The historically 
embedded network of 
the NHS Family and the 
wider NHS system were 
important. 
 The multi-agency 
partnership consisted of 
individuals with either 
an absence of or a 
disruption to networks 
with shared legacies.  
A review of the data associated with the code history and legacy, 
showed that history had an impact on how actors interpreted rules 
at all levels. At the OPL GP-groups interpreted their commissioning 
duty based on their members past experience of working together. 
Each GP-group had a distinct legacy. These differences resulted in a 
disparity of influence when it came to priority setting and resource 
allocation. At both the OPL and SCL there was a shared legacy of 
NHS Family. The historically embedded network of the NHS Family 
and the wider NHS system were important. The multi-agency 
partnership consisted of individuals with either an absence of or a 
disruption to networks with shared legacies. The theoretical 
inferences were: 
 Legacy affected how actors interpreted rules. 
 Legacy impacted on priority setting and resource allocation 
 In a context with multiple partners, shared legacies were less 
likely to exist. 
 Networks could include individuals with a shared legacy, or a 
previously shared a legacy that was now disrupted. 
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Changes to the Profession 
Table 14 Theoretical inferences: changes to the profession 
OPL SCL ISPL 
 The distribution of actors 
within networks was a 
product of the different 
patterns of hybridisation, 
restratification and 
approach to clinical 
autonomy.  
 An elite group of hybrid 
leaders encouraged 
compliance from rank 
and file doctors. 
 Leaders communicated 
expectations about how 
followers should respond 
to rule change. 
 Verbal expressions of 
resistance were 
antecedents to 
compliance with the 
expectations of leaders.  
 Members of one GP 
group appeared to exert 
more influence than 
members of the others. 
 Democratic 
representatives 
challenged doctors.  
 LA members established 
themselves as the 
dominant group having 
most influence over 
resource allocation 
decisions.  
 GPs were passive in 
multi-agency strategic 
discussions. 
 In contrast, when 
planning to operationalise 
those strategies, GPs 
enacted hybrid doctor-
manager roles and 
engaged enthusiastically 
in service design. 
 GPs had limited influence 
in strategic and 
operational decisions.  
A review of the data associated with the code changes to the 
profession showed different patterns of adoption at each of the 
three levels. The OPL was a largely uni-professional network of GP 
practices, organised into four sub-networks called GP-groups. 
Differences in the adoption of hybridisation, restratification, and the 
approach to clinical autonomy resulted in different patterns of 
relationships and leadership within each of the networks. Members 
of one GP group appeared to exert more influence than members of 
the others with impacts at both the OPL and the SCL. At the SCL an 
elite group hybrid doctor manager leaders encouraged compliance 
from rank and file doctors. GP-Leaders communicated expectations 
of how rank and file doctors should respond to new rules. Rank-and-
file doctors showed some resistance in the form of challenge and 
grumbling; this was an antecedent to compliance with the 
expectations of leaders. At the ISPL, GPs, who operated as hybrid 
elite leaders at OPL and SCL, were passive in multi-agency strategic 
discussions. In contrast, when planning to operationalise those 
strategies, GPs enacted doctor-manager hybrid roles. GPs however 
appeared to have limited influence in either strategic or operational 
decisions. The LA members challenged perceived dominance of the 
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medical model. In fact the democratic model espoused by the LA 
members appeared to have more influence as evidenced by the 
outcome of decisions. The theoretical implications of this were:  
 There were differences in patterns of adoption of changes to 
profession demonstrated in GP networks 
 Across the CCG wide GP network, hybrid doctor-managers led 
and encouraged compliance from the wider constituency of 
professionals. 
 Doctor-manager hybrids were passive in non-clinical settings. 
 At the ISPL, perceived medical dominance was challenged by 
democratic representatives. Outcomes of decisions suggested 
that the democratic model had the greater influence. 
Competition 
Table 15 Theoretical inferences: competition 
OPL SCL ISPL 
 Competition rules were 
not enacted at OPL. 
 Tightly coupled 
relationships between 
NHS commissioners and 
providers prevailed 
despite rule change that 
implied decoupling. 
 Actors within networks 
adopted differentiated 
positions when 
considering the impact 
of competition rule. 
 Dual roles of provider 
and purchaser were 
identified as conflicting. 
 Doctors showed little 
resistance when 
competition rules 
impacted them even in 
their own uni-
professional network. 
 Rules with significant 
relevance in individual 
agencies would not 
necessarily have 
relevance in a multi-
sector setting. 
A review of the data associated with the code competition showed 
that this rule had a different impact at each of the three levels. 
Competition rules were not enacted at the OPL, rather there existed 
a general awareness of the rule change, and examples of 
differences in anticipation of impact between GP-groups networks. 
Tightly coupled relationships between NHS commissioners and 
providers continued to exist even though the rule change implied a 
decoupling. At the SCL, managers and doctors within the same 
network actively adopted differentiated positions as part of a 
process of examining the implications of competition rule from 
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different perspectives. For the GPs, dual roles of provider and 
purchaser were identified as conflicting. Rank and file doctors 
showed little resistance when competition rules impacted them. 
Rules with significant relevance in individual agencies would not 
necessarily have relevance at multi-agency level. The theoretical 
implications were:  
 The competition rule was only enacted at one level. It was 
not relevant at the ISPL, and at the OPL there was awareness 
without specific actions being necessary. 
 Rules could result in conflicting roles. 
 There could be differences of opinion between sub-groups of 
actors in a network. Debate between the sub-groups could be 
a mechanism for the implications of new rules to be explored. 
 Co-operative embedded networks survived rule change, and 
enabled shared problem solving when the implementation of 
new rules had unforeseen detrimental consequences. 
Integration 
Table 16 Theoretical inferences: integration 
OPL SCL ISPL 
 At the operational level, 
integration meant the 
daily interface with other 
services and the 
practices. 
 The NHS Family network 
provided a counterpoint 
to the competition rule 
and was the basis for co-
operative problem-
solving. 
 Tightly coupled 
relationships of the NHS 
Family network were 
actively nurtured using 
OD.  
Integration meant two 
things: 
 Integration of strategies, 
including priority setting 
in multi-sector network.  
 Integration of operational 
services, coordinated by 
individuals placed to 
“broker” disagreements  
A review of the data associated with the code integration showed a 
different impact at each of the three levels. At the OPL the GPs were 
interested in the integration of their own services with other health 
and social care services. The focus tended to be on NHS services 
including community nursing services. At both the OPL and the SCL, 
tightly-coupled colleague relationships, especially between GP 
practice teams and attached community nurses, were preserved 
even when commissioning rules implied these relationships should 
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be more loosely-coupled reflecting separated market roles of 
commissioner and provider. In other words, GPs selectively 
occupied the role of commissioner. At the SCL, tightly coupled 
relationships across the integrated NHS Family network were 
actively nurtured using OD. Actors in this integrated network 
worked together to solve unintended problems arising out of the 
implementation of the competition rule. At the ISPL integration 
meant two things. The first was the integration of strategies, 
including priority setting in multi-sector network. GPs were 
relatively passive in relation to this form of integration. The second 
was the integration of operational services. This operational 
integration was organised as a project and coordinated by 
individuals placed to “broker” disagreements. GPs took active roles 
as hybrid doctor-leaders in relation to this form of integration. The 
theoretical implications were: 
 Integration meant different things depending on the nature of 
the network thinking about it. 
 Within the NHS, integration was the relationships that existed 
between healthcare services. The integrated NHS Family 
network was actively nurtured using OD techniques. 
 In the interagency environment integration could be of 
strategies, or of services. GPs were passive in relation to the 
integration of strategies, and active in relation to the 
integration of services. 
 GPs acted as hybrid doctor-managers in relation to 
integration of health and social care services. 
3.5.3.3 Implications for the theoretical framework 
In section 2.3 I described how I made the decision to use BF 
following a recognition that patterns in my data co-incided with its 
analytic categories. Table 17 is a presentation of the theoretical 
inferences identified in 3.5.3.2.3. Beckert integrated rules, 
networks, and cognitive frames into one framework. Sections 
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3.5.3.3.1 -3.5.3.3.3 are descriptions of how the theoretical 
inferences aligned with Beckert’s analytic categories. 
Table 17 Theoretical inferences by code 
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Rules were not enacted at all levels.  
Structures were preserved through rule change where possible, although sometimes 
changes to networks could be obscured by this seeming continuity.  
Where networks were changed by rules, then OD processes were used to reinforce 
these changes. 
The nature of the OD processes differed between levels. H
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Legacy affected how actors interpreted rules. 
Legacy impacted on priority setting and resource allocation. 
In a network with multiple partners, shared legacies were less likely to exist. 
Networks could include individuals with a shared legacy, or a previously shared a 
legacy that was now disrupted. 
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There were differences in patterns of adoption of changes to profession demonstrated 
in GP networks. 
Across the CCG wide GP network, hybrid doctor-managers led and encouraged 
compliance from the wider constituency of professionals. 
Doctor-manager hybrids were passive in non-clinical networks. 
At the ISPL, perceived medical dominance was challenged by democratic 
representatives. Outcomes of decisions suggest that the democratic model had the 
greater influence. C
o
m
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This rule was only enacted at one level. It was not relevant at the ISPL, and at the 
OPL there was awareness without specific actions being necessary.  
Rules could result in conflicting roles.  
There could be differences of opinion between sub-groups of actors in a network. 
Debate between the sub-groups could be a mechanism for the implications of new 
rules to be explored. 
Co-operative embedded networks survived rule change, and enabled shared problem 
solving when the implementation of new rules had unforeseen detrimental 
consequences.  In
te
g
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n
 
Integration meant different things depending on the nature of the network thinking 
about it. 
Within the NHS, integration was the relationships that existed between healthcare 
services. The integrated NHS Family network was actively nurtured using OD 
techniques. 
In the interagency environment integration could be of strategies or of services. GPs 
were passive in relation to the integration of strategies, and active in relation to the 
integration of services.  
GPs acted as hybrid doctor-managers in relation to integration of health and social 
care services. 
3.5.3.3.1 Rules 
Firstly it was possible to identify differences in the impact of rules at 
each level, whether those rules were in the form of national policy 
directives, or local agreements. Not all rules were enacted at all 
levels, and where possible network structures were preserved 
through rule-change. Historical relationships and legacies could be 
preserved or disrupted by rules depending on whether networks 
survived the change. Rule changes appeared often to be the trigger 
for interpretive processes which were reflective of legacies. When 
rules included the requirement to establish new organisations or 
bodies, OD processes were used to guide associated interpretation 
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processes and reinforce network structures through which rules 
would be implemented. It appeared from the first and second 
coding cycles that rules were an important factor in how and why 
GPs commissioned as they did. 
3.5.3.3.2 Networks 
Secondly, it was possible to identify the impact of networks at each 
level. Networks could survive rule changes. Networks appeared to 
be the basis of group responses to rules rather than occupational 
groups, although of course these could coincide. Networks provided 
the relationship and context necessary for legacies to be shared, 
and in turn legacies were a defining factor in the way members of a 
network would organise themselves, and interpret tasks and duties. 
Actors would reshape networks to consider the implications of new 
rules from various perspectives. There were differences in networks: 
some were loosely coupled and others tightly coupled. It appeared 
from the first and second coding cycles that rules were an important 
factor in how and why GPs commissioned as they did. 
3.5.3.3.3 Cognitive Frames 
Thirdly, the importance of interpretation was evidenced. In the 
spatial arrangement of networks that made up my field, it was 
apparent that perspectives on the interpretation of rules were 
developed in those networks. The relationships of actors in networks 
and the relationship between networks were both important 
dimensions in the interpretation of new rules. History and legacy 
affected how actors interpreted rules. In NHS settings, hybrid- 
doctor-managers had an important role in helping actors decide how 
to think. Finally, OD processes were used to help and reinforce 
interpretation processes when rules changed. 
3.5.3.3.4 Third cycle coding using BF; and writing as 
analysis 
The next step was to run a third coding cycle using BF. The codes 
and definitions are described in table 18 below. 
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Table 18 Coding definitions for rule, network, and cognitive frame 
Rule Networks: Cognitive frame: 
External regulatory and 
legal frameworks which 
serve to boundary the 
actions of individuals and 
organisations. This could 
include formal policies and 
directives as well as 
external regulatory rules. 
Any form that was used to 
organise people into groups 
(usually based around 
meetings), including those 
that linked actors with an 
interdependency of task, 
and those that were based 
on professional or 
organisational allegiance. 
Opinions, feelings, thought 
processes, influence, 
dominance, repression, 
challenge. 
At the time I ran this third cycle of analysis, my main analytic 
method was my writing. The stories that I would tell, and the links 
between them, were becoming increasingly clear. It was in the 
process of writing and reviewing the stories that I made a further 
research decision. This was to conceptualise “cognitive frame” as an 
active process, and it was at this stage that I also incorporated the 
sensemaking concepts into the analysis. 
I did this in a number of ways. Firstly, I structured findings using 
the SP analytic co-ordinates of wider contexts, temporality, and 
distributed sensemaking (see 2.2.3-2.2.5). Secondly I weaved into 
the stories the key tenets of and triggers for sensemaking described 
in section 2.5.1. Thirdly, I incorporated a number of key concepts 
from the literature that had particular relevance in this study. These 
are shown in table 19 below. 
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Table 19 Sensemaking concepts important in this thesis 
Qualities of actors 
Sensegiving In organisational studies the term sensegiving refers to the way in 
which leaders or managers use influencing techniques to shape 
the sensemaking of organisational members.(Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991, Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007, Rouleau, 2005) 
Actors with social 
position and/or social 
skill  
Some actors have a unique impact on others derived from their 
social positions, enabling them to be effective change-agents. 
(Lockett et al., 2014)  
Socially skilled actors are those who act, not in self-interest, but 
in order to gain co-operation from others by helping them to 
attain ends. They will show flexibility in doing this, and will adjust 
goals. Their focus is always on the collectivity. (Fligstein, 
2001:p113)  
Sensemaking types 
Prosocial 
sensemaking 
In a study of an employee support programme Grant et al.(2008) 
used the term “prosocial sensemaking as a theoretical term to 
explain non-self-interested behaviour. This includes affective 
commitment between employees and towards the organisation, 
and identity of being caring.  
Market sensemaking Kennedy (2008) used the term “market sensemaking” in a study 
of the media’s role in developing new markets. It is used to 
describe sensemaking when new markets are being created 
(Maitlis and Christianson, 2014).  
3.6 Conclusion: displaying the data in the thesis  
Miles, Huberman and Saldaña (2013) emphasise the importance of 
bringing evidence alive in the mind of the reader, arguing that this 
is how qualitative analysis convinces: 
“Qualitative data are a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions 
and explanations of human processes. With qualitative data, one 
can preserve chronological flow, see which events led to which 
consequences, and derive fruitful explanations. Then, too, good 
qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous findings 
and to new integrations; they help researchers get beyond initial 
conceptions and generate or revise conceptual frameworks. Finally, 
the findings from well-analyzed qualitative studies have a quality of 
“undeniability”. Words, especially organized into incidents or 
stories, have a concrete, vivid, and meaningful flavour that often 
proves far more convincing to a reader – another researcher, a 
policy maker, or a practitioner – than pages of summarized 
numbers.” (Miles et al., 2013:p4) 
In chapters five to seven I have displayed the data using story-form 
in an attempt to maintain the readers’ interest as the pages turn. 
Each chapter follows the same presentational structure. I did 
consider whether to present my data organised systematically into 
thematic categories, and theoretical concepts discussed in the 
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earlier parts of this chapter. This, however, would lose the 
compelling narrative which I considered important to communicate 
to readers, especially in the light of my research questions:  
 Why and how did GPs enact their commissioning duties in the 
ways that they did? 
 How does sensemaking influence field change within the 
context of networks and rules?  
Both of these questions imply the need to describe events and 
associated thought-processes of the actors. How else would I 
successfully communicate why and how GPs did what they did, and 
how their sensemaking processes worked in relation to their 
networks, and the rules that affected them, if not through telling the 
story of unfolding events? I needed to create plot and characters to 
add depth and life to my theorising. To this end, I present the data 
in such a way to maximise impact using the story telling that Ellis 
and Böchner (Ellis and Bochner, 1996) advocate. The data displays 
take the form of extended “pieces”. The stories are intended to be 
evocative and descriptive, and to transport the reader to the 
situation being described. The intention of this approach is to allow 
the data to convince of the arguments that I later propose in the 
findings and conclusions chapters that follow. 
It is in order to have the creative freedom to use this story-telling 
approach that I have provided the fine detail of the steps of analysis 
in the preceding sections of this chapter. I hope that in this way I 
have allayed concerns regarding the validity of my conclusions. 
These narratives weave in observations relating to the five empirical 
themes. Throughout the stories I have used sensemaking concepts 
to describe roles and actions, juxtaposing these with the 
mechanisms of networks and rules.  
The final section of each chapter, Theoretical implications, is a 
discussion organised into the SP analytic categories of wider 
context, temporality, and distributed sensemaking. This is designed 
to provide the connection between my arguments and the process 
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of data analysis. Table 19 is the proforma for a tabular matrix of the 
theoretical implications of the empirical data, which is presented at 
the end of each chapter. The matrix structure is a map of the main 
thematic categories (side headings) and the SP co-ordinates (top 
headings). Each cell in the matrix table includes a distillation of the 
analysis using BF and SP concepts. 
Table 20 Proforma summary matrix for data display 
Case Study Level 
 Wider 
Contexts 
Temporality Distributed 
Sensemaking 
Establishment of new organisation     
Legacy     
Professional changes    
Competition    
Integration    
 
Chapter Eight is a discussion of the findings of the previous three 
chapters. In this chapter I draw together the findings across the 
three levels, and present the theoretical contributions of the thesis. 
Before presenting and discussing empirical findings in Chapters five 
to eight, in the next chapter, I set the scene by giving an overview 
of Castlefield as a field.
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Chapter Four: Introduction to the empirical 
chapters; Castlefield as a “field” 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I outline the concept of “field” as used in BF. I also 
set the scene for the following empirical chapters by offering a 
profile for each of the three case study levels. I conclude by 
summarising the main rules impacting on each of the levels at the 
time of the study. 
4.2 The intellectual roots of Beckert’s “field” 
Beckert used the concept of field in order to develop his integrated 
framework. He explains his reasons for this: 
“…….markets are constituted and demarcated from one another by 
the mutual orientation of actors towards each other, an orientation 
that is organized by the social forces identified. This understanding 
of markets as fields encompasses conceptualizations that view 
markets as realms of interaction structured by institutions or by 
networks or by local cultures. More importantly it allows to 
investigate the interrelations between these forces based on a 
unifying conceptual framework. Each of the three structuring forces 
contributes to the social organization of market exchange by 
shaping opportunities and constraints of agents as well as 
perceptions of legitimacy and illegitimacy” (Beckert, 2010:p609) 
It is important to note that Beckert did not attempt to develop the 
concept of “field”. For him it was a mechanism by which to 
conceptualise the three way dynamic relationship between 
networks, rules, and cognitive frames. Beckert acknowledged rather 
than critiqued the work of those who first developed the concept of 
field notably Bourdieu (1977, 1990), Lewin (1997 [1951]), DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) and Fligstein (2001). He mainly drew on 
Fligstein’s conceptualisation of field in which he emphasises the 
importance of socially skilled individuals. Since Beckert’s paper was 
issued, Fligstein and McAdam have published a book The Social 
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Theory of Fields (2012) in which they describe their model of a 
“strategic action field”. The authors argue that the classic 
Bourdieuian concept of field is too focused on the individual. Within 
their model Fligstein and McAdam include concepts of fields 
embedded in fields, and describe these in hierarchical terms. 
Fligstein and McAdam are especially interested in the notion of 
social skill, and the way in which certain individuals influenced field 
change. They also argue that the broader field environment needed 
to be understood. Especially important in a strategic action field are 
episodes of contention, and the achievement of settlement. 
“If the field is more orientated toward the pole of settlement, 
conflict will be lessened and the positions of actors more easily 
reproduced.”(Fligstein and McAdam, 2012:p12) 
Beckert argued that by using the concept of field it was possible to 
shift the emphasis of analysis away from the act of exchange and 
towards the dynamics of the three social forces. 
4.3 Castlefield: a field on three levels  
The empirical setting for this study was the health economy of 
Castlefield, a City in the midlands of England. Health economy is a 
term in common usage in NHS circles, which remains undefined and 
is used flexibly to describe the organisations which provide 
healthcare in a local area. The term “economy” refers to the 
relationships and interdependencies that exist between 
organisations that plan, procure, and provide health and care within 
that geography. More recently the term “health and care economy” 
has come into usage reflecting the mutual interdependency of 
health and social care services. There is no single organisation or 
governance arrangement for a health and care economy. The health 
and care economy in the city of Castlefield included a large acute 
hospital, a community health provider, a mental health service, an 
ambulance provider, GPs, and a unitary LA, as well as an active 
voluntary sector, and various private sector organisations. 
Castlefield was a concentrated inner city area, with a population 
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that was ethnically diverse, young, and deprived compared with the 
national average. GPs served over 300,000 patients.  
The study took place in the period immediately preceding and 
during a time of statutory change to the NHS. The Health and Social 
Care Bill 2010–2012 was enacted by the Lords on 20th March 2012, 
and came fully into force on 1 April 2013. The empirical work of this 
thesis is centred on the set of field rule changes that the HSCA 2012 
contained. The controversy surrounding the passage of the Bill 
through parliament was intense.  The rhetoric associated with it was 
about the improvement of services and patient experience, although 
many were members of the public and the NHS were of the opinion 
that its real purpose was different. In the original bill there were 
proposals to significantly increase the role of competition through an 
enhancement of the role of Monitor, the economic regulator. The 
extent of the opposition to this and other aspects of the bill resulted 
in a parliamentary pause during which time the proposals to 
introduce competition were toned down and focused on the 
prevention of anti-competitive behaviour (Hudson, 2013). A 
significant change was that an initial proposal to allow any willing 
provider to provide NHS services was amended to “Any Qualified 
Provider” (AQP). This was enacted through an initiative by which to 
decide which providers were qualified and to place them on a 
register (Asthana et al., 2011). The establishment of CCGs 
continued largely unchanged, although the original proposal to 
introduce these in the form of GP consortia was amended to allow 
for a less uni-professional focus and to maintain the role of 
managers. Proposals to transfer public health duties to LAs survived 
the Bill phase and were enshrined in the Act.  
For the purposes of the study I have conceptualised the health and 
care economy of Castlefield as a three levelled field. 
4.3.1 Operational Practice Level 
The first level of the field was the OPL. Commissioning at this level 
was the routine business of the consulting room. A GPs day job was 
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to offer a consulting service to individual patients within their 
surgeries. As already described in 1.3.1 when a GP made a referral, 
offered a treatment, or signed a prescription he or she was 
allocating NHS resources.  
There was no such thing as a typical General Practice in Castlefield. 
These varied in size more than tenfold. Some operated from rented 
buildings, whilst others owned the property. Some practices served 
challenging and disadvantaged communities, whilst others were in 
affluent areas. The concentrated urban nature of Castlefield meant 
that it had more than its fair share of problems when it came to 
poverty, alcoholism, and drug-related illness and crime. This meant 
that in certain areas there were problems in the recruitment of GPs. 
It also meant that it had a higher than average proportion of single-
handed practices, and practices that operated out of rented 
premises in health centres. In other words, it was a typical inner 
city area. 
When the HSCA 2012 was implemented, it introduced a rule that 
applied to all GP practices alike across England. All were 
contractually required to be a member of a CCG and to appoint one 
healthcare professional to liaise with that CCG. 
4.3.2 Strategic Collaboration Level 
The second tier of the field was the SCL. Where the OPL was the 
activity of individual practices, the SCL was an arrangement 
whereby these practices operated as an aggregated body. The 
organisational arrangement for this strategic role was the CCGs that 
were established during the period of the study As a collective they 
developed a Castlefield-wide health strategy to meet the needs of 
their patients. They directly allocated health resources through 
designing services and letting contracts with organisations that 
provided healthcare to their registered patients. Where GPs 
provided services over those included in their core contract, these 
would also be planned and contracted at this level. 
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The new field rules that applied at this level were that all GPs must 
shape and agree the CCG strategy and have voting rights regarding 
the GP leaders, and that AQP and other competition mechanisms 
must be used to procure services. 
4.3.3 Interagency Strategic Partnership Level 
The third tier of the field is the strategic partnership level (ISPL). At 
this level representatives of the SCL became part of a Castlefield-
wide inter-sector public partnership. Representatives of the 
organisations in the health and care economy were statutorily 
required to meet as HWBs. HWBs are intended to have strategic 
influence over commissioning decisions across health, public health 
and social care. They have loosely prescribed membership and 
functions, and were formally established on 1st April 2013 . They 
have the status of committees of upper or single tier LAs, and have 
the right of veto on CCG commissioning decisions. An associated 
rule change was the transfer of public health staff and duties from 
PCTs to elected LAs. 
Castlefield HWB had the characteristics of a public policy strategic 
partnership (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002:p24). It was a forum for 
deliberation but did not have decision making power. It was 
accountable to wider stakeholders via the communication 
mechanisms of the partner organisations. The HSCA 2012 
prescribed a core statutory membership of at least one elected 
councillor, a representative from each CCG whose area falls within 
the LA boundary, the local authority directors of adult social 
services, children’s services, and public health and a representative 
from the local Healthwatch organisation. Beyond this discretion was 
granted to appoint further members. The membership of Castlefield 
HWB was widely extended. There were more than twenty members 
in total (see Appendix 4 for full membership). 
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4.4  The empirical chapters 
In the next three chapters I present findings regarding how rules 
introduced by HSCA 2012 were interpreted and implemented at 
each of the levels. Section 3.6 above contains a detailed explanation 
of how data is displayed in each of these chapters. In the empirical 
chapters, I use observations of GP- commissioning to show the 
dynamic between cognitive frames, networks, and rules. From now 
on I use the term sensemaking when considering cognitive frame. 
For ease of reference, table 20 below contains a reminder of the 
rules by level. 
Table 21 Summary of field rules by level 
OPL GPs have to be members of a CCG, and in Castlefield this means joining a 
subnetwork 
GPs have to hold a commissioning budget, out of which they will “pay” for 
their clinical referrals and prescriptions. 
SCL All GPs must shape and agree the CCG strategy and have voting rights 
regarding the GP leaders. 
AQP and other competition mechanisms must be used to procure services. 
ISPL HWB must be in place, established as sub-committees of the LA 
Public health duties (including budgets and staff) must transfer to the LA  
Arrangements for integrated care must be put in place based on localities.  
 
.
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Chapter Five: Sensemaking, networks and 
rules at Operational Practice Level  
5.1 Introduction 
The prescribed model for collaborative commissioning in HSCA 2012 
was that each GP practice should be a “member” of a CCG. As 
Castlefield was a large CCG with more than sixty individual 
practices, four sub-groups were put in place. These groups were 
called Chamber, Principled Collaboration (PC), The Gurus (a 
pseudonym suggested by one of the GPs, when I was struggling to 
think of a descriptive name); and New World (NW), all of which had 
existed in the organisational arrangements of the predecessor PCT. 
In the CCGs constitution (CCG doc 1) this arrangement is described 
thus: 
The Clinical Commissioning Group’s (the “CCG”) membership is 
organised into groups of GP practices (“GP-groups”), which are 
based partly on geographical location and partly on inter practice 
relationships and culture. 
This excerpt captures a compromise reached on a point of 
contention between doctors and managers. Managers would have 
preferred to organise practices according to geographical proximity 
in a locality-based arrangement. However doctors preferred to 
organise themselves in already established networks based on past 
experience of working together. In retaining this pattern of 
networks, their associated approaches to sensemaking were also 
preserved. 
GPs in each practice had the option to choose the GP-Group to 
which it belonged. Those few practices without a preference were 
assigned to either Chamber, or PC. Chamber happened to have 
marginally more members in the east, and PC happened to have 
more practices in the west. Practices without a preference were 
attached, east or west, according to their location. The CCG did not 
make any attachments to the Gurus or NW. Although the written 
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rules as expressed in the constitution gave “geographical location” 
equal weight to “inter-practice relationships and culture”, in reality 
it was attitudinal convergence and social networks that determined 
who belonged to which GP-group. From my observations, it 
appeared that the shared history and/or perspective of the GP 
members influenced the way they made sense of changes in general 
and of the commissioning rules in particular. 
In this chapter, I draw on observations of these networks in their 
monthly meetings each of which I observed on four occasions. GP-
group meetings took place at lunchtime or in the evenings and 
include the sharing of food, encouraging the maintenance of a social 
network that formed the basis for sensemaking between members. 
Meetings had a common core agenda, but how this was interpreted 
was different in each of the four networks. First I analyse each GP-
group in relation to its processes to make sense of commissioning 
rules. Next I use an example of cross-CCG budget-setting in order 
to illustrate and analyse the dynamic between different networks. 
5.2 Chamber 
Chamber was the largest group and included over 25 practices with 
a combined list of almost 160,000 patients. Its smallest practices 
were single handed with just over 2,000 patients, and its largest 
practice had nearly 14,500 patients. This was the only group that 
did not allow a representative from every member practice to attend 
its monthly meetings. Instead approximately a third of the practices 
were represented by a range of staff groups including practice 
nurses and practice managers, as well as doctors. The remaining 
practices were bound to the network through a buddy system. The 
group met in a hotel designed for conferences at the edge of 
Castlefield, easily accessible from main transport routes. Meetings 
took place in the evening between about 6.30pm and 9pm, and 
were held in a small room; the meeting table took up most of the 
space creating an intimate atmosphere. Food was served outside on 
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hot plates, and was eaten during the formal business. Doctors 
arrived hungry and often late, having driven across town after 
evening surgery. Between ten and fifteen people would typically be 
in attendance. 
There was a predominant approach to sensemaking and sensegiving 
in this network. A number of the GPs that regularly attended 
meetings were previously fundholders, and this influenced which 
sensemaking cues were extracted from the commissioning rules. 
The group leader, Dr Baasit, now in his fifties, had led the 
Castlefield fundholder group as a younger man. Dr Conary, also in 
her fifties, had been a partner in a prominent fundholding practice. 
Dr Ibrahim was also a first wave fundholder. The GPs that attended 
meetings often referred to member practices as businesses, and 
they appeared to conceptualise primary care as a business sector, 
with themselves working on behalf of that sector towards common 
business goals. This was not dissimilar to the model used by 
Chambers of Commerce which draw representatives from 
businesses in a region with the shared aim of supporting enterprise 
and sustainability. There was no evidence that they identified as an 
elite with more status in a hierarchy, rather they interpreted their 
sensegiving role as one of peer-based guidance and 
encouragement. 
The leader, Dr Baasit, had a personal interest in organisational 
behaviour and OD. I knew from my own experience that the term 
OD in the NHS is used imprecisely to cover a wide variety of 
activities connected with change, service development, and to 
engage and motivate staff. It usually involved focused time in 
groups, to support changes in rules. OD activities were often 
supported by a facilitator who helped groups to understand their 
shared objectives, and runs group processes to help them to plan 
how to achieve these objectives, whilst staying personally neutral. I 
first met Dr Baasit in the early 1990s when he had completed a 
Business Masters degree, and had developed a practice level OD 
programme (“The People, The Horizon, The Vision”) designed to 
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help practices determine their future direction. Dr Baasit used to 
meet with practices and act as a facilitator. He appeared to draw on 
this background in his current role. He explained his approach to me 
using the words: “It’s all about how to change behaviour” (Chamber 
fieldnote 3). The language he used strongly emphasised inclusion 
and the sharing of opinions and views in order to improve decision 
making. When faced with a difficult issue he used phrases that 
emphasised peer relationships in a collective often using “we”, for 
example “We need to solve a puzzle” and “What can we do?” 
(Chamber fieldnote 3).  
Other group members appeared to follow his lead. They spent time 
discussing and planning how to approach member practices, and 
emphasised the use of questions to encourage practices to think 
actively. For example when discussing the problem of patients not 
turning up for appointments, the action proposed was to ask each 
practice for its policy with the simultaneous posing of the question 
“What do you plan to do to be more proactive?” (Chamber fieldnote 
3), prompting practices to self-direct improvement. 
Dr Baasit, introducing cues from the wider commercial world, 
encouraged others to make sense by developing a business-like 
identity. He drew parallels with a well-known retail business with a 
mutual ownership model, in order to add emphasis that practices 
should think commercially and co-operatively at the same time:  
“We are a John Lewis kind of organisation; we are the sum of our 
parts” (Chamber fieldnote 2) 
Rewards were the result of aggregate performance achieved by 
each individual practice in the GP-group. Just as in fundholding, if 
referrals and prescriptions cost less than the CCG had budgeted 
then an element of the saving could be retained by the GP-group. 
Those GPs that were active in Chamber’s inner circle were focused 
on ensuring that practices in the network collectively managed 
demand, and thus returned savings, a part of which could be spent 
on the priorities that the Chamber practices determined. When 
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talking about what might constitute an irresponsible referral or 
prescription Dr Baasit said:  
“We don’t want to see any of our little businesses doing that sort of 
stuff”……We are in a new world where budgets are supposed to 
matter” (Chamber fieldnote 3) 
There were ambiguities implicit in the new rules however. The 
practices did not have control over their budgets in a complex 
health and social care system. Hospital activity was charged to 
practice budgets, and there was a frustration when these were 
impacted by forces outside of the doctors’ control. Dr Baasit’s 
frustration was articulated in the following words:  
“What about the patients who stay in inpatient care? Social 
problems. Messing up my budget big time. Do we have an alerting 
system?” (Chamber fieldnote 3) 
Dr Baasit wanted a warning system to let him know when patients 
were unable to be discharged because of a lack of social care 
facilities, just one example of the way that costs could continue to 
accrue with no way for the doctors to influence, let alone control. 
The control of costs was a main sensemaking cue that Chamber 
doctors had identified. The ex-fundholders had experience of 
controlling clinical activity as a way to contain costs. A discussion of 
member practices’ activity formed the centre piece of every 
meeting. Bridget Jones, a manager from a medium sized practice 
based in a multi-purpose inner city health centre, produced a cross-
network data set which she presented each month, and which 
formed the basis for discussions with individual practices through 
the buddy mechanism. Bridget’s data set consisted of a set of 
graphs which showed how practices compared in terms of 
prescribing, outpatient referrals, and emergency admissions, each 
presented in terms of the impact on the overall group budget. The 
group’s attitude of enquiry was one of critical curiosity, with a view 
to sharing tips and deepening understanding of problems. One 
fieldnote entry reads: 
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[Bridget] pointed to a sharp deterioration in one line “Emergency 
admissions obviously went mad.” The same practice was showing 
an improvement over the same period on prescribing. Dr Conary 
commented “There are many reasons – the question is, do they 
know?” The Drs talked around what it could be. It could be a virus 
or some other reason… (Chamber fieldnote 3). 
More importance was placed on patterns than snapshots. The 
dataset, and the questions raised when it was scrutinised, formed 
the basis of how Chamber practices interacted. Regular practice-
based communication took place. Firstly, practices were made 
aware of the patterns of activity they were producing, and secondly 
informed challenge took place in the form of discussion between 
peers, coupled with an intention to learn from each other. Dr Conary 
said: 
“The question “Why is that?” needs to be asked.” And “Where 
practices are making big inroads we ought to find out what they are 
doing?” (Chamber fieldnote 2) 
Inherent in the process of referrals and prescribing were both 
ambiguities and uncertainties – the system was complex and 
unpredictable at the same time. Chamber GPs knew that 
sensemaking could not depend on the accuracy of facts. Instead 
they attempted to understand and support - rather than accuse and 
blame. Dr Conary was especially influential in promulgating this 
approach. She had a personal interest in working directly with 
individual practices to help them improve. In addition to her work at 
the GP-group level, she also had devised and led a CCG-wide 
programme of practice visits. She described her approach to me in 
an interview: 
Dr Conary: “Well I can see, practices are very isolated groups, they 
work very hard and they have their heads down dealing with 
difficult situations all day long and they may have short amounts of 
time with their practice manager to manage the practice but on the 
whole they don’t have time to look wide, they don’t have time to 
meet with other GPs in a relaxed way to talk about things………I feel 
very much that there’s lots of things that are happening that are 
positive and that can be helpful but actually the practices just don’t 
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know about them and they’re mostly feeling rather demoralised and 
no one’s there to help them and I do feel that they need a 
structure. I really believe in the kind of independence and 
autonomy of individual general practices but the downside to that is 
they’re isolated and feel easily demoralised because they’re not 
appreciated and I feel a lot of them are really conscientious, 
hardworking people who are doing the best for their patients and 
put themselves out all day long and wear themselves out and are 
trying to be helpful and positive and help depressed people or 
people down on their luck to think more positive and think positive 
about the way for the future. All day long they’re doing this 
emotional job and nobody’s coming, and they’re doing it because 
they feel motivated that they really want to serve the patients and 
feel good about themselves.” 
Adele: “That’s a phrase I use all the time ‘serve the people’ 
whenever I’m trying to orientate.” 
Dr Conary: “Yes that’s right, but the structures around are so 
complicated and so demoralising that they easily can feel very fed 
up and demoralised and that all this has been done to them instead 
of them being appreciated and I really felt that practices really 
needed people to go round to who could see the bigger picture and 
actually say this is what it’s all about, here look this is your 
information you are doing really well on this and you know you’ve 
been better than other practices on this and well done because 
you’re really working in a difficult situation.  Maybe you’re not 
doing so much on that and maybe you don’t know how to do that 
so let me tell you about ways that other practices are doing it or 
how you can get more money to do that because, and employ 
somebody new or how you could find out where you get locum 
nurses or what the, you know why haven’t you applied for this 
funding because it’s there available, perhaps you didn’t know about 
it, why haven’t you referred people to these services because you 
don’t know about them, let me tell you about them, let me tell you 
what other people have found in a positive way.” (ConaryInterview) 
This approach of looking for reasons for variation in clinical practice, 
and then offering support to and sharing insights between practices 
to improve is an example of prosocial sensemaking where actors in 
organisations care for each other (Grant et al., 2008). 
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The GPs that attended meetings were an inner circle of peer-leaders 
that offered guidance and encouragement to a wider circle. The 
continuation of collective sensemaking was highly dependent on the 
legitimacy of those in the inner circle as perceived by those in the 
outer. The conditions for collective sensemaking needed to be 
nurtured on an ongoing basis. Meetings often focused on how to 
sustain the trust and co-operation of member practices in the face 
of ambiguity and uncertainty. The fact that this was a sensitively 
balanced relationship was illustrated by a discussion about whether 
to write a letter to those practices whose referral and prescribing 
rates tended to be higher than others (Chamber fieldnote 2). Dr 
Baasit thought that a letter should be sent to the partners to inform 
them of their position relative to others. Chamber needed to be 
tough, he argued, in order to establish expectations of behaviour 
that would enable practices to survive in the future. He was afraid 
that being too soft would be a “disservice” in the long-run. In his 
view all partners needed to grasp that financial management 
mattered according to the new NHS rules for GP commissioning. The 
others disagreed. Writing a letter would be a step too far. They felt 
that to send a letter would be perceived as an expression of 
hierarchical power. Given Chambers’ GPs emphasis on working to 
influence rather than to direct most felt that face to face discussion 
would be more appropriate. Dr Kerala, another Chamber Executive 
GP (see 6.2.1) described the CCG’s relationship to the practices as 
“fragile”, usually only one GP in each practice acted as a point of 
liaison; a letter to all partners would cause offence. The Chamber 
doctors instinctively realised that an impersonal didactic approach 
would put at risk the trusting relationship upon which their approach 
depended. 
Trust was only one aspect to this legitimacy. Two other dimensions 
that were actively nurtured in the sensemaking process were the 
quality of information; and patient centredness. Dr Clemence was a 
GP from a medium sized all female GP partnership. She, in 
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particular, strove to ensure that information was as relevant as it 
could be to the task in hand. One fieldnote reads:  
There was a real appetite in the room to drill down further. Dr 
Clemence was clear, the figures needed to show day cases 
separately. They also needed to show non-elective admissions 
separately from A&E. This would enable the practices to look at 
patterns they could most affect. Dr Clemence continued to refine, 
thinking about sub category data. She was also interested to see if 
some procedures e.g. joint replacements could be isolated. 
(Chamber fieldnote 3) 
On another occasion she spotted the potential in an initiative for 
GPs to be paid twice for the same work (Chamber fieldnote 4). She 
quashed this immediately, and none of the other GPs objected. 
Chamber’s discussions were consistently framed around whether 
patients’ needs were being met. This appeared to be a fundamental 
shared value that underpinned the continued social approach to 
sensemaking in this network. Earlier in this chapter I described my 
observation that Chamber GPs had elected to work together 
because they shared a legacy as fundholders. This is only part of 
the story. Chamber GP-group included a high proportion of GPs that 
rented space in health centres in disadvantaged areas. This was an 
indication that these doctors were likely to identify as having a 
vocation to serve the poor. They would often criticise existing 
services according to how effective and compassionate they were 
for patients, often using examples and personal stories, drawn from 
operational clinical practice. Dr Baasit had a special interest in 
cancer services and often focused on the need for earlier diagnosis. 
South Asian people suffer a high incidence of bowel cancer, and he 
talked about the time he went on Asian television showing how to 
take a stool sample using a Gulab Jamun (squidgy brown Asian 
sweet) and a sample bottle (Chance encounter fieldnote 2). Practice 
nurses raised their concerns about gaps in services, for example the 
young people’s obesity service served patients up to the age of 
thirteen, leaving a gap until the adult programme could be accessed 
at the age of eighteen. A particular frustration was access to 
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psychological therapies, for which there was a fifteen week wait. 
One doctor said: 
“We all talk about the patient centre – let’s not leave them 
wandering in the desert” (Chamber fieldnote 2) 
The process for making referrals was often under scrutiny, 
especially as more contracts were let outside of the traditional NHS 
Family. It is difficult to pin down how membership of the Family is 
conferred. A number of organisations that were inside the NHS 
Family were not owned by the state. These included Castlecare (the 
provider of local community health services) that had recently 
become a social enterprise, and GP practices that were private 
partnership businesses. Some of these discussions were about how 
arrangements helped or hindered the day to day work of a GP, 
especially the general difficulty in dealing with information overload, 
and complexity of services. In one discussion about referring into a 
new non-NHS psychological treatments service (Chamber fieldnote 
2), doctors said: 
“We don’t get enough information.” 
“If you want us to refer we need to know how.” 
“We’re talking GPs, so big letters.” 
Thus, the inner circle established legitimacy, by first establishing 
trust, working hard to make available relevant information, and by 
establishing moral purpose through a discourse based on serving 
patients. This legitimacy was the basis of how Chamber peer-guides 
nurtured ongoing social sensemaking, and succeeded in joint 
enactment of demand management with the associated accrual of 
savings across the wider network. The money saved could be spent 
on services that the network chose. This choice reflected their 
shared commitment to vulnerable patients. They invested in 
domestic violence education for practice staff, a carers support 
service through a local charity, and the development of a “recovery 
college” to provide emotional support for patients with long term 
conditions (Chamber fieldnote 1). 
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From these observations it is possible to draw out the implications 
for BF at the intersection of SP. When making sense of the 
commissioning rule, there were two main influences on 
sensemaking in Chamber. Firstly, sensemaking was influenced by a 
shared legacy; past experience of fundholding was a source of cues 
to interpret commissioning rules. Practice-level activity data was 
routinely scrutinised. Secondly, the needs of patients from 
disadvantaged areas was also a source of cues for interpretation of 
the rules. An active inner circle of GPs acted as sensegivers, guiding 
and encouraging the wider group. Continued co-operation with this 
model depended on legitimacy, which the inner circle consciously 
attempted to engineer using sensitive communication, high quality 
information, and a focus on vulnerable patients. Sensemaking was 
prosocial, with an emphasis on caring for and helping member 
practices. The inner circle sensegivers, especially Dr Baasit, used an 
established OD technique where practices were encouraged to 
develop a questioning approach in order to conceptualise 
commissioning duties for themselves. 
5.3 Principled Collaboration 
PC was the second largest GP-group which included around twenty 
practices and had a combined actual list size of almost 125,000 
patients. Its smallest practices were single handed with just over 
2,000 patients, and its largest practice had nearly 13,000 patients. 
Meetings took place in a modest hotel close to the City Centre. 
People from all practices and all staff groups were welcome; 
typically more than 30 people would attend. A hot meal with dessert 
was available. People would arrive early, collect their food, and 
move to eat it at the large horseshoe meeting table taking time to 
catch up and chat before the meeting began.  
In Castlefield in the mid-1990s a group of GPs objected to the fund-
holding scheme, arguing that it created a two-tier service. They 
formed an allegiance based on a principle that the NHS should be 
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equitable. Many members of this group shared a legacy as non-
fundholders, which influenced which sensemaking cues were 
noticed. Dr Strong, one of PC’s leaders, was a founder member, and 
many of PC’s doctors had been part of that early collaboration. The 
executive GPs, Dr Strong, Dr Lovett, and Dr Cooper, all white 
English men in their fifties, had known each other in non-
fundholding circles for over twenty-five years. 
PC GP-group was stratified with clearly differentiated hybrid-leaders 
who acted as directive sensegivers to the rank-and-file. Meetings 
were formal and tightly chaired. Discussions followed a pattern in 
which at least every other contribution was made by one of the lead 
GPs. When Dr Cooper, the chairman, looked to appoint a deputy he 
began by asking if anyone would like the role, at the same time 
adding “if not we’ll knobble one of the boys” (PC fieldnote 1), 
meaning Dr Strong and Dr Lovett. Dr Strong was duly appointed 
unopposed. 
Their focus was on national policy and healthcare as a system. This 
contrasted to the practice-based lens of Chamber GP-group. PC did 
not analyse individual practice activity as its mechanism for 
undertaking commissioning. Practices, their privacy intact, were left 
to self-manage. Dr Cooper once described the member practices as 
“grown up” (PC fieldnote 2). Comparison of practices happened 
through the CCG-wide practice visit programme under the 
leadership of Chamber’s Dr Conary, and this is where practice level 
scrutiny began and ended. 
PC leaders appeared to make sense of their own roles by adopting 
an identity as system-steward. As an alternative form of influence 
to that of fundholding, non-fundholders had collaborated with 
Castlefield Health Authority to design the local healthcare system, 
and to have stewardship for the health economy. The legacy of this 
could be seen in how PC doctors made sense of the current 
commissioning rule. Meetings focused on national initiatives, and 
pathways that crossed the boundaries of primary and secondary 
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care. The leaders interpreted their sensegiving role to be that of 
explainer and promoter of local and national policies, thus 
minimising ambiguity and confusion for the rank-and-file. The 
agendas of meetings were constructed to include both national and 
local topics. 
Whilst PC doctors made sense of the commissioning rule by thinking 
about the wider system, discussions were usually about the impacts 
on primary care. When doctors discussed the effect of an initiative 
on their own practices they would often react with indignation and 
resistance to any proposed increase in work load or change to 
working patterns. An illustration of this was a discussion about the 
introduction of seven day working between the hours of 8am and 
8pm (PC fieldnote 2). The doctors foretold catastrophic 
consequences with phrases such as “the end of the essence of 
general practice” and “the end of the family doctor”. When the 
patient representative spoke up to counter the prevailing GP opinion 
saying “providing there are good doctors who are caring and 
understanding, [patients] don’t mind”, the practice managers 
shifted to focus on the practical reality of finding enough doctors to 
cover the hours: “We’d love to do it if we could recruit GPs”. When 
this sort of reaction occurred, which it did frequently, the approach 
adopted by the leaders was to allow time for emotions to be 
expressed sometimes joining in as fellow doctors, and to then close 
the discussion by proposing a way forward which would always be 
accepted by the rank and file, if sometimes more grudgingly than 
others. It appeared that these leaders were in fact committed and 
adept at maintaining emotional discipline in order that a problem-
orientated attitude would not become dominant. One way they did 
this was to show that they held two positions at once: that of 
affected GP, and that of leader and system-steward. As will be seen 
in the next chapter, this role of system-stewardardship was also 
evident in lead doctors at the strategic collaboration level. 
Members of PC-group spent time discussing local contracts for 
secondary care services. Issues that arose with local health care 
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providers were framed in terms of the contractual relationship that 
existed between the CCG and that provider. According to the letter 
of the new rules, the GPs had the upper hand over the hospitals and 
community providers - they were the paymaster who could specify 
the terms of a contract for services. An issue regarding the contract 
with Castlecare, the provider of community nursing services, 
became a topic of discussion over a cycle of three meetings. The 
first time it was raised was by a practice nurse. She framed an 
operational question in terms of the contract. 
“There is a need to clarify what is included in the spec and what is 
actually being delivered.” (PC fieldnote 2) 
As later events would reveal, actually, this nurse was worried, and 
wanted to raise the alarm about an impending change. In an 
attempt to operate within the new rules and to minimise her 
appearance of struggle with ambiguity, she couched her concern in 
the language of contracts and specifications, with the consequence 
that the real operational impact of the issue was obfuscated. By the 
next meeting, a month had passed, and it was clear that Castlecare 
had made a unilateral change to community nursing services (PC 
fieldnote 3). The GPs had not agreed this in contractual terms as 
commissioners, nor had they or their practice nurses been consulted 
as affected clinicians. The reaction was emotional, doctors and staff 
were annoyed at the lack of consultation, and were protective of 
their affected colleagues and patients. One practice nurse described 
how a community nurse had been crying in her office. Another 
practice described a community nurse as “completely flummoxed”. 
Rather than conceive this as a failure of commissioning, Doctor 
Cooper framed this in positive terms. 
“This is an example where clinical commissioning can really work. 
We can give immediate feedback”. 
Duly, at the third meeting (PC fieldnote 4), two senior nurse 
managers from Castlecare were summoned to give an account. One 
of the Castlecare nurse managers began with their response, 
adopting a dominant, and unapologetic stance. She appeared to be 
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deflecting criticism by implying that the commissioner-expectation 
for involvement was unreasonable. She said assertively, that it was 
“inevitable that change [was] going to happen”. She then shifted to 
the next anticipated change, saying: 
“The integrated care programme is rolling down the hill, which you 
do know about” [my emphasis]. 
Confronted with this assertive, challenging response the GPs 
appeared to feel intimidated. They stopped being commissioners, 
and became fellow community clinicians. The doctors and practice 
nurses said that community nurses were part of the team. The 
Castlecare nurses explained that the reason for the change had 
been in order to staff new care home teams that the GPs had 
commissioned. The strong words that underpinned the tone of the 
last meeting were replaced by more ameliorating language. Dr 
Lovett said:  
“People like teams, and like relationships. Whilst you are within 
your rights, it would be nice to know”  
These words indicate that Dr Lovett preferred to work in harmony 
with Castlecare colleagues, rather than thinking as a payer trying to 
get value from a contractor. In an apologetic tone, another doctor 
said:  
“Our DN [district nursing] team are absolutely fabulous but they 
are run off their feet. I feel very protective to them.” 
Until April 2011 the services now provided by Castlecare had been 
provided by Castlefield PCT. As part of an exercise known as 
“Transforming Community Services” all PCTs had been required to 
divest themselves of this responsibility. Across England there were 
now a variety of business models for the provision of these services. 
In Castlefield a Community Interest Company (CIC), Castlecare CIC, 
had been formed which delivered NHS contracts. The nurse 
managers began to share the difficulties they faced, focusing on the 
recent change of status from being part of the PCT to becoming a 
stand-alone social enterprise. 
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“Because we are a social enterprise, hospital nurses are put off 
working for us because their NHS pension gets frozen”  
Sensemaking cues about an integrated health service were being 
extracted, which seemed more plausible in this context than a 
contractual relationship. GPs and other practice staff and Castlecare 
staff worked together on a daily basis in the same teams and 
buildings. There was an inherent ambiguity in GP commissioning 
because the doctors were both colleagues and buyers at the same 
time. The nurses made the GPs choose to be one or the other, and 
the more embedded personal NHS Family relationships superseded 
the contractual commissioner ones. 
From these observations it is possible to draw out the implications 
for BF at the intersection of SP. Firstly, a shared legacy informed 
how this network made sense of the commissioning rule. Prominent 
leaders from early days of non-fundholding were present day 
leaders and sense-givers in PC. There remained a commitment to 
the principle of one NHS, which manifested itself in the 
conceptualisation of PC as one part of an interdependent healthcare 
system. The focus was outward to the wider healthcare system. 
However this was with an emphasis on the impact of system 
changes on General Practice. Secondly, leaders were differentiated 
from the rank and file, but did not interfere with operational 
business of practices. This appeared to be intentional and 
instrumental in the approach the leaders took to sensegiving. 
Leaders would switch into rank and file mode, expressing empathy 
when other doctors reacted with cynicism and resistance. They then 
would switch back into a prospective solution-orientated mode, 
encouraging other doctors to mirror this shift. Thirdly, members of 
PC did make explicit attempts to adopt the identity of 
“commissioner” separated from “providers” in a market-like 
distribution. However this ran counter to their usual way of making 
sense and extracting cues. In other words actors attempted to 
respond to new rules by adopting a market sensemaking in a 
culture with a legacy of prosocial sensemaking. However when 
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problems arose between commissioners and providers then all 
would draw on a deeply embedded legacy of colleagueship across 
the inter-dependent NHS system in order to make sense. 
5.4 The Gurus 
This network consisted of 14 small practices owned by older Indian 
Hindu GPs. The total list size was around 30,000 patients. The NHS 
has always depended on migrant workforces, and the 1950s and 
1960s saw a drive to recruit doctors from India. Doctors arrived 
with no more than three pounds in their pockets (AQP fieldnote 1), 
and began to work in single handed practices in disadvantaged inner 
city areas. This group was the most closely knit of the four 
networks. They shared a common cultural and religious heritage 
and the experience of migration to be doctors in deprived areas of 
Castlefield. In an interview, Dr Poona (PoonaInterview), the chair of 
the Gurus explained that overseas doctors were deployed into areas 
of medicine where there were recruitment problems: 
Dr Poona: Yeah, well when I went to, when we came into this 
country I wanted to go in general surgery, there was no vacancy 
for me to go in general surgery. The job which I could get easily 
and could get it was ED, A&E and that’s where I had to work. So I 
think back, why the hell did I do that? It’s not that I didn’t like it, I 
enjoyed it there also, but I was orthopaedic trained when I came to 
this country and I wanted to do orthopaedics and A&E was part of 
it, so I would, I couldn’t go into orthopaedics, no vacancies for me 
to go into orthopaedics……… 
Adele: ….it does seem like overseas Doctors were put into the jobs 
that the indigenous population didn’t want. I can see that 
everywhere I look actually……… 
Dr Poona: …….whatever name you might call it and that’s the 
facts………I’ll leave it for you to understand and……….It’s clear in 
front of you……..you can’t avoid seeing it. Why is it that the inner 
city practices are being run by overseas, most of them, over the 
last say twenty years? ………it’ll come to standstill because if you 
see all the inner cities it’s being done by us, [Accident and 
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Emergency] was being done by us at that time and if they stopped 
it would have been terrible. 
All of these practices were small. Some were single-handed. Some 
were husband and wife teams covering both the doctor and practice 
manager functions. A number of the practices did not employ 
practice managers, which meant that the administration in its 
entirety fell to the GP(s). The doctors were old enough to retire, 
with one exception – an anxious younger doctor worked in a surgery 
with his mother. 
The meetings took place after a shared lunch in a local Indian 
restaurant. The atmosphere was familiar and friendly; these doctors 
were part of a network that went beyond the work-a-day. They 
belonged to a number of associations that brought them together – 
a group for deprived area doctors, the Castlefield branch of the 
Small Practices’ Association, and a group for overseas doctors. Each 
of these met monthly which added up to a weekly gathering. 
Dr Poona together with his friend Dr Ashok took the executive lead 
roles at the CCG level, and are described affectionately by one 
practice manager as “Tweedledum and Tweedledee” (Gurus 
fieldnote 5). They acted as a conduit between the CCG and the 
rank-and-file. Sensegiving was an act of communication; there was 
no evidence of these doctors operating in a directive hierarchical 
fashion. The meetings at first sight appeared disordered; the formal 
agenda being subject to deviations. Conversation flowed in a 
naturalistic way, and there was a sense of equality between all 
those present. There was no apparent gender hierarchy although 
men were in the majority. 
At the meetings a great deal of time was spent in sharing stories 
from the surgery. There was a repeated theme regarding the 
problems created by new initiatives. Below are some examples to 
illustrate this: 
About patients being sent to the hospital with the earliest 
appointment when they have suspected cancer: “That 2 week wait 
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is a bloody pain in the backside; you get appointments in 
Timbuctoo, not in Castlefield” (Gurus fieldnote 3) 
About the Choice initiative, where referrals can be made to a range 
of hospitals: “I had a patient this morning for neurology. I started 
clicking all these buttons. I had to change the symptomology to get 
an appointment in Castlefield.” (Gurus fieldnote 6) 
About new partnership arrangements for children’s services: “Three 
years ago we went through all this…set up all these Boards for 
young adults. Why are we doing it again? It failed miserably last 
time.” (Gurus fieldnote 6)  
At a practice managers meeting, about the move to electronic 
referrals and discharges which has been implemented early in 
Castlefield: “We get letters from Seasidetown and Nextown? Why 
can’t we get letters from Castlefield”? (Gurus fieldnote 7) 
They shared stories about the demands of patients, the cost of 
supplies and services, problems with computers, and many other 
operational concerns. The pressure to change caused various 
emotional reactions. These included frustration when required to 
make new systems work or to adapt to new ways of working; world-
weariness when initiatives were tried that were similar to ones that 
had failed in the past; and a mixture of disappointment and 
cynicism when systems did not seem to work in the interests of 
patients. 
The regular and social meetings, the shared ethnic heritage and 
history of migration, and the sharing of operational experiences 
meant that this network more than any other group had a shared 
way of making sense of new rules, and in the current context that 
was mainly to interpret them as burdensome, and sometimes 
threatening. 
Change was laced with threat for this network. National policy for 
primary care, both existent and anticipated, was increasing the 
complexity of primary care medicine. When discussing a transfer of 
work from dietetics to primary care linked to new responsibilities in 
the management of diabetes, Dr Franklin, the network’s wit, used it 
as an opportunity to make a wider point: 
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“That’s why they call it drip feeding, little by little everything drips 
into general practice” (Gurus fieldnote 6) 
Another doctor described the impossibility of keeping abreast of the 
range of knowledge now required, saying:  
“People keep coming to teach me things……all baby foods, and 
rabies this week” (Gurus fieldnote 1). 
The complexity of 21st century general practice had led to a 
commonly held view, particularly amongst policy makers and 
managers, that small practices did not have enough doctors to 
cover and master the range of skills and knowledge required to 
deliver modern care. Small practice medicine was not seen as a 
viable model going forward and awareness of this contributed to this 
network’s shared anxiety about the future. Small practices were 
also facing financial difficulties. All locum doctors were now entitled 
to be on payrolls and all staff must have the availability of a pension 
arrangement, adding to practices’ overheads. A scheme called the 
Minimum Practice Income Guarantee, upon which small practices in 
deprived areas were reliant, was being phased out. These changes, 
coupled with the fact that many doctors owned buildings which were 
hard to sell as going concerns, meant that financial difficulties 
seemed inescapable. These factors, severally and in combination, 
meant the Gurus noticed cues that signalled an uncertain and 
worrying future. 
Despite these worries, this network had a great capacity to take 
care of each other. The group was socially cohesive with long 
standing personal relationships. There was a willingness to talk 
about feelings of vulnerability which was not so apparent in the 
other GP-groups. Phrases included: “I am just completely lost” and 
“I haven’t got the full grasp…” (Gurus fieldnote 6). One extract from 
a fieldnote reads: 
Dr Ambala showed signs of going out of control. Dr Franklin 
stroked his back and said “it’s alright” in a really gentle voice. 
(Gurus fieldnote 8)  
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Emotional support and emotional openness were incorporated into 
the social sensemaking processes of this network. On deeper 
inspection it became obvious that discussions that had at first 
seemed chaotic and problem-based were this way because the 
meetings were serving more than one purpose. The meetings were 
a space for members of the network to be emotionally vulnerable, 
and to provide and access mutual support. The extract below is a 
discussion about the introduction of a target for cancer screening 
which was in the process of being introduced. 
“Cancer one [new target introduced by the CCG].” “How will we 
report back?” “What are we supposed to do?” “What do we report?” 
“Who to?” No one seemed to have an answer. The topic then 
moved suddenly into a review of Long Term Conditions and a 
concern about scanning and coding data “our staff have to put in.” 
Dr Ambala said “We don’t know what community staff have done” 
Dr Mani said “log in under someone else’s name, and put own 
name at the bottom.” Then the topic moved again; this time to the 
pink card system (a patient linked alert system for A&E to fast track 
an admission) – apparently patients were still finding it hard to get 
admitted. “Can we refer new patients?” (Gurus fieldnote 1) 
This example is a series of seemingly unrelated questions, solutions, 
and comments. There are no conclusions or summaries. This was an 
opportunity to share concerns and anxiety. This was not about 
resolving problems, it was about sharing them. In his interview 
(PoonaInterview), Dr Poona described the sense of vulnerability that 
the doctors in this network feel: 
Adele:  Feel what? Sorry, what was that? 
Dr Poona:  Vulnerable. 
Adele:   And what does vulnerable mean? 
Dr Poona:  Vulnerable in the way that we are not being told 
that you’re not able to provide a service, you are not up to the 
standard or up to the mark of providing that service to us because 
if we have to see say twenty patients then you’ve got one hour with 
us, we will cut short things………….. there’s a danger there and, of 
running short of time and not providing a service what the patient 
needs……….one problem, one appointment………you have provide 
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holistic care for them, to say that mechanically one problem, one 
just thing there, what the hell he’s going to do if he has got two 
problem or three problem or four problems and you will have more 
problems as we grow old. So that’s where I think we are coming to 
that we will not be able to provide the service what is requested by, 
or required by us for the patients. 
As well as being overwhelmed by change, and worried about the 
future of the small practice business model, some of these GPs at 
least, were experiencing an anxiety related to the safety of the care 
that they could offer – although this would not be admitted 
publically – and felt vulnerable as a result1. 
From these observations it is possible to draw out the implications 
for BF at the intersection of SP. This group did not have distinct and 
distributed roles; the leaders’ approach to sensegiving was to simply 
provide a conduit between the group and the wider CCG. These 
doctors shared a multi-faceted legacy which informed their 
approach to sensemaking. Just as these doctors shared a legacy of 
working lives in parallel, they also shared a prospective concern 
about the future. This was a threatened network, and its primary 
focus was on how to navigate and survive an uncertain future. 
Strategic discussion was limited; rather members of the network 
enacted their sensemaking by demonstrating prosocial behaviours 
of mutual support, and problem-sharing. 
5.5 New World  
This was the smallest of the four groups and consisted of just two 
practices, with a list size of around 40,000 patients. One provided 
primary care on the site of Castlefield University. One was a new 
practice that has set up in close proximity to the train station to 
serve patients from all parts of the City. Both practices’ patient 
                                       
1 It is important to note that there is no evidence to suggest that the care 
given by this group of doctors is in any way inferior to that provided by 
other GPs.  
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population reflected increased global mobility. The new practice, 
Station, offered services under a scheme called Alternative Personal 
Medical Services (APMS) aimed at a patient group that would find it 
hard to access the services of a traditional general medical practice. 
It offered these services from a newly converted building, and it was 
in a functional meeting room in this building that the lunchtime GP-
group meetings took place, over sandwiches ordered in from a local 
caterer. Usually about eight people were in attendance including 
nurses, managers, doctors and a lay representative. 
NW’s lead GP, Dr Whitbread, was also the Chair of the CCG’s GB. He 
was a partner at the university practice. With over 35,000 patients 
on its books, this was the largest practice in the CCG having more 
than twice the number of patients of the next biggest practice. The 
practice manger, a technology savvy young man, represented the 
practice in NW meetings thus allowing Dr Whitbread to focus on 
chairing and presenting commissioner business from the wider CCG. 
The practice focused on services for a younger than average patient 
population; for example it was developing a health app, had 
developed an award-winning eating disorders services, and sports 
medicine was a high priority. 
Station practice was designed to provide services to a mobile and 
less-settled population. It was located adjacent to the railway 
station in a non-residential area. The partners espoused a social 
justice ethos, almost to the point of a brand. The issues that this 
practice raised during my observations included homelessness, 
healthcare of asylum seekers, and psychological well-being services. 
Because of its non-geographical nature, and its willingness to 
engage with inner city social problems, Station practice took 
registrations from local probation hostels, and other types of 
temporary accommodation. The number of patients registered with 
this practice was growing, recently accelerated by a closure of a 
nearby single handed practice (a member of the Gurus). The staff 
group consciously adapted working patterns in order to meet 
anticipated demand and cater for the lifestyles of its patients. For 
136 
 
instance the surgery opened on both Saturday and Sunday 
mornings, staffed by a practice nurse and a healthcare assistant, in 
order to undertake new patient checks. 
This network did not share a long history of working together. A 
new, more prospective, approach to sensemaking appeared to be 
developing. This was the only group that was not doctor-dominated. 
Nurses and practice managers took part confidently in discussions 
as equals. It was evident that the individuals, especially the nurses 
and practice managers, communicated between meetings. It was 
often difficult to follow discussions as there was little need to explain 
or update as everyone, except me, knew the latest. A fieldnote 
reads:  
The meeting doesn’t really have a beginning. Chris, a young and 
dynamic practice manager starts to talk about Wi-Fi and patient 
feedback, and it would seem we have begun. The discussion, or 
chat, moved into discussion of readmissions and transfers between 
the two main acute hospitals. It felt like they just picked up where 
they left off last time. I tried to put my finger on why this was so 
different from other meetings. I think it must be related to 
relevance, and a sense of connection. They weren’t arriving to dip 
into the CCG business. This was their business. (NW fieldnote 1) 
In particular, the university practice manager took a lead on new 
initiatives, and acted as a sensegiver in this respect. He gave 
particular prominence to the importance of communications and 
communication technology reflecting the habits of the young, 
mobile, international patient group that his practice served. 
Both practices shared an enthusiasm to improve services for 
patients, and were optimistic about the potential to do this in the 
future. Of particular focus was access to services, about which 
discussions would often be framed in terms of lifestyle and 
economic issues for younger and working age people. Long waits for 
physiotherapy services were discussed with reference to the ability 
of patients to continue working or caring. 
“6 weeks is a long time to wait if you can’t go to work. It’s not an 
acute get back to work service.” (NW fieldnote 3) 
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“Carers end up with back problems don’t they?” (NW fieldnote 3) 
The doctors and practice staff were happy to use new contractual 
models if this meant better access to services for patients. They 
were happy for services to be provided by non-NHS suppliers if 
improvements were gained as a result (see 6.3 for evidence on GP 
attitudes to competition). Dr Johnson, a female GP from Station 
mentioned that the partners had received “an interesting private 
sector letter” thanking them for using the service. “You’d never get 
one of those from the hospital” she commented (NW fieldnote 3). 
This network’s approach to sensemaking was confident and with a 
sense of moral purpose. This was demonstrated in incidences where 
CCG rules were challenged and disobeyed. It is not possible to 
decipher how much this happened as a consequence of Dr 
Whitbread allowing it, or from a moral principle that clinical staff 
should do the right thing, something that Station staff emphasised. 
One incident did evidence Dr Whitbread’s ability to bend wider CCG 
rules. It was not CCG policy to fund practice-based physiotherapists, 
but the university practice had one. When a CCG director challenged 
this, asking “have we really examined why it exists?” (NW fieldnote 
4) Doctor Whitbread replied kindly “If you want innovation you have 
to take risks”, and thus closed any discussion, whilst ensuring his 
relatively young, sporty patient-population continued to have their 
physiotherapist on-site. 
NW members always spoke about what was best for the patients in 
their clinical opinion, and would act on this whether or not it fell 
within the CCGs rules. An example (NW fieldnote 2) was the 
prescribing of Vitamin D, a deficit of which had other impacts 
including problems with bone health, heart function, and causing 
the onset of diabetes. Station practice had been part of a research 
study, which had revealed that a significant proportion of its 
population was deficient in the vitamin. Consequently, the practice 
had routinely tested patients that came to surgery, and found that 
“the whole population was deficient.” Tests were followed up with 
vitamin D prescriptions. As a consequence Station’s prescribing 
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budget was overspent. Despite the CCG prescribing advisors’ 
efforts, Station continued with its approach of testing and 
prescribing, arguing that not to prescribe was more costly in the 
long-term. 
The developing shared approach was to extract cues related to 
innovation and improvements in patient care including new 
technologies. Although these practices had been brought together 
for the purpose of secondary healthcare commissioning their 
attention was on the development of 21st century primary care. In 
NW secondary care commissioning was one of the less popular 
items on the agenda. Dr Whitbread, would “feedback” from his 
perspective as Chair of the CCG, describing progress with provider 
contracts and the status of strategies and programmes. An extract 
from a fieldnote (NW fieldnote 3) reads:  
Dr Whitbread did his commissioning feedback. There was a long 
description of the issues which was very concentrated on the acute 
hospital, which he led the contract for. He talked about “the 
emergency rate threshold” and “mega-millions”. The hospital had 
got to find £50 million of savings. “Pathology has joined with 
another county and will be provided in a shed off the motorway” 
said Dr Whitbread as an example of ways that economies of scale 
were being found. Only Dr Whitbread and the patient 
representative (a sociology professor) were really interested. 
Others present visibly sat back in disengagement. 
Dr Whitbread routinely reported back on planning and contracting 
activity, but failed to engage the interest of others. Of all the GP-
groups, this is the only one where these issues are presented in this 
formal comprehensive way, without an accompanying discussion 
about the effect on primary care. After a few minutes others in the 
room changed the subject back to their own clinical businesses. 
From these observations it is possible to draw out the implications 
for BF at the intersection of SP. This was the smallest GP-group 
network with only two practices. It was formed because each of the 
practices served non-traditional niche populations and therefore did 
not have a natural fit with the other networks. Members of the 
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network were developing mutually supportive social working 
relationships outside of meetings. The sensemaking cues that this 
group chose to extract cues related to innovation and improvement 
in primary care. 
Unlike the other GP-groups, NW did not have an established shared 
history of commissioning together, and therefore did not have an 
established sensemaking legacy upon which to draw. This appeared 
to allow them to be future orientated, with an enthusiasm to try 
new ways of doing things in order to improve services for patients. 
The ground for this prospective sensemaking was particularly fertile 
in this network, as its patient group (at both practices) was 
considerably younger than the Castlefield average. When making 
sense of their environment the actors in this network appeared to 
feel relatively unconstrained evidenced by the fact that they 
challenged, bent, and broke rules when they deemed such action to 
be in the interests of their patients. This was in part due to the fact 
that Dr Whitbread was the CCG chair, so was a protective presence 
in terms of negative consequences from the CCG, but it was also 
likely to be attributable to the fact that these were non-traditional 
developmental enterprises that extracted and bracketed cues 
related to innovation in primary care. This was reflected in the 
network’s confident, challenging, and risk-taking shared identity, 
which was in contrast to the legacy–derived identity of the other 
GP-groups. Not only was their sensemaking confident and self-
assured, but appeared to derive from a sense of moral authority 
based on a commitment to continually improve the quality of 
primary care services, and to fight for social justice. 
5.6 Four GP-groups in one Clinical Commissioning 
Group network 
Earlier sections of this chapter were considerations of the different 
sensemaking styles associated with the four GP-group networks. In 
the distribution of networks in the health economy these were 
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positioned as sub-networks of the CCG. Most of the time the CCG 
functioned as a unified collaboration, but underlying this were 
tensions related to the different sensemaking processes of the GP-
groups which from time to time would bubble to the surface. During 
my observations there was one exercise when an overarching 
decision about the four groups needed to be made which clearly 
exposed these tensions. 
During the January and February cycle of meetings, the “Group 
Budget-Setting Exercise” happened. In previous years a nationally 
devised distribution tool, known as “the York formula”, had been 
used for all practice-budgets in England. This year, 2013-14, this 
had been discarded, and instead local finance directors had been 
given discretion to set budgets locally. I was invited to attend a CCG 
GB development session (GB fieldnote 4), where budget-setting was 
on the agenda. As already discussed earlier in this chapter, 
Chamber leaders, in their sensegiving role, had extracted cues from 
their experience of fundholding, had encouraged individual practices 
to make savings to spend on priorities that the network would 
determine. Almost certainly as a result of this approach it had 
returned a very respectable under-spend on the 2012-13 budget. 
By contrast the hands-off approach taken by PC had returned a very 
significant over-spend amounting to almost two million pounds. I 
had observed Chamber GPs to have a quiet but deep felt pride at 
having achieved this position. Dr Baasit in particular was pleased to 
have outperformed PC. The Gurus had returned a slight under-
spend. NW had overspent due, in part, to the practice of prescribing 
Vitamin D described earlier in 5.5. The level of PC’s over-spend, 
because of its magnitude, was not something that could be turned 
around without intervention. Because of this, the finance team were 
preparing to rebase the opening budgets for the 2013-14 financial 
year, altering the ratios of the split between four GP-groups. 
Chamber, the Gurus, and NW, would get less money in order that 
the PC had a budget that reflected what its member practices had 
spent during the previous year. 
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At the development session, Conran, the Finance Director, began by 
talking about the budget setting formula. Three options were put 
forward for the 2013-14 budgets, on a PowerPoint slide (see figure 
2) 
Figure 2: Options to set GP budgets 
 
This was presented as if it were a purely rational process, with no 
acknowledgement of the potential emotional impact on those GPs 
that had worked hard on budget management. Conran continued to 
build his argument. PC’s two million pounds over-spend, if built into 
next year’s opening position, would not incentivise the network to 
manage their finances since there was no prospect of working within 
budget. Conran described the three options. In scenario one each 
GP-group would open with a similar proportion of the overall budget 
as in the previous year. In scenario two part of the budget would be 
adjusted to bring the relative over-spend and under-spend positions 
closer together. In scenario three then the opening budget would be 
set at the level of the previous years’ actual spend i.e. over-spends 
and under-spends would be cancelled, and the new budget would be 
based on the end of year positions. 
During Conran’s presentation Dr Cooper was aware that he needed 
to defend his financial management. “The point here is that at GP-
group level we are doing well” he said, attempting to exonerate the 
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majority of PC practices by isolating the responsibility for the over-
spend to certain practices within the network. He argued that PC 
had been underfunded in the first place, because the patients had 
greater needs: 
“Present budget setting does not compensate for physical pathology 
or mental health pathology” 
Conran deflected this point, knowing that it could not be argued on 
evidence. Conran’s argument was that budgets were a mechanism 
to affect behaviour, including clinical practice:  
“Budgets set parameters; hold people to account; and incentivise 
and engage…..there is no point setting budgets that are over 
generous or overly penal.” 
Conran explained that budget-setting methodology was subject to 
national review, but a new formula would take more than a year to 
develop, and even when it was ready it would be introduced via a 
gradual phasing programme. In the meanwhile the CCG needed to 
put its own house in order. As things currently stood, the extent of 
PC’s problem meant that there was no prospect of anything but a 
similar outcome next year. Unless shares were altered, PC had no 
chance of incentivising its practices to make savings. “We have no 
innovation fund whatsoever” said Dr Cooper. The consequences 
began to dawn on Dr Baasit who had not been party to discussions 
in advance, in contrast to Dr Cooper who evidently had. Dr Baasit, 
usually quiet in CCG-wide environments said with emotion in his 
voice: 
“We are bigger, we are hard on our red [over-spending] practices, 
and they have come in line. We were robust in our practice visits. If 
there is no reward, it changes the game. It demotivates.” 
At this point, the university representative, an accountant, 
intervened, saying he could see both sides. He was assertive, whilst 
holding eye contact with Conran. I suspect he too had been briefed 
beforehand. The intervention served to deflect Dr Baasit’s point. 
Somewhat insensitively Dr Cooper spoke up again, and the following 
exchange took place: 
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Dr Cooper: “Option 3 makes absolute sense to PC.” 
Dr Baasit: “If you do what you’ve always done….. It might 
demotivate my Chamber practices.” 
Dr Poona: “How will I go back and tell my practices?” 
Dr Cooper: (sensing victory, and going too far):“It really 
disappoints me; the passion with which those leaders want to hang 
on to those under-spends.” 
Dr Whitbread: “I give millions each year which you’re benefitting 
from.” [Referring to a budget adjustment to reflect the younger 
healthier population] 
At this point Dr Baasit had to leave to go back to his surgery. Just 
after he had left, the university representative proposed that option 
three be adopted, and this was agreed. Conran added a definition of 
how the savings element would be allocated in an attempt to soften 
the blow: fifty percent would be used to reward individual GP-
groups, and fifty percent to fund Castlefield wide initiatives. He 
added that in strict cash terms the change in budget would not 
make that much difference, glossing over or failing to understand 
the impact that this budget-based rule would have on sensemaking 
in the GP networks. In Chamber this could jeopardise the legitimacy 
of the inner circle in the eyes of the wider group. The under-spend 
was the result of practices responding to the incentive that savings 
would be returned to spend on Chamber’s own priorities, but had 
also resulted in a budget reduction going forward. Instead of being 
penalised, the over-spending behaviour of the GPs in PC network 
had resulted in a budget increase for the following year. Conran 
closed the discussion with a rallying call to the group, using 
language that minimised the impact. 
“Let’s make that marginal shift.” 
The remainder of the discussion was about how to take the decision 
forward, including how Dr Baasit would be “briefed”. Dr Cooper 
sidestepped this one, saying “You guys decide the best mechanism”. 
Over the next few weeks during January and February the GP-
groups were informed of these events in their monthly meetings. 
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Since the financial year had not ended, the possibility of practices 
gaming during the remaining few weeks was eliminated by Conran’s 
pre-empting this and basing the following year’s budgets on the end 
of December position. 
The first GP-group to receive the news was PC, where the mood was 
celebratory (PC fieldnote 3). Where Chamber were the losers, PC 
were the winners. The announcement of the shift of the budget to 
an historical position prompted one doctor to say jovially “get 
spending” in a stage whisper, before finding out that the finance 
team had anticipated this reaction and intended to project the 
outturn based on the year to December. Even so, PCs opening 
position had just improved by nearly two million pounds. “I think 
the finance team did a fantastic job” said Dr Cooper. 
The intended impact of this adjustment was not without tactics on 
the part of Conran. It was now up to the PC lead GPs to introduce 
financial discipline into its modus operandi. At the following meeting 
(PC fieldnote 4), in March, Dr Cooper introduced this challenge 
saying: 
“It is now incumbent on us to project an under-spend for the first 
time in PC’s history…….everyone happy with that? It’s not all off to 
Harvey Nicks. We need to deliver an under-spend next year”  
A paper had been put forward suggesting approaches to developing 
a proactive approach to budget management. The paper included 
thirty one suggestions, mainly about how to manage referrals. The 
difficulties of enacting peer challenge in this group were evident. 
The health system orientation in PC, with its hands off approach to 
individual practices, meant that this network was not accustomed to 
discussions about personal referral and prescribing behaviour. 
Doctors became disgruntled and problem-focused: 
“A lot of these are admirable, but we are all at capacity, a lot of 
these will mean more work for GPs, we will need locums”  
“I’d like some clarity about which patients we are supposed to look 
after. I’ve no idea which cardio and which diabetics are coming 
back.” 
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Discussions carried on this vein for the rest of the item. Prescribing 
was challenged, including a large amount on prescribing for erectile 
dysfunction. The impact of chaotic patients was mentioned. 999 
calls from nursing homes for infections was also blamed. At no point 
was the mechanism of practice by practice scrutiny and comparison 
suggested. By the next meeting in April, a plan for budget 
management had been produced but this was still largely based on 
making savings through the implementation of initiatives, rather 
than scrutinising referrals and prescriptions more closely and 
focusing on the financial consequences of day to day practice. 
The next GP-group I observed receiving the information was 
Chamber (Chamber fieldnote 4). A middle grade finance manager, 
Alan, had been sent to present next year’s budget. Only Dr Baasit 
and I had prior knowledge of what the report would contain. My 
observation note reads: 
Alan went through the arguments. Dr Conary’s face said it all. Dr 
Baasit shuffled papers around, looking down. The implication began 
to dawn. Dr Clemence realised that there was no chance of any 
behaviour change to alter the bottom line. [December outturn was 
used]. Dr Conary said “As a group we have been very proactive to 
promote the formula.” This group of Doctors then began to see the 
implications this had for them as leaders. “The practices will be 
angry. We will lose credibility. How can this come as a fait 
accompli? This needs to be out for wider consultation.” Questions 
were asked about why a part historic, part formula option had been 
discarded. This shocked discussion continued for some time. 
Eventually Dr Baasit began to lead the Doctors back to cohesion. 
“We are part of a wider city, that’s important.” “But”, said others, 
“Chamber has been running at a 14% reduction” and “PC has been 
running with uncontrolled over-spends.” Even Dr Conary, and Dr 
Kerala, also executive GP in the CCG, had not known until now, 
when I knew that PC had announced this victory to all its Doctors 
the previous week. “If we’re going completely historic there’s not 
much point” said Dr Conary. All the doctors gasped. 
Chamber had worked hard to produce an under-spend, and would 
now find themselves disadvantaged the following year as a 
consequence. Alan argued that this was not significant in strictly 
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cash terms. Perhaps not, but in sensemaking terms this change in 
rules was extremely significant to the Chamber leaders. It altered 
the very basis of why the inner circle had felt justified and 
legitimate when guiding the outer circle to manage demand. This 
change made them feel powerless, and undermined; their 
confidence in themselves was affected. They quickly regrouped and 
reframed the interpretation, but an important issue was revealed. 
The sensemaking that held the network together was highly 
dependent on the inner circle retaining credibility and legitimacy in 
the wider group, and as such was vulnerable to rules being changed 
in this way. 
The next group I observed was the Gurus who also were losers, 
albeit not to the same extent as Chamber (Gurus fieldnote 4). The 
Gurus had in fact managed their budget to spend almost exactly 
what was available to them. They had looked at practice-level data 
during the year to make sure they were not over-spending. They 
had not prioritised savings in the way that Chamber had, nor had 
they avoided seeing each other’s position as PC had. When Alan, the 
same finance manager presented their budget, he attempted to 
argue that the redistributed budget, and the re-incentivisation of 
PC, would produce a greater overall saving to spend on CCG-wide 
initiatives from which everyone would benefit. These men and 
women were not to be fooled by the suggestion that a cut to their 
budget was a good thing, nor were they going to worry too much 
about it either. An exchange between Dr Franklin and Alan 
illustrates their lack of concern. 
Dr Franklin: “What would the consequences of an over-spend be?” 
Alan: “If our accounts are qualified, then our finance director goes.” 
Dr Franklin: “What’s the consequence for us?”  
[Silence, whilst everyone pondered the question] 
Dr Franklin: “Bad boy” 
In other words there would be no real consequences, other than a 
ticking off. These doctors were not emotionally invested in 
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commissioning. Primarily, they were concerned with surviving 
operational changes on a day to day basis. Nevertheless, they had 
managed their budget well, and would continue to do so. 
The final group was NW (NW fieldnote 4). They received the 
information without comment. They were outside of the inter-
network politics between PC and Chamber. They did what they 
thought was right clinically in any case, budgets were not a pre-
occupation. 
Comparisons can be drawn between the four distributed GP 
networks as they made sense of the budget setting rules. PC’s focus 
outwards onto the wider healthcare system had a corollary effect of 
a reduced practice focus, resulting in a separation of network-wide 
business and the routine operations of individual practices which 
remained autonomous and private. By contrast, for Chamber close 
scrutiny of the operation of practices was the focus of the network, 
and probably as a consequence savings had been generated to 
spend on their own priorities. NW had overspent, partly due to 
Station practice continuing to prescribe Vitamin D in volume. The 
Gurus had returned a position very close to breakeven, having 
shared information during the year in order to keep a check on the 
budget. Ultimately the positions of these distributed networks were 
aggregated, and an overall exercise to set budgets for the following 
year was undertaken and budget shares were adjusted to reflect the 
previous years’ outturn. 
Important points about sensemaking in these distributed networks 
can be extracted from reactions to the rule changes. The PC GPs 
were celebratory when they discovered that their over-spending had 
resulted in a budget adjustment in their favour. The leaders 
understood that they were now challenged to manage the budget 
next year, but there was still no cross-fertilisation of ideas with 
Chamber. When the Chamber group received the news, the doctors 
were concerned at the effect on their legitimacy. This had the 
potential to undermine the basis of social sensemaking in the group, 
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since the compliant work of individual practices to generate savings 
had resulted in less money for the following year. Despite their 
views being marginalised at the development session, the lead 
doctors in Chamber appeared to accept the change with little 
observable complaint. Neither the Gurus nor NW showed much of a 
reaction. They did not have a legacy in commissioning, and were 
more interested in other issues anyway. The Gurus reassured 
themselves that there were no real consequences, and returned 
their focus to the more immediate problems that they faced on a 
day to day basis. Similarly NW continued to focus on primary care. 
There was no sign of cross-fertilising of sensemaking approaches 
across this distributed network, with PC leaders becoming more 
practice-focused and Chamber more politically aware in order 
minimise the risk of integrity being seen as naivety. Whether or not 
actors whose sensemaking process is informed by a legacy would be 
able to cross-fertilise in a distributed system is a potential area for 
further research. 
One question that this raises is, why did the CCG managers adopt a 
budget-setting strategy that rewarded the over-spending behaviour 
of PC and penalise the practices in Chamber especially when the 
cost-control of referrals and prescriptions was such an important 
commissioning objective? Conran’s argument was that the only 
practical way to re-incentivise PC was to rebase the budget. 
However, as will be seen in the following chapter, PCs sensemaking 
legacy of enactment of commissioning at the level of NHS-as-
system” was shared by GPs and managers alike at the SCL. This is 
explored in more depth in the following chapter. 
5.7 Discussion: Operational Practice Level  
5.7.1 Introduction 
Below I discuss how and why GPs commissioned in the way that 
they did at OPL by identifying sensemaking processes within the 
context of networks and rules. The discussion is organised into 
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three sections: wider context, temporality, and distributed 
sensemaking. In each section the five themes identified during data 
analysis are discussed. These were: the establishment of new 
organisations; legacies; changes to the profession; competition; and 
integration. I conclude by presenting a summary in the form of a 
tabular matrix, the structure of which is themes (side headings) 
corresponding to the three analytic co-ordinates (top headings). The 
content of the matrix are concise statements consisting of the main 
implications for BF and SP. 
5.7.2 Wider context  
Of the three levels, this was the most contained; the organisational 
boundary was equivalent to the aggregate of the sixty plus general 
practices in Castlefield and their routine business. The requirement 
for practices to join a CCG was incorporated into national contracts 
for primary care. This national rule was loosely specified, and 
therefore there was scope for variation in its interpretation. Because 
the CCG did not exist in isolation; there was ample evidence of 
other influences on sensemaking, especially the wider NHS, and 
developments within the medical profession. 
Sensemaking was within the context of a changing profession (see 
2.2.1 -2.2.2). Forces impacting the profession were evident, 
including restratification and hybridisation, alongside the increased 
application of regulatory controls that affected autonomy. These 
forces affected each GP-group network in different ways and to 
different extents creating different combinations. These 
combinations in turn reflected how each GP-group interpreted rules 
with reference to previous and current national policies, for example 
previous fundholders drew on fundholding techniques to enact new 
commissioning rules. The Gurus continued to practice in the 
traditional small practice model with only limited evidence of 
restratification and hybridisation, and appeared to experience all 
change, including the increase of management and regulation, as a 
burden. Chamber’s peer-management approach appeared to 
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evidence hybridity accompanied by very limited restratification; in 
this model all practices were expected to adopt management 
discipline not just a differentiated group of leaders. PC adopted a 
hierarchical stratified model with an elite group who represented 
and advised the rank-and-file by interpreting local and national 
policy on their behalf. In PC’s model clinical activity rates remained 
private, and practices retained a high degree of autonomy. NW was 
different again. NW was significantly smaller than the others 
comprising of only two practices. A combination of size and the 
desire to value the contributions of all staff groups resulted in this 
group operating a non-hierarchical multi-disciplinary model. 
Another significant external influence related to the industry-wide 
context. The staff who worked in the NHS had a deeply embedded 
approach to sensemaking which included co-operation and mutual 
problem solving across professional and organisational boundaries. 
The term NHS Family was used to describe this shared identity. This 
was not imposed; it is a commonly used term used to describe the 
inter-relationships of organisations and staff, as I knew from 
personal experience. The approach to sensemaking within the 
healthcare sector in Castlefield appeared to be derived from this 
shared identity, and can be conceptualised as a prosocial 
sensemaking type. The existence of this sensemaking type was 
evidenced by examples of mutual support and shared problem 
solving. The rule that GPs should commission was not new, but the 
HSCA gave this duty added emphasis and this affected field 
relationships within this Family. The example of the exchanges in PC 
with Castlecare nurses illustrated this. Castlecare had only recently 
become an independent organisation having previously been part of 
Castlefield PCT. Community nursing staff worked within the 
practices on a day to day basis. When actors on the CCG side 
communicated in technical commissioning language their meaning 
was obfuscated. These attempts were quickly abandoned for a 
return to communicating in terms of a collegiate relationship based 
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on affiliative, co-operative relationships between NHS clinicians 
across organisational boundaries. 
The rules introduced an expectation that NHS commissioning would 
become more commercially orientated, with some mandatory 
procurement, but for the most part this was a loosely specified rule 
left to local interpretation. The national rules included a requirement 
to introduce competition into procurement processes. Procurement 
at the CCG was not the responsibility of the GP-groups, but there 
were examples of GPs anticipating what a new more competitive 
NHS might mean at operational level. 
Integration at this level tended to trigger discussion about how GPs’ 
own services dovetailed with other healthcare services at points of 
referral and discharge. Social care was not discussed, and was only 
mentioned in so much as information was received about the ICP. 
5.7.3 Temporality 
In this section I explore the link between sensemaking, legacies and 
anticipated futures as new rules impacted on the OPL networks. 
GP-group structures from the predecessor PCT were retained in the 
new CCG. Each GP-group network had its distinct sensemaking style 
informed by its legacy. These differences affected prospective 
sensemaking in that the cues extracted reflected the distinct shared 
histories. Two of the four networks derived their approaches from 
previous versions of commissioning rules. Chamber had a style of 
sensemaking derived from fundholding, and PC from non-
fundholding. In common to both was that these were earlier 
variations of rules relating to GP commissioning. It appeared that in 
circumstances where the rule was directly descended from earlier 
versions then sensemaking cues were directly extracted from that 
previous experience. Actors in both Chamber and PC focused their 
agendas on the substance of the new rule. Whilst derived from the 
same rules originating in the early 1990s, the legacies were 
different in each of these two networks, even though many of the 
original actors were no longer members. Chamber’s inwards focus 
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on practices’ profiles of clinical activity contrasted to PC’s outward 
focus on system-wide concerns. Of the two remaining GP-groups, 
one had a more embedded legacy, and one had only a very short 
history of working together. Neither the Gurus nor NW appeared to 
be motivated by the substance of the rule itself but rather took part, 
albeit with very different feelings, because of the opportunity to be 
part of a network. The Gurus legacy was distinctly different from 
those of PC and Chamber in that the actors had not changed over 
time. These were individuals who had aged together, sharing an 
ethnic heritage, experience of migration, and life experiences as 
immigrant doctors working in small practices in deprived areas. 
Their sensemaking processes had not been handed on, and would in 
all likelihood end in the relatively near future as the last of them 
retired from practice. This informed their responses to the rule 
change, which they perceived as taking place within a wider context 
of multiple rules that threatened their business model. Their legacy 
was derived from a shared life and work history. Their sensemaking 
appeared to be prospective, and was anticipatory of a limited and 
difficult future. Their thinking was laced with emotions such as 
anxiety and world-weariness, and their repertoire of behaviour 
included the demonstration of mutual support and sharing survival 
strategies. By contrast again, the NW GP-group had no long-
standing legacy to predetermine its members’ ideas about how to 
commission. This network’s process of sensemaking, compared to 
others, was optimistically prospective drawing on cues from an 
anticipated future that appeared to offer opportunities. 
Whether or not actors had previous experience of working together 
appeared to influence their choice of allegiance in the present. Past 
differences in interpretation of predecessor rules persisted into the 
present, resulting in differences in sensemaking type. The fact that 
these differences endured, meant that it was highly likely that they 
would continue whilst so ever the networks remained in place, 
limiting the extent of prospective sensemaking. In my data the 
group with the least experience of working together appeared to 
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have the more optimistic prospective approach to sensemaking, 
creating ideas of a future with new and different ways to provide 
primary care. 
Pre-existing organisational forms were maintained through rule 
change. Legacies derived from previous shared experiences (for 
example, commissioning, and migration) formed the conditions for 
sensemaking. Within the overall prosocial sensemaking type of the 
NHS Family, separated sensemaking styles existed at the level of 
the GP-groups.  
5.7.4 Distributed sensemaking 
In this section I explore how the spatial relationships within and 
between networks related to sensemaking when new rules were 
introduced. 
The sensemaking style, the legacy, and the distribution of each 
network appeared to be inextricably linked, each having an impact 
on the others. Actors were distributed across the four GP-group 
networks, and in turn each GP-group had its own pattern of 
distribution. Decisions that affected these networks were collectively 
managed through cross-CCG structures described in the constitution 
and inter-practice agreement. Membership of the GP-groups was on 
the basis of self-selection. Selections appeared to be made on the 
basis of whether a legacy was shared with other members of the 
network. 
The wider context of a changing profession was interpreted in 
different ways in each of the four networks resulting in different 
patterns of distribution in leader and rank-and-file relationships. 
Chamber developed an inner and outer circle based on a peer buddy 
system. GPs were encouraged to self-direct and to scrutinise their 
own clinical practice in order to manage demand. In other words, 
value was placed on the management of individual clinical practice 
meaning that all doctors were encouraged to adopt management 
strategies. The active GPs in Chamber, through a buddy system, 
emphasised facilitative one to one relationships. In order for this 
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mechanism to continue to be effective, legitimacy must be 
maintained and this was carefully nurtured though the quality of 
clinical information, patient-centredness and integrity. 
PC-group operated more hierarchically. Differentiated leaders 
focused on national policy and the wider health and care field for 
cues on how to make sense of the rule. Often the leaders would 
step back into rank-and-file shoes and join the others in emotional 
responses to new rules. This was always a precursor to reinstating 
the distance, including a reminder to the others of the need for 
emotional discipline and to find a way of going forward. A tension in 
sensemaking could result from a dual identity as commissioner and 
provider. Members of PC attempted to adopt a commissioner 
identity using technical commissioning language. When they 
attempted to communicate with community nurses in this way, then 
the distribution into separate commissioner and provider roles was 
soon challenged by those nurses. Commissioner authority was 
discarded in favour of harmonious inter-professional relationships in 
the NHS Family. Not only was the NHS Family part of the wider 
industry culture and context but it also informed the distribution of 
relationships for sensemaking – these were people who had worked 
together over many years of service and who were conjoined 
through their shared patients. They had a shared legacy which 
would endure a rule that implied that their relationships should be 
re-patterned. 
The Gurus’ leaders did not separate themselves emotionally or 
hierarchically from the member GPs, they simply provided a conduit 
between the network and the wider CCG. They were preoccupied 
with change and extracted cues that made them anxious about 
operational change and managing the future. For The Gurus, whose 
shared history was much wider than commissioning, the future 
looked uncertain and threatening. Emotional support between peers 
became very important. 
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In NW, everyone was welcome to be directly involved. The chair of 
the CCG was also the chair of this group. At the SCL he acted as a 
hybridised leader, but this did not appear to transpose to this GP-
group where he appeared to encourage an egalitarian multi-
professional approach to sensemaking. It is not possible to say 
whether this is just because the group was small, and it is easier to 
be egalitarian when there are fewer people. The attitude was 
forward looking, and emotions of confidence, courage, and 
excitement and openness about changes ahead were apparent 
based on a commitment to high quality primary care. 
The only point at which I observed the relative impact of the 
separate group styles was when it came to sharing a budget across 
the four groups. The decision of the CCG GB was to base the 2013-
2014 budgets on the closing positions that the group’s returned in 
2012-2013, and thus rewarding an over-spend that had occurred 
associated with PCs systems-based hierarchical style and penalising 
Chamber’s peer guide, practice focused approach. Why PC was 
treated leniently was possibly just because it was the only practical 
thing to do, but it could also be related to the importance of their 
sensemaking style at the SCL, as will become evident in the 
following chapter. 
There appeared to be no dynamic of cross-fertilisation between 
these networks with different styles. 
5.7.5 Summary matrix of theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications identified in 5.7.1-5.7.4 are presented 
in a summary matrix in table 21. The matrix structure is a map of 
the main thematic categories (side headings) and the SP co-
ordinates (top headings). Contents of the matrix are articulated 
using concepts from BF and SP. 
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Table 22 Operational Practice Level summary matrix 
Operational Practice Level 
 Wider Contexts Temporality Distributed Sensemaking 
Establishment 
of new 
organisations 
National rules introducing CCGs did not specify 
operational arrangements for GP engagement.  
GP-group structures from the predecessor PCT 
were retained in the new CCG.  
Four networks (GP groups) formed a distributed 
mechanism for the management of clinical activity.  
Decisions that affected these networks were 
collectively managed through cross-CCG structures 
described in the constitution and inter-practice 
agreement. 
Legacy  Actors had an embedded allegiance to the NHS 
Family with an associated prosocial sensemaking 
type.   
Each GP-group network had its distinct 
sensemaking style informed by its legacy. These 
differences affected prospective sensemaking in 
that the cues extracted were different according to 
different shared histories.  
Actors’ selection of networks was informed by 
legacy relationships. Legacies informed the 
distribution of actors within networks (also see 
Profession: Distributed Sensemaking).  
Professional 
changes 
Changes to the profession (as described SoP and 
medical sociology) were evident in different 
combinations in the GP-group networks. These 
combinations in turn reflected how each GP-group 
interpreted rules with reference to previous and 
current national policies, for example previous 
fundholders drew on fundholding techniques to 
enact new commissioning rules. 
GP-group networks had different expectations 
about what the future would hold. Sensemaking 
cues were drawn from an anticipated future as well 
as from a known past. For example the older group 
of migrant GPs was anxious about the future, and 
this affected their ability to think optimistically 
about the future. 
Decisions about the distribution of actors in 
networks were informed by legacies, and these 
distributions differentially reflected professional 
changes. The four patterns of distribution where: 
 All GP- hybrids, non-hierarchical 
(Chamber) 
 Elite GP- hybrids, hierarchical (PC)  
 Leaders as conduit, non-hierarchical 
(Gurus)  
 Multi-professional hybrids, non-
hierarchical (NW)  
Competition The rules introduced an expectation that NHS 
commissioning would become more commercially 
orientated, with some mandatory procurement, but 
for the most part this was a loosely specified rule 
left to local interpretation.  
 
Actors had little in the way of past experience for 
use in retrospective sensemaking. Attempts were 
made to think prospectively regarding the impact 
of competition, most notably by the ex-
fundholders.  
 
No impact on distribution.  
Integration 
 
There were no specific rules about integration at 
this level. 
 Attempts by primary care nurses and doctors to 
relate to community colleagues as commissioners 
were abandoned in favour of NHS Family 
collegiality. 
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Chapter Six: Sensemaking, networks and 
rules at Strategic Collaboration Level 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I focus at this CCG level – the formal rule-based 
statutory collaboration. I begin by outlining the rule that required 
the establishment of CCGs. In section 6.2 I focus on networks. I 
explore how the CCG-wide GP network was established, and 
consider how this was situated in a wider collegiate network that 
spanned the NHS. I present findings that suggest doctors from 
primary and secondary care have a tightly coupled relationship that 
underpins social sensemaking derived from an interconnected 
network based on professional identity. In Section 6.3 I consider the 
dynamic relationship of rules, networks, and sensemaking when 
introducing the new requirement to introduce competition into 
processes to award contracts for services. I present data relating to 
the introduction of competition rules in secondary and primary, and 
relating to actors’ response to perceived conflicts of interest that 
result.  
Observations were centred upon activities organised from the CCG 
headquarters. This was a pre-NHS Victorian Hospital. It had 
continued as a hospital until the mid-1990s when it became the 
headquarters for the District Health Authority and has continued to 
be the administrative hub for Castlefield health services for the 
ensuing 20 years. Many of the observations were in other venues –
hotels with conference facilities were used for group events, and 
sometimes meetings were held in local community health facilities 
in an attempt to connect senior people with the neighbourhoods 
that they served. 
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6.2 Commissioning networks 
The rule by which CCGs were established included a provision that 
final decision making power must be held by the collective 
membership of GPs. The outgoing PCT leaders, when deciding the 
organisational form for the new CCG, had put in place an 
overarching network to connect Castlefield GPs known as Total 
Members (TM). In this section I begin by considering the processes 
to establish the CCG. Next I consider sensemaking processes across 
the TM network. Finally I consider how TM’s sensemaking was 
located within a wider network of the NHS Family, and why this had 
an important impact at times of rule change. 
6.2.1 Establishing the Clincial Commissioning Group 
In Castlefield, the CCG was established by the people of the 
outgoing Castlefield Primary Care Trust (PCT). As with the GP-
groups described in the previous chapter, PCT organisational 
structures were retained wherever possible. The PCT’s 
arrangements had been working well, and the rationale was that 
disruption should be minimised and organisational knowledge 
retained as far as possible. As a result sensemaking approaches and 
networks were also kept intact. The staff at the outgoing PCT were 
the designers of the organisational form of the CCG into which their 
job-roles transferred. The change, as far as the GPs were 
concerned, was minimal. An extract from the 2011-2012 annual 
letter from the audit commission read: 
Castlefield CCG is in a strong position since it includes the same 
GPs as Castlefield PCT, covers the same geographical area, is 
coterminous with the local authority and will have some continuity 
of senior staff, reducing the risk of loss of corporate memory. The 
PCT is undertaking work to establish proper governance and 
financial management structures going forward. (CCG doc 1) 
The rules that defined CCGs (each practice to be a member and to 
appoint a clinician to act on its behalf) were loosely specified. 
Because CCGs were new legal bodies it was impossible to avoid 
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making changes. The rule that the CCG should be a member 
organisation was formally implemented. A constitution (CCG doc 2) 
was developed which outlined the operational arrangements and 
decision making structures. This in turn was underpinned by an 
inter-practice agreement (CCG doc 3) that a partner from each 
practice was required to sign. This agreement bound the practices 
to abide by a Castlefield-wide interpretation of the national rules. It 
included how a practice should formally engage with the CCG, how 
finances and financial risk would be managed, how GP-groups would 
work, how innovation and development funds would be allocated, 
and how practice performance would be managed through a 
programme of visits. In accordance with the national requirement, 
ultimate decision making authority was reserved to the CCG 
membership, which was in turn delegated to the GB on a day to day 
basis. 
The GB was similar to the Board of Castlefield’s outgoing PCT. It 
included GPs, managers and lay members. The Chair was Dr 
Whitbread from NW, the smallest GP-group. The other GP-group 
Chairs had places at the table, and so did Dr Lovett who took lead 
responsibility for patient safety, safeguarding, research and 
education. Responsibility for the CCG and its operations on a day-
to-day basis rested with its Chief Operating Officer, Catrina Cook. 
Other management directors at the GB were Maggie Smith, Director 
of Primary Care; Lisa Diggle, Commissioning Director; and Conran 
Shaw, Finance Director. In addition the GB had a Company 
Secretary, three lay members, and an independent nurse and 
doctor. 
The HSCA 2012 included a rule that CCGs be led by GPs. In 
Castlefield a Professional Cabinet (PrC) was put in place to enact 
this. Each GP-group nominated executive GPs in numbers broadly 
proportionate to the size of its registered population. Thus, the 
different legacy-based sensemaking styles, discussed in the 
previous chapter, was represented in this overarching network. The 
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GP executives each had lead areas on behalf of the CCG-wide 
network (see Table 22). 
Table 23 Executive GPs' lead work areas 
Chamber, 160,000 patients, three executive lead GPs 
Dr Baasit Chamber GP-group chair and CCG lead for cancer services and some 
large independent sector contracts 
Dr Conary Chamber executive, and CCG lead for practice visits programme, and 
the only female executive GP 
Dr Kerala Chamber executive and CCG lead for integrated care and long term 
conditions 
Principled Collaboration, 125,000 patients, three executive lead GPs 
Dr Cooper Principled Collaboration GP-group chair, and CCG lead for mental 
health services 
Dr Strong Principled Collaboration GP-group executive, and CCG lead for the 
Health and Wellbeing Board  
Dr Lovett Principled Collaboration GP-group executive, and CCG lead for 
education, professional development, research, and safe-guarding. 
The Gurus , 30,000 patients, two executive lead GPs 
Dr Poona The Gurus GP-group lead, and CCG lead for the contract with 
Castlefield community services enterprise 
Dr Ashok The Gurus executive and general advisory role in the CCG  
New World, 40,000 patients, one executive lead GP 
Dr Whitbread New World GP-group chair, CCG Chair, and lead for contracts with large 
local acute provider NHS trust 
Through this mechanism of allocated lead areas, the GP-leaders 
formed a network with a built in inter-dependency. Individual roles 
were broadly aligned with the sensemaking context of the GP-group 
to which they belonged. PC-GP group conceptualised primary care 
as one part of a wider system. In line with this, Dr Strong led 
interagency work; Dr Cooper led the mental health portfolio; and Dr 
Lovett led on research, education, patient safety and safeguarding. 
Chamber GP-group conceptualised practices as small, individual 
businesses (see 5.2 above). Reflecting this, Dr Conary led the work 
on developing a programme of CCG practice visits to discuss and 
monitor business and clinical issues, and Dr Baasit led on contracts 
with the private sector. The burden of CCG leadership 
responsibilities was minimised for the Gurus; this group had limited 
capacity to be proactive given the significant problems facing small 
practices. Dr Poona led on the contract for community services but 
this was effectively shared with Dr Kerala (from Chamber) who led 
on service integration between health and social care. Dr Ashok held 
no specific brief, and was described as a special advisor. Dr 
Whitbread from NW was the Chair of the GB, and also took the lead 
on contracts with the main acute hospital.  
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This distribution of lead areas between the four GP groups did not 
result in a mix of those sensemaking styles identified in the 
preceding chapter. Instead one group’s approach appeared to be 
adopted across the network of executive lead GPs and their 
manager colleagues. PC’s focus on system management and design, 
its commitment to colleagueship in the NHS Family, its separation of 
followers and leaders in order to manage resistance from rank and 
file GPs were all features that shaped sensemaking across the 
leadership network at this level, as will be evidenced in the 
scenarios described below.  
6.2.2 The Total Members network 
The inter-practice agreement set out a requirement that TM should 
meet twice a year. I observed two of these meetings (TM fieldnotes 
1 and 2). The following paragraphs draw on observations from both 
these meetings. For ease of reading I have conflated the data in 
order to avoid a disjointed narrative.  
Total Member meetings were held in a local hotel with conference 
facilities. Each meeting attracted about 150 attendees including 
GPs, practice nurses, practice managers, and CCG staff. These 
meetings were held in the evenings and were preceded by a buffet 
meal. People milled about, awkwardly balancing hot drinks and 
plates of food. During this pre-meeting time I chatted informally, 
and gained insight into the thoughts of the people who worked in 
primary care. I would find myself talking to practice managers about 
the impossibility of the keeping abreast of all the bureaucracy 
associated with change. Doctors told me they were intending to 
retire, many basing this decision on the fact that the government 
had recently limited personal pension funds. Others would ask me 
what I was doing, and when they found out I was researching their 
professional role would tell me how much more demanding the job 
of a GP had become over recent years. This was a group that was 
ambivalent to the latest rule change; they could see no reason to 
believe it would bring improvements especially at a time of reducing 
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funds and increasing demand. It was against this attitudinal 
background that TM meetings took place. 
Before moving to describe the meeting itself, I would like to 
introduce Dr Lovett, the GP leader who was put forward as the 
facilitator for the meetings. Dr Lovett was an executive GP from PC 
GP-group. Along with others in PC, he had been a non-fundholder 
and interpreted commissioning as service and pathway design in 
partnership with hospital colleagues. Dr Lovett took a role within the 
CCG, along with Dr Conary, as the leader responsible for the 
professional development of doctors. He also took responsibility for 
education, research, and safe-guarding. This dry list of lead areas 
only tells part of the story. It does not give insight into the sort of 
man he was, why he was chosen to lead, and how he had an effect 
on sensemaking. His impact in the main was due to personal 
qualities: he was kind, to everyone, all the time. When he met me 
for an interview, he knew my son’s father was unwell, and he began 
by giving me a bar of chocolate, a hug, and calling me “love”. Many 
others would have experienced this type of interaction, and like me, 
would have remembered it. He was well-known as a GP educator 
and an able consensus builder. It came as no surprise to find that 
he was the facilitator at the TM meeting. He was an effective and 
trusted “sensegiver”. The following excerpt from an interview 
(InterviewLovett) illustrates that he was aware of why he had been 
chosen:  
Dr Lovett: “And I think that’s partly to do with… well I think that’s 
partly to do with I’m at the older end of it. I think I’m lucky enough 
to be reasonably respected because of my role in the vocational 
training scheme, the GP training scheme and education generally 
so they’ve seen me around, they’ve seen me in appraisals and 
hopefully they’ve thought that I was reasonable. I think that… I 
often think of myself, please don’t think this is arrogance, it’s just 
that you’re asking me to answer the question.” 
Adele: “I’m asking you, I need you to tell me what you really 
think.” 
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Dr Lovett: “Yeah, Yeah. I think I’m a bit of like the glue 
sometimes…….In that I often try and interpret which is… I try and 
interpret what I think someone is saying when they’re not getting 
their message across……… I try and interpret for them so that they 
get their message across in the way that other people understand it 
if they’re not doing it themselves, that’s what I see my role as so I 
support them if they’ve got a good idea that for whatever reason 
isn’t coming across to the people who are making the decisions.” 
Dr Lovett understood that he was drawing down reserves of 
previously earned goodwill and trust, and proactively facilitating the 
transposition of these feelings to the new CCG arrangement. He had 
personal qualities that allowed him to generate trust and 
commitment from others. Dr Lovett, and others, used TM meetings 
to skilfully influence how the wider group responded to the 
commissioning duties that HSCA 2012 introduced. The design of the 
evening was such that the rank-and-file were led through a process 
by which key hybrid-leaders communicated an expectation that 
positive, constructive attitudes should be adopted and resistant or 
negative reactions should be contained. 
Now to discuss meetings of TM. On the way into the meeting room, 
attendees were given a table number, reflecting a pre-planned 
arrangement into groups. Sixteen circular tables were laid out 
“cabaret style” –each table, dressed in crisp white linen, seated ten 
to twelve people. When people had settled down in their seats, Dr 
Whitbread opened by giving a short welcome presentation 
announcing that the CCG was now official having been approved by 
the authorising body. Catrina Cook, the Chief Operating Officer gave 
an overview of the role and powers of the CCG. She told the 
members:  
“You can remove the executive body – not at a whim…….as well as 
reserved powers, you have responsibilities………It’s only if we bring 
the Member organisation to life that we will be different to a PCT.” 
She was reflecting the difficulty member GPs were having in 
conceptualising the difference between the predecessor PCT and the 
new CCG. Whilst powers were handed to GPs under the new rules, 
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locally every effort was made to minimise the chances of these 
being exercised. TM meetings were part of a process to establish a 
co-operative sensemaking approach, whereby GPs exercised 
emotional discipline, and did not actively resist implementing the 
new rules even if they did not like them. 
The meetings were structured to allow the wider membership to 
express their views, whilst at the same time reinforcing the position 
of the GP executives who represented them on a daily basis. 
Following Catrina and Dr Whitbread’s introduction, Dr Lovett took to 
the floor, as though it was a stage: 
“Hello C-A-S-T-L-E-F-I-E-L-D. Good turnout. How would you 
measure a mid-life crisis? The average age of a male going to 
Glastonbury is 43.” [He made a gag about the Rolling Stones]. ‘It 
starts at ‘I can’t get no Satisfaction’ to ‘I like it, like it’. I can’t 
answer what’s the meaning of life? or why you’re on the table that 
you’re on.” 
In this extract, Dr Lovett used a number of techniques to let those 
present know how he expected them to behave. Dissention was 
dealt a pre-emptive blow in the Rolling Stones lyric “I can’t get no 
satisfaction”. By referring to “no satisfaction” Dr Lovett was letting 
the rank-and-file members know that he had anticipated their 
resistance before they had chance to express it. He continued by 
introducing a group-work exercise, designed around questions to 
elicit views on what the CCGs commissioning priorities should be. 
Dr Lovett was the facilitator for the table at which I sat. This 
included a mixed group of doctors, practice managers, and nurses. 
There were a number of The Gurus present who displayed emotions 
of anxiety similar to those described in the earlier chapter (see 5.4). 
They described feelings of being overwhelmed, with nowhere to turn 
for help. One elderly Indian female doctor became very anxious and 
agitated about the electronic workload. “So many emails, so many 
replies, so much to read”. Another younger doctor talked frantically 
about the complexity of primary care, using the example of a 
patient with rabies that he had treated that week. For the first few 
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minutes of the group exercise people expressed increasing levels of 
hopelessness, which peaked in the following contribution from an 
older Indian doctor:  
“This is a whole bloody waste of time, The [referral screening 
service] is always sending referrals back………All we want is life to 
be simplified so we can look after patients…..Once upon a time we 
were the guardian lions, now we are the lambs threatened with the 
mint sauce and the fridge.” 
This highly emotive contribution was a crescendo and a turning 
point. The complainants, all of whom were members of The Gurus, 
had exhausted their points. Dr Lovett seized this as his moment to 
facilitate the shift in tone. He had allowed space for people to 
express resistant, anti-rule feelings, but now began to encourage a 
change to constructive, optimistic engagement with the set of 
questions... He asked actors to suggest areas for inclusion as 
indicators in the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). This 
framework was a set of locally agreed targets included in the GMS 
contract in which targets were set, the achievement of which would 
trigger payments. “We do need people to make a suggestion, let’s 
just try” he said, setting up a situation where resistance would 
require deliberate obstructive behaviour. A younger female Doctor 
was the first to follow his lead, suggesting clinical conditions where 
services could be improved: renal colic; dizziness and tinnitus; and 
dermatology. This had a snowball effect. An older doctor suggested 
that the availability of urgent slots for “ultrasound, gallstones, and 
thyroid” would mean that GPs had somewhere to refer when they 
were unsure. Another doctor suggested osteoporosis and pain 
management patients would also benefit from such an arrangement. 
Dr Lovett once again seized the moment and extrapolated from 
these examples to a general point about the ever-evolving nature of 
a GP’s job. He counteracted resistance to change with the 
statement: “what a normal GP does changes every year.” He 
emphasised his point with examples: a few years ago “missing a 
cancer” would not have seriously affected the outcome for the 
patient, but now it did; and in the past GPs did not manage people 
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with insulin dependent diabetes, and now they did. The emotional 
young doctor angrily made one final challenge: “Why should the 
government keep changing all of our contracts? Why don’t we just 
quit?” Dr Lovett responded, not by answering the question, but by 
refusing to reinforce this catastrophising. He simply said, calmly 
“this is completely sortable if we work together.” The hopelessness 
largely expressed by doctors from the Gurus GP-group was actively 
replaced by a focus on improving clinical care.  
The next stage of the meeting was in plenary. Dr Lovett was once 
again the frontman. He introduced the executive lead GPs as “The 
new boy band” (seemingly forgetting the gender of the one female 
executive GP- Dr Conary), jokingly saying Dr Baasit was Jagger, and 
Dr Poona was Keith Richards. He continued with his earlier Rolling 
Stones reference “Can’t get no satisfaction, but tonight you are” – a 
humorous challenge to any GP that complained about the evenings’ 
events. Each group’s rapporteur gave feedback to the wider group. 
In all the reports, it was evident that the small groups had decided 
upon a number of suggestions for CCG priorities, and had worked 
constructively on the issues that they had been asked to discuss. 
This was an example of a hybrid leader appealing to doctors to 
comply with the external rules enshrined in HSCA 2012 and enacted 
by the CCG executive team; to do otherwise would be 
unprofessional (Evetts, 2003). In this way the rank-and-file doctors 
were encouraged to suspend their sensemaking in relation to the 
new rules, and instead to concentrate on identifying opportunities to 
improve patient care. This was a shift in the basis for cue 
extraction, with a corollary effect of shifting actors from a state of 
resistance to one of compliance. 
6.2.3 The NHS Family 
So far in this chapter I have discussed the establishment and 
organisation of the CCG, including how a shared sensemaking 
across the GP membership was promoted by socially skilled actors. 
If the co-operation of GPs was to be maintained then the benefits of 
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commissioning needed to be plausible propositions to the rank-and-
file doctors. Key to this plausibility was the wider industry context, 
and the inter-professional, inter-organisational network, which is 
commonly referred to as the NHS Family. Its history dates back to 
the inception of the NHS in 1948. During my observations, GPs 
appeared to make sense of commissioning in two main ways. On 
the one hand, it involved the management of demand by controlling 
the level of one’s own referrals and prescriptions – this was akin to 
the fundholding model and informed the sensemaking style of 
Chamber GP-group. On the other hand, it was the process of 
planning and designing the flow and balance of services in the 
multi-organisational, multi-professional environment of the NHS 
services. This form of commissioning underpinned the sensemaking 
style in the PC GP network, and was also the dominant style at the 
level of the CCG-wide collaboration. It was dependent on spanning 
organisational boundaries to work collaboratively in professional 
networks, where ideas could be discussed, and plans could be made 
and implemented. 
Working in the NHS was very important to many doctors, and 
primary care was no exception. Castlefield City was a concentrated 
urban area. Commissioning GPs were clinicians who saw patients 
daily, and inner city doctors had reasons for working where they 
did. There were personal reasons why Indian doctors were now in 
England. Both Dr Kerala (Chamber) and Dr Poona (Gurus) told me 
that part of their own decision-making related to the NHS being free 
to patients: 
Dr Kerala: “So when I came in 2001, 2002, to the UK, at that time 
I was very much frustrated with the Indian system where a person 
had to pay before getting even analgesia or treatment for severe 
burns. So I came for a short stint to see what was special [about 
the free British NHS]……..I was staying with a few GPs and I saw 
them socially as well as work-wise, and I was doing shadowing in 
hospital medicine, but because I was living with GPs and seeing 
them work as well……..took a decision…….that rather than going 
into hospital medicine, I wanted to be a GP.” (KeralaInterview) 
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Dr Poona: “My motivation was different [from that of his father who 
had spent some time in England], my son, the eldest son, when he 
was born he got a cataract in one of his eyes and as a young parent 
it was very difficult for me to, what to be done, what needs to be 
done there ……very difficult, we weren’t that rich that we could do 
that …on our own and get the operation done and come here on a 
medical thing and go back, but the ultimatum for me was that if I 
could work for NHS….” (PoonaInterview) 
It seems reasonable to extrapolate that this commitment to the 
English NHS as a contrast to the Indian system is shared more 
widely than these doctors. A further dimension to sensemaking by 
inner-city doctors seemed to derive from personal value-systems. 
Doctors would talk of their own vocation to serve the poor and 
disadvantaged. I will use the best articulated example to illustrate. 
The following is an extract from an interview with Dr Conary:  
“……….as I was coming toward the end of the medical school I was 
thinking really I was going to do medical missionary work probably 
is what I was kind of drawn towards although I’d still got general 
practice at the back of my mind. But then I met what became my 
husband who was at medical school as well and he wasn’t at all 
interested in medical missionary work so we ended up not doing 
that and so then we got married and then I moved around with him 
until he got his permanent post here in Castlefield [as a 
psychiatrist]……… and while I was moving around I did work for 
quite a long time in psychiatry and they did want me then to train 
to be a psychiatric consultant in elderly psychiatric but I decided 
that I’d done all my training already in general practice……… I did 
apply for short term jobs in general practice particularly in inner 
city places because I felt that it probably would be more like 
medical missionary work kind of a Christian outreach to the most 
poor and vulnerable………..[describes finding out about a particular 
inner city practice, with a committed Christian senior 
partner]……….So I went there and found he had a very strong 
Christian ethos as well and he had a very big heart to reach out to 
the most vulnerable and deprived people and to develop services 
and to provide high quality general practice to the most deprived, 
so that really fitted in with my ethos really of coming from a 
background that wasn’t a posh background and I felt I had a lot of 
things in common with ordinary people and I could communicate 
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with ordinary people and I felt that my Christian ethos fitted well 
with helping develop that kind of practice.” (ConaryInterview) 
Inner cities have a resident population with problems associated 
with urban deprivation. The incidence of certain problems such as 
alcoholism, poverty, and inter-generational worklessness are more 
common than in affluent suburban and rural areas. Individual 
doctors often choose to work in the inner-cities, motivated by a 
political or spiritual commitment. 
What these doctors had in common - whether they were Indian 
migrants who appreciated working in a centrally funded model, or 
vocational doctors who wanted to work towards social justice - was 
a tendency to derive sensemaking cues that reflected their own 
valuing of the NHS and being part of it. The importance of the NHS 
Family was a theme in the previous chapter, especially in the 
system orientated PC GP-group. Here, I further unpack its influence 
on sensemaking. In order to do this, I use extracts from 
observations of two CCG-wide Focused Learning Events (FLE) (FLE 
fieldnote 1 and 2). 
Castlefield CCG had established a programme of FLEs. Afternoons 
were set aside for practice staff to come together around specific 
topics. Each GP-group ran its own series; and in addition twice a 
year Castlefield-wide FLEs were held. These were open to all staff in 
the practices. I attended two Castlefield-wide events on the topic 
Emergency Care – it had to run twice in order that all 600 people 
who wanted to attend could be accommodated in the hotel venue. 
The programmes were identical and spaced a week apart. Again, in 
the interests of narrative flow, I have conflated the data from the 
two events. These were popular occasions, providing information 
and also a chance for people to interact socially. When I arrived, the 
foyer was bustling, and a Christmas tree was twinkling. People were 
happily chatting as they queued for lunch and mince pies. There 
were stands from local drug companies, and local NHS and 
voluntary sector services, all keen to tell GPs what they were doing. 
There was a busy, friendly, ambience. 
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The agenda was designed to allow people to consider emergency 
care from the perspective of their own role within a wider system. 
Separate sessions for practice nurses, practice managers and GPs 
were running in parallel. I sat in on the sessions aimed at GPs. On 
both occasions over 100 doctors were in the room, representing a 
spectrum of ages from new entrants to those on the brink of 
retirement. More than half were non-white. There were about twice 
as many women as men. People were wearing comfortable clothes, 
with anoraks and body warmers in evidence as it was a cold day. 
The sessions were led by another PC GP-group executive, Dr 
Strong. He had been a non-fundholding pioneer, and had spent 
many years spanning the boundary between primary and secondary 
care. The agenda for the afternoon included inputs from two 
hospital consultants. These doctors together operated as 
sensegivers. Dr Strong had legitimacy amongst GPs due to his long-
standing commitment as a lead commissioner, and the hospital 
doctors had legitimacy as recognised leaders in their specialisms. 
Similar to the TM event, this was to be a facilitated afternoon, and 
would reinforce shared sensemaking derived from a shared social 
identity as an NHS doctor. Dr Strong reminisced; back in 1983 when 
he became a GP the “take” system was shared between the then 
two local hospitals which had since been merged. In those days, 
there had been approximately 30 GP admissions a day; now there 
were over 300. He had dug out some old discharge notes from a 
cardiac infarct patient. They had been sent home with a spray. 
Everyone laughed. It was a clinical in-joke that illustrated how 
vastly more sophisticated was today’s medicine. 
The first contribution was from Dr Hamilton, the lead consultant for 
emergency medicine at the local acute hospital. He began his input 
by emphasising that primary and secondary care doctors had shared 
values and tasks. Picking up where Dr Strong left off, he gave 
personal reflections on the nature of emergency medicine. Dr 
Hamilton told the GP audience that patients had slept all night in the 
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emergency department the night before, illustrating Dr Strong’s 
point about the sheer number of people who needed care. Dr 
Hamilton then put the discussion in terms of the humanity of the 
patient.  
“I make it sound like a process. It isn’t, human beings are coming 
to hospital later. If you see someone at 10 at night, it’s harder to 
get them home”  
Dr Strong and Dr Hamilton together were demonstrating a joint 
approach to the design and management of the emergency system, 
united in a common task of response to acutely ill patients. The on-
going sensemaking of this uni-professional network appeared to be 
synchronised in the fact that they identified and bracketed cues 
based on interconnected tasks and shared values. They treated the 
same patients, and were jointly responsible for clinical care. They 
shared organisational problems; the demand on emergency services 
was intense - primary care doctors have to adjust their practice 
when the hospitals are busy. They shared a sense of moral purpose, 
being responsible for very sick people when they are acutely ill. This 
cross-sector medical network was tightly connected, and would not 
easily be de-coupled. 
Dr Hamilton related to GPs as peers, not as commissioners who paid 
his wages. Castlefield emergency care network, which included Dr 
Strong as one of its members, had developed a system of 
recognising warning signs. (Castlefield Emergency Medical Signals - 
CEMS), and Dr Hamilton was explaining how this worked. It was 
being used by hospitals, GPs, and ambulance crews. All in the room 
were engaged and attuned, as they learned about how to identify 
critical illness and get the right medical care in place quickly. Dr 
Hamilton used a case study of a woman with a very painful ear. A 
slide (figure 3)2 was shown which showed the woman’s vital signs, 
giving an overall score for CEMS. Dr Hamilton discussed which tests 
                                       
2 Pulse of 163, a temperature of 26, Blood pressure of 92/65, and a 
respiratory rate of 11.  
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would be indicated, and then showed a further slide with results 
(figure 4)3 
Figure 3: Presentation of woman with painful ear 
 
Figure 4: Test results for woman with painful ear 
 
The patient needed to be admitted to the Ear Nose and Throat 
department. He asked the GPs what they would do. They started to 
give ideas, and concluded that they would treat as sepsis. 
This discussion was different from any other I had witnessed during 
my many hours of observations, and, looking back, had only rarely 
been privy to in my years as a health service manager. The slides 
and the content of the presentation illustrated the core of shared 
                                       
3 C-reactive protein of 11, a normal full blood count, normal urea and electrolytes, 
and a lactate score of 21. 
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sensemaking between doctors across the hospital and primary care 
boundary. The doctors were animated and engaged, talking in the 
language of diagnosis and observation. How would they decide what 
to do? How would they respond to this emergency? The shared 
approach to sensemaking was to extract cues that supported the 
collaborative endeavour of treating illness and saving lives. Dr 
Hamilton emphasised the importance of the primary care doctor in 
this: 
“Dr, your patient has a CEMS of 5…..It shows some good stuff: 
good team work………..After all, you are GP consultants you are 
senior clinicians – you know who you’d like to admit to……We are 
taking patients through a better process. It is more thorough. We 
do work brilliantly as a team.” 
There was no discussion of pricing, contracts, or specifications. This 
was about clinical systems, managing demand, making the process 
work for the patient. Dr Hamilton underlined the importance of 
getting it right for the patient again. 
“We did have septic people, sitting in a plastic chair, hardly able to 
hold their head up.” 
Dr Strong and Dr Hamilton had done much more than simply 
explain an assessment process. They had personally modelled 
behaviours that displayed co-operation across an organisational 
boundary. They had accessed the network’s own language of 
science, diagnosis, and observation. They had distinguished the role 
of doctor from the role of commissioner, for the purposes of treating 
shared patients in inter-dependent pathways of care. 
Dr Hamilton was a doctor rooted in acute medicine. His focus was 
on emergencies and the need for an urgent medical response. His 
relationship to GPs in the network was one of immediacy – working 
out a problem and addressing it quickly in order to prevent death or 
deterioration. The next presentation was by a community-based 
geriatrician. Dr Hamilton handed the baton to Dr Gibson, speaking 
explicitly about the NHS Family network, calling for an extension of 
openness and trust: 
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Dr Hamilton: “We have no walls. If no-one had walls that would 
seem like the sensible way to go” 
Dr Gibson: “The whole NHS should be without walls – just trust 
each other a bit more.”  
This doctor illustrated a different aspect of the relationship between 
primary and secondary care. Medicine was about intractable on-
going problems as well as emergency interventions. His focus was 
the management of older people with a complex set of conditions, 
often with social dimensions. Dr Gibson presented the 
Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment (CGA); a new process being 
gradually implemented across Castlefield’s health and social care 
services. GPs were asked to consider two case studies at their 
tables, both of which were designed to illustrate the 
interdependency of GPs and other professionals from hospitals, 
community and social services. Dr Gibson explained that a 
comprehensive geriatric assessment needed to be multi-disciplinary. 
The product of the assessment was a “stratified problem list” in two 
formats, one reflecting the patient’s own goals and priorities, and 
one reflecting the clinical critical path, and including a bespoke 
management plan. Dr Gibson posed a question to the assembled 
GPs: 
“One of the problems is when it moves into the community. Who is 
in charge? And who else is involved?” 
This question was designed to highlight the fact that care needed to 
be organised in a network. This plan would be multi-disciplinary, 
and the staff who would deliver it would be in a network based on 
interdependency of task even though actors would potentially never 
meet (McDonald et al., 2015). The following exchange took place: 
GP: “This model is wrong. The CGA model doesn’t fit with how GPs 
currently work.” 
Dr Gibson: “it’s a wicked issue; it’s a wicked issue; it’s a wicked 
issue, I feel your pain, but we’re with you all the way.” 
GPs pointed out that the current system of ten minute appointments 
did not facilitate this more bespoke approach to patient 
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management, such as the appointment system outlined above. Dr 
Gibson was not in a position to solve the problem, but his response 
illustrated a supportive relationship between hospital doctors and 
GPs. Doctors in the NHS Family were willing to work together 
despite operational barriers. 
In summary, a shared sensemaking type existed across a fluid, 
difficult to define, network that is referred to as “The NHS Family”. 
Doctors, for various reasons, were deeply committed to the social 
insurance based national system of healthcare which is the NHS. 
Cue extraction for sensemaking tended to reflect this. FLEs were 
one of many mechanisms for the maintenance and development of 
the wider NHS network with its shared sensemaking type. At these 
FLEs the focus was on professional inter-dependency, shared work, 
and shared clinical responsibility. This was about sharing work and 
responsibility between hospital and primary care. Similar to TM, OD 
facilitation techniques were used including group work, which 
allowed time for individuals to air their concerns and conceptualise 
the information that they were receiving. Also similar to TM, 
respected doctor leaders led discussions and gave key messages. 
They acted as sensegivers emphasising the common bond of the 
medical profession and the shared nature of clinical aims and tasks. 
6.3 Enacting the rules: extending competition 
So far, I have discussed those aspects of commissioning that relate 
to the design of services and pathways, often undertaken in 
collaboration with actors from both commissioner and provider 
organisations. However, the formal technical dimension of 
commissioning was the contracting and procurement processes 
which governed how money was allocated and spent. The HSCA 
2012 was controversial for many reasons, but none more so than its 
requirement to increase competition in the English NHS. This section 
is an exploration of the dynamic of sensemaking, networks, and 
rules when enacting the business of awarding contracts. 
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Sensemaking was triggered by the ambiguities related to the co-
existence of competition and co-operation, and the dual role for the 
GP as provider and commissioner. 
As my time with the CCG passed by and my understanding 
developed, it became apparent that this rule change would not be 
easily accommodated in existing sensemaking processes and 
networks, especially those of GPs and other clinical staff. The word 
competition in NHS networks was a loaded one. It was interpreted 
as a mechanism to spend money with organisations outside of the 
NHS who most probably would be profit-orientated. Competition in 
the NHS was not new. Competitive tendering processes had always 
been used. However, historically, organisations outside of the NHS 
Family had been awarded contracts to supply capacity in addition 
to, rather than as a replacement for, existing NHS provision. The 
HSCA 2012 changed the rules of the game. When the Act was at the 
Bill stage in parliament it allowed for “Any Willing Provider” to be 
given equal competitive advantage when services where put out to 
tender; this was subsequently amended to “Any Qualified Provider” 
to emphasise that not just anyone could provide healthcare. Whilst 
competition was not new, the concept of AQP was. Under this 
initiative a register of qualified providers would be compiled, and 
the patient must be given the choice, usually by the referring GP, as 
to which service he or she would like to use. The difference between 
this initiative and earlier ones was that it was potentially a 
mechanism to replace NHS Family members as providers. The NHS 
had existed for over 60 years. During this time the people who 
worked within it had developed a shared approach to delivering 
services to patients. It was based on facilitative interactions and 
joint problem solving across the complex network of organisations 
(hospitals, community, primary care services, as well as interfaces 
with other agencies especially local authorities) that provided 
healthcare. Relationships between organisations within the NHS 
Family were stable and mutually supportive; this included 
relationships between those organisations separately identified as 
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payers (commissioners) and providers since the introduction of the 
internal market in 1990. 
6.3.1 Competition: Any Qualified Provider and secondary 
care services 
At the start of my observations, a large scale re-tendering exercise 
was nearing completion. Previously Castlefield PCT had let a ten 
year contract for an independent treatment centre. It was located 
on the major acute hospital’s campus. It provided outpatient and 
day case activity. The initial business case had been generated by 
the hospital as a proposal to extend its own capacity. However, it 
had coincided with a national drive to acquire additional capacity 
from the private sector. The contract had been put out to tender, 
and had been won by a private sector firm. Ten years on, it was 
time to re-tender. This time there had been three bidders for the 
contract, worth 40 million pounds over three years. One of these 
bidders had been the hospital. Amongst the commissioners, 
especially the GPs, there was consensus that the sensible thing to 
do would be to award the contract to the hospital, who employed 
the staff under a secondment arrangement anyway. This timing of 
this tendering exercise coincided with an NHS-wide programme to 
reduce spending. The NHS organisations in Castlefield were 
collectively required to cut back spending in real terms by 20 million 
pounds over a three year period. The privately provided treatment 
centre and the publically provided hospital were part of the same 
inter-dependent clinical network, one providing outpatients and 
diagnostics on behalf of the other. If these could be brought 
together into the same organisation then services and associated 
costs could be rationalised. This was not something that could be 
taken into account under the European Tendering rules. In fact, it 
would be explicitly anti-competitive. In the words of Conran, the 
CCG finance director: 
“We have got to assess according to the quality of the bid rather 
than the impact on the health economy.”(CC fieldnote 1) 
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In the end, the existing private sector provider won the tender. The 
hospital, relatively inexperienced in completing commercial tender 
applications, had not put forward a good enough bid on paper. 
Based on this and other experiences, the GPs were far from 
convinced that competition had delivered the best results for the 
NHS healthcare system. The introduction of competition included 
ambiguity which was a trigger for sensemaking. How could the 
benefits of competition be realised, whilst retaining the co-operative 
methods that underpinned interactions in the NHS Family? 
AQP was introduced through a national initiative associated with 
another policy driver, Choice. Choice was a national policy to enable 
patients to choose where, how and by whom they were treated, and 
was enshrined in the NHS Constitution (Department of Health, 2015 
[2012]). A new rule was put in place in the form of a directive 
(Department of Health, 2011). All CCGs were required to select 
three services for which they should compile registers of qualified 
providers. Referring GPs should give patients access to these 
registers in order to choose their service provider.  
My observations began towards the end of the tendering exercise, 
when contracts had been let. In Castlefield community podiatry, 
ultrasound scanning, and psychological therapies now had AQP 
registers which included a number of private sector providers. I 
observed a discussion at the CCG GB meeting (GB fieldnote 5) 
which was held in public. It became apparent that the trusting co-
operative shared approach to sensemaking in the NHS Family 
network did not equip commissioners to guard against pitfalls 
inherent in a competitive environment. The discussion was based on 
ambiguities relating to the requirement to open services to the 
market, and the duty of commissioners to make sensible decisions 
on behalf of their population.  
Tender specifications had not been specific enough; as absolute 
specificity had not been needed in the past. In podiatry, new 
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providers did not have premises from which to offer their services. 
Lisa Diggle, the Commissioning Director reported:  
“We do want to offer choice, but choice in suitable locations”  
The “learning” was that in the future specifications would pin down 
the need for patient accessible locations. The procurement of 
ultrasound diagnostic services had also presented problems. Due to 
a shortage of radiographers the local hospital had been unable to 
bid. National private sector organisations had put in multiple bids 
across the country. Every CCG in England had gone out to tender at 
the same time, the result of which was a shortage of applicants who 
could be qualified. Dr Cooper, baffled by this situation, pointed out 
that a planned ultrasound service at the treatment centre would 
have been more sensible: 
“This is very much the market. We have a sparkling Treatment 
Centre [based at the hospital] with a transport connection….If we 
had a vision that we wanted diagnostics there…… In terms of our 
infrastructure, our city, our patients, common sense….this ought to 
guide our commissioning decisions.” 
Market forces had not delivered this self-evident sensible outcome. 
Lisa reported a conversation with hospital managers. They were 
sorry that they had not been able to bid to provide the ultrasound 
services. They were recruiting more stenographers so that they 
could bid the next time the contract came up for renewal. Dr Kerala, 
who was standing in for Dr Baasit, had a surgery near the hospital. 
He reported a conversation with a patient:  
Doctor: “Would you like to go to [choice of two sites at the other 
side of town both of which involved a bus ride past the hospital]”  
Patient: “What happened to the hospital?” 
The discussion continued, with the managers attempting to argue 
the benefits of services being provided privately. They found it hard 
to defend the principle of competition; after all, they too, shared the 
NHS Family sensemaking type. The main advantage that they 
identified was the transfer of clinical risk to the private provider. 
Managers had a different expectation upon them generated from 
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the Centre. This required them to be uncritical of NHS hierarchy. 
They were there to defend and implement policy, and not to 
question or undermine it. In contrast, the doctors did respond 
critically, and as operational professionals with patients who were 
directly affected, they pointed out problems, particularly for those 
patients. One doctor said:  
“One of the providers we’ve just qualified is intending to provide 
services out of the back of a lorry” [laughter]  
The conversation petered out, with Dr Whitbread thanking everyone 
for their hard work. Significantly, at the end of the discussion, it was 
noted that waiting times had improved, a major positive outcome 
resulting from having a wider range of providers. This positive 
aspect was not discussed, probably because the tension in 
sensemaking in part resulted from the fact that none of the leaders 
had yet decided whether competition was a good or a bad thing. 
They were grappling with the ambiguities inherent in the tension 
between competition and co-operation/integration. This was a time 
of trial, error, and critique. 
6.3.2 Competition: Any Qualified Provider and primary care 
services 
During the fieldwork, a number of primary care services were put 
out to tender. GP practices operate as small businesses. The 
majority of GPs work in the NHS through a contractual arrangement 
known as General Medical Services (GMS). These contracts cover 
core primary medical services, and they could be added to under an 
arrangement known as Enhanced Services. Some Enhanced 
Services were nationally determined, but there was scope to 
develop local services to address specific problems, and a number of 
services were provided this way in Castlefield. When my 
observations began the decision had been made to put certain Local 
Enhanced Services (LES) out to tender using the AQP rule. I first 
heard about this at a TM meeting where Dr Whitbread explained 
that this was being done because “current arrangements are 
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probably illegal” [my emphasis] (TM fieldnote 1). Some services 
that most people would consider to be basic primary care services 
such as phlebotomy and treatment room (for example suture 
removals, ear irrigation, and wound care including dressings) were 
to be included. This would mean GPs would have to tender to 
continue to provide services that they already delivered. This 
disrupted established assumptions. GPs comfortable position as 
protected, established providers within the safety of the NHS 
network was under challenge. This was an occasion when 
sensemaking amongst the GPs was triggered. The requirement to 
compete was ambiguous. The GPs found it difficult to understand 
why they were being invited to tender for services they already 
provided, and the leaders found it difficult to clarify what the 
benefits of this tendering exercise would be. These points are 
illustrated in the data presented below. 
The following paragraphs relate to two events designed to prepare 
GPs and others to tender under the AQP rule. The first was a 
briefing for all potential Qualified Providers, including GPs, hosted by 
the CCG. The second was an event to help in the preparation of 
bids, organised by the Local Medical Committee (LMC), an 
organisation whose job it was to represent the interests of GPs. 
6.3.2.1 Clinical Commissioning Group event 
The CCG briefing (AQP fieldnote 3) was held at a local hotel close to 
a junction of a major motorway. Tea and Coffee were available, but 
the usual relaxed networking time over food was not part of the 
afternoon’s proceedings. Smartly dressed business people were 
milling around alongside GPs. The atmosphere was subdued; there 
was none of the friendly chatter that I associated with gatherings of 
the NHS Family network. Tables were set out cabaret style in a 
large room, holding approximately 100 people. I sat on a round 
table with people who were strangers to me; I subsequently 
discovered they were from community pharmacies and other 
pharmaceutical businesses. 
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Even though practices are legally independent businesses, they 
operate as a set of related managed clinical units, where their 
“boss” is the commissioning health organisation in their area 
whatever it may be called at a particular time, and was presently 
the CCG. 
Maggie Smith, the Director of Primary Care, opened the meeting. 
She introduced two solicitors who were there to outline the legal 
aspects of the process. The material was technical, and many 
people in the audience looked puzzled. What was covered quickly, if 
not glossed over, was that there was no legal imperative to go out 
to tender. The decision to proceed in this manner had been taken 
locally. However once this had been decided and the process had 
begun then European procurement legislation did pertain. The 
solicitor emphasised the potential for legal challenge; and looking at 
the faces in the room this was causing alarm amongst the GPs. The 
sharply dressed solicitor in his mid-thirties left the doctors in no 
doubt of the potential ramifications, which could affect all the 
services that were covered by the contract between a practice and 
the CCG. 
“Courts can decide to make a Declaration of Ineffectiveness – the 
contract could be set aside” 
When the solicitor had finished his presentation, one of the GPs in 
the audience began to ask questions, based on the fact that he had 
noticed that the value of the contracts when split down to practice 
level was too small to trigger a tendering exercise under European 
law. The following interchange took place: 
GP: “If every contract is small at practice level then why do we 
have to do it?” 
Maggie: “There are ways to stop deliberate disaggregation” 
GP: “But that’s irrelevant” 
Maggie: “No it isn’t, we can talk about that at the break” 
GP: “But these are contracts for our services” 
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Maggie: “They’re not your services. They are public services. It’s 
tax payer’s money.” 
This excerpt shows a significant departure from the trusting 
prosocial shared sensemaking type that underpinned the network of 
the NHS Family. Doctors were not to assume that they had any 
more entitlement to continue to provide these services than a 
commercial pharmacy. 
Maggie outlined the steps bidders would need to take. Despite the 
fact that this was a mixed audience, much of the content was aimed 
at the GPs, indicated by phrases such as “write as if you don’t know 
us”. Termination letters giving notice on existing contracts would be 
sent to the GPs, and then the procurement process would begin. 
Scoring would be on a pass/fail basis. Once contracts for LESs were 
in place, any breach would have consequences for the whole GMS 
contract that each practice held with the CCG, as Maggie assertively 
pointed out: 
“If you say you’re doing three days phlebotomy and you’re not, 
then your whole CCG contract will be in breach…..Have you all got 
it then? You know what to do? …..jog on…….It’s scary, it really is, if 
we need to suspend service we’ve both lost, we don’t want to scare 
you.” 
Clearly, there was an intention to scare practices despite this denial. 
The fact that Maggie stated that this new arrangement would be 
used to ensure doctors fulfil the terms of their contract is an 
indicator that she intended to monitor more closely than current 
arrangements allowed. This was followed by a discussion regarding 
the potential for a large single provider to win the tenders. One 
doctor pointed out that this would make management of the 
contracts easier. The reaction of the GPs at this meeting was muted. 
Other than the odd question, they were quiet. They were mulling 
over the implications that this had for their services, patients, and 
income. The contractual rules here were being wielded as a threat 
to GPs. The presence of solicitors contributed to a climate of 
intimidation. GPs were to act as if they were unknown to the CCG. 
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During the proceedings described above, Maggie was acting as a 
sense-demander. The GPs appeared to act subserviently, despite 
the fact that they were technically the commissioners under the 
terms of their own contract and CCG constitution. GPs had an 
embedded history of responding to the directions of authority, it has 
served them well in the past. GPs, including their leaders, had 
learned to comply with the demands of authority. They appeared to 
be unequipped to resist the change in field rules from a protected 
single prosocial system to a competitive market. The doctors were 
required to act competitively if they were to continue to be paid to 
provide certain established services. Despite the ambiguities it 
raised, they were compliant and obedient. 
6.3.2.2 Local Medical Committee event 
Local Medical Committees (LMCs) are statutory bodies that 
represent the interests of General Practitioners in their interactions 
with local organisations such as CCGs. LMCs have been in place 
since 1913 (Lancashire and Cumbria Local Medical Committees, 
2015)and have a statutory function to support and promote the 
interests of GPs in their dealings with CCGs . A number of the staff 
at Castlefield LMC, including the Chief Executive, had seen GP 
commissioning develop through all its embodiments since its 
introduction in the 1990s. Castlefield LMC intended to help GPs 
prepare to submit bids to be included on the registers of Qualified 
Providers. Jim Wood, the Chief Executive of Castlefield LMC, told me 
in an interview that this initiative was causing considerable concern 
amongst the GPs. 
“in terms of general practice themselves, the things that is of most 
immediate concern to them is things like enhanced services which 
have now been you know a subject to this ridiculously overblown 
competitive regime where you know for a contract of, which 
individually may amount to no more than you know £70,000 or 
£80,000 a year, are having to jump through these ridiculous hoops 
which were designed to regulate major European contracts shall we 
say.” (WoodInterview) 
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Even though he was not an apologist for the AQP initiative, he 
considered it inevitable that GPs would have to bid, and an event 
was organised to support them in doing this. I managed to get an 
invitation to attend, using my long-standing connection with Jim. It 
was held in a modest hotel on the edge of Castlefield City Centre 
(AQP fieldnote 3). This was exactly the same cohort of GPs as TM, 
but the terms of engagement with the LMC were different; a more 
self-interested approach to sensemaking might well be revealed. It 
would be here, if anywhere, where GPs would talk about how much 
money they were likely to make. If money was their motivation this 
is where it would be declared, since the LMC had an established and 
legitimate purpose to get the best deal for GPs in their patch. 
Jim began with a presentation, explaining that AQP was linked to 
the Choice initiative. Jim explained that when a GP decided that a 
patient needed one of the services offered under AQP then, 
regardless of whether or not he or she was a “Qualified Provider”, 
the full choice would need to be offered to the patient. The GP 
would be obliged to “offer Virgin or Boots or another practice” Jim 
said, using large-scale multi-nationals to emphasis the point that 
this was a market-place. Jim’s presentation was followed by 
facilitated group work, led by a manager from one of Castlefield’s 
practices who described some of the operational considerations of 
offering services as one amongst several Qualified Providers. 
Qualified Providers would be obliged to offer services to any patients 
that chose them, even if this caused a capacity problem in the 
surgery. “Practices need to work out if this is worth their while” the 
practice manager cautioned. The group work involved discussing the 
requirements of the pre-qualification questionnaire (CCG doc 4), 
page by page. Tables of 10 to 12 people each had a facilitator. I 
facilitated the table at which I was sitting. I had anticipated the 
discussion to be about money, but this was far from the case. 
Instead, the topics were operational continuity, safety, and 
protecting services for patients. A problem-solving approach to 
making sense of this initiative was apparent. Various tangible 
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problems were identified. Audited accounts were required, but since 
practices were legally partnerships, not companies, these did not 
exist. Public liability would be an issue since patients from other 
practices would be potential users of services; “you might all have 
your patients going to someone else, and others coming to you” 
said one practice manager. At an operational level, this was not 
going to be a straightforward exercise.  
The full group reconvened into plenary session. Some GPs 
representing more entrepreneurial practices were keen to show that 
they were prepared to compete: 
GP: “We’ve got screens that upsell our enhanced services.” 
GP: “Our practice has just developed the first app.” 
GP: “It will be on a resell basis to other practices.” 
Despite the fact that some people were eager to show willing, most 
people focused on the hurdles that would need to be overcome. 
Various clinical questions were asked:  
GP: “If you remove a lump or bump, what do you do about the 
histology?” 
GP: “What would you do to confirm patient identity?” 
There was particular concern about treatment room services. 
Practices that just did simple wound care, leg ulcer dressings, and 
removal of stitches would have to stop as the specification required 
a wider range of services. One Doctor said “It’s just not fair on the 
patients.” Everyone agreed with this, and signalled their intention to 
continue to do it on an unpaid basis in order to serve their patients 
in the way that they thought was right. In this private environment 
away from the CCG leaders I had anticipated the GPs would focus 
on the negative impacts of AQP, because there were significant 
downsides for the doctors, not least of which was the effort required 
to produce tenders and the potential loss of money and resultant 
confusion as new services were implemented. I was surprised that a 
stoically compliant, and patient-centred sensemaking appeared to 
be the response. 
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After these events the bidding process for LESs went ahead in the 
background. One issue did cause problems and was discussed at 
PrC (PrC fieldnote 4). The GPs were not bidding to provide 
phlebotomy services; the specification included a requirement to 
visit patients’ homes to take blood and this was off-putting. Dr 
Whitbread shared his fears with me informally after the meeting, his 
facial expression betraying a mixture of worry and embarrassment. 
He thought that there was a good chance that there would be no 
phlebotomy service as a result of this tendering process. In the end 
the situation was rescued by Castlecare who agreed to provide 
domiciliary phlebotomy under a separate contract. The established 
NHS Family network had provided the environment for the situation 
to be salvaged. Other adjustments were made, for instance ear 
irrigation was disaggregated from the treatment room service and 
again put into a separate contract with Castlecare. So, what had 
started as a competitive process, ended up as one in which the 
mutual supportive behaviours associated with the NHS Family 
network were reinforced. 
Later, on reflection, Jim Wood conceded that this mixture of co-
operation and competition had in fact improved services:  
“Well I understand what the issue is with home visits……..until 
recently was....a mixed model where some practices sent all of 
their bloods to the community service who were commissioned to 
provide a service. Some provided it themselves and were paid for 
that service. Some provided it themselves and weren’t paid for 
those services and some were paid to provide a service but still 
sent their patients to the community service. So it was a mess. And 
the Castlefield CCG decided having looked at it and looked at 
previous attempts that had failed to resolve this sort of mess that 
the only way to do it was to cut through it by making Any Qualified 
Provider. And their aim is simply to ensure that there is an 
adequate service that patients can access whether it is provided by 
GPs or whether it is provided by the community services.” 
(Woodinterview) 
So despite reservations about the process being disproportionate to 
the problem, with hindsight, Jim did agree that a problem had been 
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solved. About a year after the exercise had begun, I interviewed 
Maggie. She told me that she had deliberately put the GPs into a 
position where they had to compete in order to induct them into the 
new rules that would govern healthcare in the future: 
“I think the issues for GPs is they’ve seen it as a threat, and this is 
what we’ve got to get their head round, is for them to see it as a 
benefit. Because as organisations, they need to get more money in. 
The only way they can get more money in is by bidding for 
business. So in Castlefield….I put all of the enhanced services out 
to AQP and they were in a room, and we are one of the only CCGs 
who done it, but again I went to them and said, you’ve just got to 
trust me, you’ve got to do this. And this is where, and the local 
enhanced services GPs were paid pittance for delivering a blood 
test that, in a community contract, or an acute contract, they were 
paid 25 pounds for doing it. Why should a GP be paid 2 pounds and 
somebody else be paid 25? What are they doing differently? 
Nothing. So……I gave a fair price for a fair job, so whether it be 
phlebotomy, wound care, I put them all out to AQP, but what I 
have said to GPs is, yes, I’m putting them out to tender, but this is 
the price now that we’re going to pay for it, whether you be a GP or 
a community services or an acute provider, it’s a fair price for a fair 
job. And GPs are financially benefiting from that and what we find 
now is, they were nervous of it to begin with, but now, they’re 
specialising enough in those services and they’re bringing people in 
and they’re delivering those services within 24 hours. They couldn’t 
have done that before procurement.” (SmithInterview). 
This interpretation was developed with the benefit of hindsight, 
especially given the significant problems that needed to be managed 
along the way, such as the lack of bids for phlebotomy. It showed 
that as Commissioners, both managers and GPs, became more 
experienced and assimilated what they had learned about 
competitive processes, a new approach to sensemaking had been 
forming which incorporated competition whilst preserving the co-
operative principles of the NHS Family prosocial sensemaking type. 
6.3.3 GP commissioning and conflicts of interest 
Inherent in the model of CCG commissioning, where GPs are 
simultaneously commissioners and practising clinicians, was the 
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potential for conflicts of interests. This was especially so when 
competition rules applied. People were acutely conscious of this. The 
term “conflicted” was coined to describe this state. At the beginning 
of meetings, those present would declare their personal interests in 
agenda items. At a national level, an attempt had been made to 
avoid these conflicts by keeping contracts for primary care at a 
regional tier. Nevertheless, since providers of secondary and 
primary healthcare are so interdependent, it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to maintain this separation. Inherent in this dual role 
was ambiguity which triggered sensemaking.  
An example to illustrate how these conflicts could arise is the GP 
Out of Hours (OOH) services which were re-procured during the 
time of my observations. About fifteen years previously a 
community benefit company had been established which GPs 
themselves owned. It included an OOH emergency clinic, and the 
capacity to make home visits. Local GPs provided this service on a 
rota, supplemented by locum doctors. The contract for these 
services had reached its end-date and it was put out to tender, 
meaning that GP commissioners were the current owner-providers 
of the contract that was up for renewal. I attended a PrC (PrC 
fieldnote 2) where this was on the agenda. The executive doctors 
obviously felt uncomfortable with the fact that they were potentially 
the ones that would destabilise this GP enterprise. The first part of 
the discussion related to why OOH services were being 
commissioned by the CCG at all, given that the commissioning of 
primary care was done at the regional tier. “Because it’s urgent 
care” Catrina explained. “But its primary care” said a doctor, to 
whom Catrina replied “Its urgent care, so it’s our statutory duty.” 
Because OOH services fell outside of the core contract for general 
practice, it classed as urgent care, and contracts were let by the 
CCG. In the end, a lay member from the GB convened the 
procurement process, and the contract was successfully re-issued to 
the GP co-operative, but not without considerable anxiety on the 
part of the GPs and the staff of the OOH service. 
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The question of defining how a conflict might arise was subject to 
much agonising. Catrina was rigorous in ensuring that interests 
were declared. At the beginning of one Board meeting Dr Whitbread 
declared his own shares, his wife’s shares, and shares of his 
partners in the OOHs organisation (GB fieldnote 6). Catrina said 
anyone who had previously held shares and who worked there 
would also be “considered conflicted”. Dr Cooper had declared at a 
previous PrC meeting that he had “flogged” his shares and now 
worked there (PrC fieldnote 2). Cat described the concept of an 
“ethical wall” which allowed GPs to say what they “believed is in the 
interests of their patient” but “separates them from procurement 
decision”. The concept of anticipating a future conflict was discussed 
- since all GPs may at some stage in the future might have an 
involvement in an OOH business then all should be considered 
conflicted in relation to the immediate decision that needed to be 
made. 
The state of being “conflicted” was such a preoccupation that a GB 
development session (GB fieldnote 8) was dedicated to the subject. 
It was led by two solicitors. One began with an overview: 
“Having the declaration is only the start. It’s what you do with it. It 
would be like you as a Doctor making the diagnosis but not 
deciding what to do with it……It’s not just actual conflicts, its 
potential conflicts as well……There is no statutory definition of 
conflict…..it could even include your trustee position on a charity.” 
Technically the interests of all GPs should be declared, since as 
members of the CCG they were all commissioners. The solicitor 
advised that executive GPs should endeavour to investigate what 
these were. The solicitor warned:  
“You can’t use the argument that you didn’t know if you didn’t take 
reasonable steps to find out….The trouble with anything to do with 
knowledge is it’s very hard to prove.  
Potential conflicts were wide-ranging including direct and indirect 
interests, pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests, and inducement. 
There were also potential conflicts arising from associations with 
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partner organisations. “What if the University Chairman is a GPs 
wife?” one of the doctors asked. 
Executive GPs had put themselves forward to lead commissioning 
because they were willing to offer expertise and advice. The effect 
of the inherent conflicts of interest in the system was that they were 
under pressure not to use their expertise in any way that could be 
seen to benefit themselves or their colleagues. They were very 
concerned that the predicament of being “conflicted”, which affected 
all GPs not just executives, would be especially problematic in 
clinical settings, and potentially unnerving for patients. The extract 
below referred to the situation where a GP when offering to take 
bloods from a patient under the AQP system, previously discussed, 
would be required to make the patient aware that a payment was 
involved and that there was a choice of providers.  
Solicitor: “Patients will need to be told of the choice, and made 
aware if the Doctor has a financial angle.” 
Dr Cooper: “Our members will think we are potty.” 
Maggie: “Well…you just say, have your blood-test, these are your 
choices, I am conflicted.” 
Dr Cooper: “….and you think that’s a normal GP consultation….The 
whole issue here is the Doctor Patient relationship.” 
During the ensuing discussion an exchange took place between 
Catrina and Dr Lovett. Dr Lovett talked about a workforce, 
pathways, and patient flow. Catrina talked about contracts, 
business, and enhanced services. The language was different. The 
agenda was different. The cues for sensemaking were derived from 
different priorities, serving to expose the differences between 
doctors and managers. It was clear, and I interjected to say so, 
they were trying to do two things at once: develop commercial 
competition, and develop professional integration within the context 
of the NHS Family. There was an inherent conflict; the question was 
whether both could exist side by side, not whether one or the other 
was right. My interjection had resonated with the doctors. Over the 
break a number of them came over to talk to me. Dr Lovett said “I 
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can’t change who I am”. The independent doctor from a 
neighbouring acute hospital said:  
“There are many metaphorical and philosophical issues here that 
are more than the mechanics of dealing with interests……” 
The second solicitor led the remainder of the afternoon. The content 
of his presentation was all about the possibility of investigation and 
the need for an audit trail of evidence of good governance. His 
language was peppered with words like “justification”, “challenge”, 
and “breach”. He explained that Monitor, the regulator, had a role to 
prevent anti-competitive behaviour that was not in the interests of 
the patients. He seemed to reassure and alarm at the same time, 
advising people to “take solace in the fact that the word 
proportionate is used extensively”, but then following up by 
emphasising the dangers: 
“One piece of legislation might put you in breach of another one”, 
The Public Sector, Social Values, Act, European legislation, Patient 
Choice….. if you are going gung-ho for the spirit of the public sector 
act like the minimum wage and a local workforce, it could put you 
in breach of Europe or Choice.” 
Towards the end of the meeting Dr Lovett decided to play dumb: 
“I don’t understand. I’m getting more confused. I don’t think I’ll 
ever grasp this…….If you put the patient, quality of care, at the 
centre, there’s no problem.” 
Dr Lovett’s statement, although couched in language of “confusion” 
was an important stage in the development of collective 
sensemaking regarding the impact of conflicts of interest. CCG 
managers and GPs wrestling with the ambiguities associated with as 
being “conflicted” was, I came to realise, a collective sensemaking 
process. This network was actively working out how to think 
together. Through various activities, including trying out competitive 
commissioning, identifying problems, reflecting in developmental 
sessions like this one, and taking different positions, like the 
managers and doctors, they had exposed, understood, and 
negotiated issues, a more nuanced plausible future was being 
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constructed where competition and collaboration could exist side by 
side. 
Towards the end of my study, over a year after the development 
session had taken place, I followed up certain themes in interviews. 
Conflicts of Interests was one of these. The data from the interviews 
showed that both doctors and managers were still developing and 
negotiating how to think about this topic. Dr Lovett continued to be 
concerned that guarding against doctors serving their own interests 
could mitigate against the potential to serve the interests of patient. 
He found it offensive that managers could ascribe unscrupulous 
motives to the doctors. There was a danger of missing an 
opportunity by being too guarded about the risks: 
Dr Lovett: Right, well I think the conflict of interest is a red herring 
and I think that… I think… the whole point about doing 
commissioning was to get people who are clinical in to the 
commissioning environment therefore they are conflicted. I think 
[there is] a lack of confidence in the ability to make an argument 
that’s reasoned… it was the fear of being thought to be self-
interested and I don’t think the people who were making any 
decisions are remotely self-interested but I think they’re aware of 
the drivers that get things done and we know that incentives 
change performance. We know that. It’s not about sticking more 
money in to GPs pockets………..… well I think there’s something else 
as well, there is a conflict between managers and clinicians. There 
still is. There are some of the management I fear that are obsessed 
with the thought that their clinical colleagues might be pulling a 
fast one to get them a better deal than actually the patient… I still 
think that happens and I think it happens here and I think it’s really 
disappointing. (LovettInterview) 
In an interview with Lisa Diggle, the director of commissioning, I 
pushed her on the point about GPs acting in their own interests. Her 
view was the same as Dr Lovett’s. GPs were concerned about the 
constraints of primary care, and concerns about payments were in 
this context:  
Lisa: “I have very, very rarely seen anything where I’ve had the 
view that someone has expressed their opinion, which has been 
purely to gain a benefit, rather than they’re expressing their 
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professional opinion. And I suppose the classic is where we’re 
talking about services which could be provided by GPs, and I think 
GPs are always … use that opportunity to identify the real 
constraints of primary care, which is real, and so I don’t know, I 
wouldn’t expect them to do anything different. They have to … In 
order to say whether it’s right for a service to be delivered in 
primary care or not, they have to start from this is the current 
position in primary care…..” 
Adele: “Have you … you’ve seen mainly that it’s not greed.” 
Lisa:  “No, no it’s not.” 
Adele: “I’m pushing you on that in case I’m wrong.” 
Lisa: “No, no, it’s definitely not about greed. I’ve seen a couple of 
cases where … You know the GPs who are far more business and 
money orientated……. I think GPs in general, absolutely aren’t 
greedy. But what they are most concerned about is the capacity 
constraints within their particular sector, which means that there is 
absolutely no way they can do what they need to do without 
additional resource. That isn’t greedy, that’s just absolutely 
recognising the capacity issues within their bit, of which they are 
exposed to on a daily basis.” (DiggleInterview) 
Dr Strong, on the other hand, prior to one of the TM meetings, had 
once said to me “they’re not all angels”, and in an interview I asked 
him to expand his view: 
Adele:  “Does it matter, as long as that conflict’s declared? Do you 
think, I suppose what I’m getting it is will GPs try and feather their 
own nests, or is that, the idea is that you shouldn’t have these 
conflicts because GPs will act in their own interests, is that, can you 
comment on that?” 
Dr Strong: “Yeah, I think it’s inevitable.” 
Adele: “Do you? Or do you think sometimes they act against their 
own interests?” 
Dr Strong: “Well, there’s a spectrum and I think possibly I’m at the 
end of the spectrum where I might even act against my own 
interests……So there are a few examples of that. But I think the 
risks of conflict are greater now than they were. I don’t think that, 
even in conversations I heard this morning, sometimes GPs don’t 
understand that they are, they’re providers in the same sense that 
[Any NHS Trust] are. Why should they have special dispensations 
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around training, for example, rather than having to organise that 
for themselves, is something that some colleagues can’t see. 
(StrongInterview) 
Here, he added context to his opinion that the risk that doctors 
would act in their own interests was a real one. He emphasised the 
fact that this was inherent in the model of primary care businesses. 
Doctors had to make enough money to cover their own training and 
operating costs so it was inevitable they would have an eye on how 
much they could be paid. Maggie also talked about the problem 
regarding fairness between primary and secondary care: 
Maggie: “there’s also different conflicts of interest and it’s really 
focused on primary care in GPs, but there are bigger conflicts here. 
So, and this is where I find it a little bit frustrating, so for example, 
we have an [acute] Trust who’s financially in deficit, we use non-
recurrent monies to bolster it up, to keep it going……well, that’s a 
conflict of interest. What is the difference between giving [the 
Trust] money to keep that organisation going, than giving a local 
GP on the corner money to keep him going to provide health 
services for his population? So I think conflict of interest, I truly 
believe in the concept, but I think what we have to do is 
understand the grey and blur, the greying boundaries. We’re a 
CCG, it’s very easy to say to a GP, we’re not putting money into 
primary care because that’s a conflict of interest, but actually it’s 
no more of a conflict than giving the Trust more money, because 
that’s going to go over, where’s the difference?” (SmithInterview) 
The change in tone of the managers would indicate that as thinking 
had developed, a more nuanced understanding was emerging. The 
initial separation of managers and doctors into proponents and 
critics of competition initiatives appeared to be settling into a 
reconciled position following a process of trial and error. AQP had 
exposed tensions in operating a competitive process within a 
broadly co-operative system. In the end however, it appeared 
possible to reap the benefits of competition without a corollary loss 
of the benefits of co-operation. Both parties reframed their ideas to 
accept this based on a process of distributed sensemaking.  
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6.4 Discussion: Strategic Collaboration Level  
6.4.1 Introduction 
Below I discuss how and why GPs commissioned in the way that 
they did at SCL by identifying sensemaking processes within the 
context of networks and rules. The discussion is organised into 
three sections: wider context; temporality; and distributed 
sensemaking. Each of these sections draws on the thematic analysis 
using the codes: establishment of new organisations; legacies; 
changes to the profession; competition; and integration. In each 
section I first discuss the relevant findings to the heading and draw 
out the theoretical implications, focusing on sensemaking within the 
context of networks and rules. I conclude by presenting a summary 
in the form of a tabular matrix.  
6.4.2 Wider context  
The CCG network was nested within the wider network of the 
Castlefield NHS, which in turn was nested within the national NHS. 
This nested arrangement forms the wider industry context. As 
already discussed in the previous chapter, and earlier in this 
chapter, there were embedded expectations of prosocial behaviours 
between NHS actors who would respond by helping, regardless of 
organisational boundary. 
National rules required the establishment of the CCG, and that 
decisions regarding how it was led were reserved to all members. 
Beyond this, rules were loosely specified.  Similar to OPL, actors 
appeared to identify as NHS Family and use an embedded prosocial 
sensemaking type. Changes to the profession (see 2.2) were 
evident. At this level the GP network was hierarchically stratified 
into hybrid-leaders and rank-and-file. The call to professionalism 
was used by leaders to encourage compliance.  
The added impetus given to commercial competition acted as a 
trigger for sensemaking. Inherent in the new rules was a potential 
role conflict for GPs who were both providers and commissioners. It 
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would be against the rules to give advantage to organisations in the 
NHS Family.The implication of the rule was that sensemaking should 
shift from a prosocial type to a market type. This resulted in 
ambiguity as actors did not have experience from which to derive 
cues as to how to be commercial. Actors were unprepared as to how 
to respond. Mistakes were made both on the commissioner and 
provider sides. NHS providers did not have market experience to 
produce bids of a sufficient quality to secure services, and 
commissioners failed to produce watertight specifications.  
Another source of ambiguity was the commissioner-provider role 
conflict, which local actors described as a conflict of interest. Being 
“conflicted” entered the organisational lexicon. The legal 
implications of the field change were the subject of much 
discussion, and commissioning decisions made by the doctors were 
under added scrutiny. The CCG response included the development 
of principles by which to identify conflicts, and the concept of an 
“ethical wall” between GPs and certain decisions was used. It was 
an unexpected finding that doctors did not resist this conflict more 
than they did. After all, doctors were commissioners precisely 
because they had an expert contribution to make. This conflict was 
unavoidable, so the question was how to handle it. GPs appeared to 
respond by complying with the rule change, even sacrificing 
personal income to ensure patients continued to receive a service.  
Integration could be interpreted in a number of ways. The NHS 
Family was the context for the integration of NHS services (for 
example between primary care and hospitals). This was the focus of 
integration rules at this level. 
6.4.3 Temporality 
In this section I explore the link between sensemaking, legacies and 
anticipated futures as new rules impacted on the SCL networks. 
As far as the rules allowed, organisational architecture and 
associated ways of doing business were continued in the post April 
2013 health and care economy. At the SCL, this meant that a GB 
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was formed which was similar to the PCT’s outgoing Board, and an 
Executive Team that was made up of Executive GPs nominated by 
the GP-groups, and management directors. The Executive GPs also 
formed a PrC which was similar to the PCT’s Professional Executive 
Committee. Rank and file GPs found it difficult to differentiate 
present arrangements from the past. 
The differences in style that were apparent at OPL were subsumed 
into a single style as a way to unify sensemaking for collaborative 
purposes. The non-fundholder “NHS as system” sensemaking style 
was adopted by the network of leaders. The new rules were 
implemented within the context of the NHS, and could not alter the 
history of working together that the actors already had. Actors in 
the NHS Family shared a legacy as clinicians trained and 
experienced in working across organisational boundaries with a 
common aim of serving, often shared, patients. The NHS Family 
continued to solve problems together, even in a competitive model. 
Because actors did not have experience of competition, there was a 
need to sensemake prospectively. This was the source of ambiguity, 
and the trigger for sensemaking which included taking distinct 
positions in networks (see 2.4.4). In the example of the split of 
managers and doctors, managers endorsed competitive principles 
by imagining a future where competition was the usual way of doing 
business. Doctors on the other hand were protective of existing 
professional and operational networks and wanted to retain co-
operative non-market arrangements. During the process, actors 
from the same network were in a state of seemingly irreconcilable 
opposition, and did not realise that this was an inevitable stage in a 
longer timeframe in which a more nuanced understanding would 
emerge derived from a balance of retrospective and prospective 
thinking. In the end, competition principles were incorporated into 
the existing prosocial sensemaking type. 
Sensemaking happened in a timeframe, and was paced. One key 
factor in this pacing was the role of sensegivers in a distributed 
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landscape. Sensegivers relied on personal legacies for legitimacy. 
The pacing of sensemaking, including its suspension, appeared to be 
an active process. For example, at the same time as the managers 
and doctors were making sense of the implications of competition, 
the rank-and-file GPs also needed to be kept informed and involved. 
OD processes were used, where a socially skilled individual appealed 
to the rank-and-file to refrain from reacting to the rule per se, but 
instead to act compliantly drawing on concepts related to 
“professionalism”. A theoretical implication of this is that action can 
commence before sensemaking is complete. Rather what is 
important is to diminish resistance by finding alternative ways to 
facilitate constructive engagement. 
6.4.4 Distributed sensemaking 
Technically the rule under which CCGs were established attributed 
shared decision making power to individual GP practices. It was not 
feasible for all GPs to be involved in every interaction or decision on 
a daily basis. Arrangements for decision-making were set out in a 
Constitution. These arrangements were tantamount to the 
distribution of actors in formal networks. The key formal networks 
were the GB, the PrC, and TM. The documents set out arrangements 
for the rank-and-file doctors of each GP-group to be represented by 
Executive GPs. These representatives operated as a collective of 
manager-doctor hybrids. They, alongside the management 
directors, comprised the PrC. The “NHS as System” sensemaking 
style seen in the PC GP-group at the OPL appeared to predominate 
across all members of the PrC. In addition TM, a collective network 
including GP representatives from each practice, was established. 
Through this mechanism, GPs were hierarchically stratified into 
hybrid-leaders and rank-and-file. The leaders recognised that it was 
important to engage with the rank-and-file since individual GPs 
retained ultimate decision-making power. It operated as the 
mechanism by which sensegivers could influence, listen to the ideas 
and opinions, and deal with resistance.  
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Sensemaking activities relating to new rules took place in these 
formal networks. A key observation during the study was that 
networks did not remain static at times of rule change, and that the 
distribution of networks was an active part of the sensemaking 
process. Active network distribution occurred in relation to the 
competition rule. Actors redistributed networks in order to consider 
rule change from different perspectives. One example was when 
practices were required to compete for business under the AQP rule. 
An active process of network separation took place. Rank-and-file 
GPs retreated into their uni-professional network to make sense of 
the rule by considering the implications for themselves and their 
patients. Within this uni-professional network the shared prosocial 
sensemaking type was in evidence. GPs indicated that they would 
enact the rule by working together to minimise any negative 
impacts on patients even if this meant a loss of income. Another 
example was when the ambiguity associated with the extension of 
competition triggered sensemaking amongst the CCG directors and 
the Executive GPs. In an active process of distribution the two 
occupational groups distributed into two sub-networks based on 
positions of proponent and critic. In this example the doctors 
displayed the prosocial sensemaking type and the managers 
displayed a market sensemaking type. By the end of the study, 
there was evidence to suggest that this had been a stage in a 
learning process whereby competition principles were incorporated 
into the existing prosocial sensemaking type. 
As already discussed in 6.4.3 above, sensemaking existed in a 
timeframe, and was paced. One key factor in this pacing was the 
distribution of actors and the role of sensegivers. These sensegivers 
could hold sensemaking in suspension by diverting attention. This 
appeared to be an active process. For example, in parallel to doctors 
and managers taking different positions on competition, the rank-
and-file GPs also needed to be continue to enact their own roles in 
commissioning arrangements. A socially skilled individual acted as 
sensegiver at TM’ events. Rank-and-file doctors were encouraged to 
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put aside resistance, on the basis that to resist would be to act 
unprofessionally. This was an active process, designed to maintain 
stability until the leaders had themselves had time to give more 
consideration of the implications of the rule changes. The appeal to 
“professionalism” in this example was in the form of a request that 
doctors contribute ideas about how services for patients could be 
improved through active co-operation across the primary and 
secondary care boundary. A theoretical implication is that action can 
commence before sensemaking is complete. Rather what is 
important is to diminish resistance by finding alternative ways to 
facilitate constructive engagement. 
For suspended sense to hold then the potential to improve services 
had to be a plausible reality. This plausibility was dependent on the 
existence of professional networks that were wider than primary 
care, and which were a further dimension to the distributed 
landscape. Another key role of sensegivers in distributed 
sensemaking was to maintain cross-organisational networks. GP 
leaders were positioned at the interface of the rank-and-file and 
medical leaders from other healthcare organisations. The emphasis 
was on the development of a cohesive network unified by the 
prosocial sensemaking type that existed in the NHS Family. OD 
processes, dependent on the legitimacy of critically placed 
individuals, were used to reinforce cross-organisational networks 
and prosocial sensemaking. FLEs were regular meetings where the 
topics concerned the interface between primary and secondary care, 
and where sensegivers from both demonstrated that the NHS was 
one system requiring joint work to develop pathways and referral 
mechanisms across organisational boundaries. In a similar way to 
TM meetings, OD facilitation techniques were used. Group work 
sessions allowed time for individuals to air their concerns and 
conceptualise the information that they were receiving. In this way, 
not only were rank-and-file GPs introduced to new ways of working, 
but also the inter-organisational medical networks to which 
Executive GPs belonged were displayed for all to see. In this 
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context, the detail of the technical aspects of contracting and 
specifications were absent. The focus was on shared diagnosis, 
treatment, and caring for patients when discharged. 
6.4.5 Summary matrix of theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications identified in 6.4.1-6.4.4 are presented 
in a summary matrix in table 23. The matrix structure is a map of 
the main thematic categories (side headings) and the SP co-
ordinates (top headings). Contents of the matrix are articulated 
using concepts from BF and SP.
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Table 24 Strategic Collaboration Level summary matrix 
Strategic collaboration Level 
 Wider Contexts Temporality Distributed Sensemaking 
Establishment 
of new 
organisation  
National rules required the establishment of the 
CCG, and that decisions regarding how it was led 
were reserved to all members. Beyond this, rules 
were loosely specified.  
As far as the rules allowed, arrangements from 
the pre-existing PCT were retained, along with 
associated networks Rank and file GPs found it 
difficult to differentiate present arrangements 
from the past.  
The distribution of actors was set out formal 
documents designed to describe the 
arrangements for decision-making. Decisions 
about the leadership was reserved to rank and 
file GPs in a network called TM. 
Legacy  Similar to OPL, actors appeared to identify as 
NHS Family and use an embedded prosocial 
sensemaking type. 
The PC “NHS as system” sensemaking style was 
adopted by the network of leaders. The NHS 
Family legacy endured rule change and problems 
continued to be solved together. Sensegivers 
relied on personal legacies for legitimacy. 
Executive GPs led rank-and-file acting as 
sensegivers within the context of the NHS Family. 
Professional 
changes  
Changes to the profession (as described SoP and 
medical sociology) where evident. At this level 
the GP network was hierarchically stratified into 
hybrid-leaders and rank-and-file. The call to 
professionalism was used by leaders to 
encourage compliance.  
Sensegivers paced sensemaking, including 
suspending sensemaking processes amongst the 
rank and file whilst they themselves considered 
how to interpret new rules. This suspension was 
achieved by leaders linking being compliant with 
being professional. 
The GP network was stratified into hybrid-leaders 
and rank-and-file GPs. GP leaders were the 
interface between rank-and-file GPs and 
secondary care. OD facilitation and group work 
was used for leaders to encourage compliance on 
the basis of “professionalism”. 
Competition Competition rules implied a shift from prosocial to 
market sensemaking. They were mainly loosely 
specified. It was against the rules to give 
advantage to organisations in the NHS Family. 
Inherent was a role conflict for GPs as both 
providers and commissioners. 
Competition created ambiguity. A combination of 
retrospective and prospective sensemaking 
resulted in the incorporation of competition 
principles into the existing prosocial sensemaking 
type. 
Active network distribution occurred. In the 
leadership network, medical and management 
executive leaders formed a distribution into two 
sub-networks based on positions of proponent 
and critic. In the GP rank-and-file there was a 
retreat into uni-professional network. 
Integration Integration could be interpreted in a number of 
ways. The NHS Family was the context for the 
integration of NHS services (for example between 
primary care and hospitals). This was the focus of 
integration rules at this level.  
NHS Family continued to solve problems 
together, even in a competitive model. 
 
GP leaders were placed between the rank-and-file 
and other healthcare organisations. GP 
executives and doctor-leaders from those other 
organisations acted as sensegivers to the rank-
and-file. OD facilitation techniques were used. 
The medical cross-organisational network was 
reinforced Group work sessions allowed time for 
individuals to conceptualise.  
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Chapter Seven: Sensemaking, networks and 
rules at the Interagency Strategic Partnership 
Level 
7.1 Introduction 
In the two preceding chapters the focus was GPs in the NHS. In this 
setting this shifts to the wider health and social care economy of 
Castlefield. Health services are only one part of a wider set of public 
services, including social care, community safety, education, and 
housing. GPs plan services with other agencies in two ways. They 
participate in partnerships that bring senior people together to set 
priorities and allocate resources. They also work with colleagues 
from other agencies to devise operational arrangements for service 
delivery. This chapter is an exploration of the dynamic of 
sensemaking, networks and rules in the inter-agency environment. 
The opening section is an analysis of the implementation of two 
aspects of the new rules. The first is the statutory requirement to 
establish HWBs in each second tier LA area. The second is the 
associated statutory requirement to transfer the public health 
function out of the NHS and into LAs. Section 7.3 is an exploration 
of sensemaking processes between members of the HWB and the 
attempts that they made to develop shared understanding, and how 
they set priorities. In section 7.4, I focus on GPs, also drawing on 
findings from earlier chapters, in order to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of GPs sensemaking and networks at IPSL. I use the 
ICP as a case-study, to show that, similar to findings in earlier 
chapters, GPs relate most actively to rules in networks when they 
can focus on the operational implications, and take part in service 
design activities with other professional colleagues. 
The observations took place in Bevin House, Castlefield Council’s 
headquarters. The one exception to this was those that were 
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associated with integrated care; this was an interagency project, 
and its meetings took place in various locations. 
7.2 The rules 
There were two main rules in the HSCA 2012 that took effect at the 
level of the strategic partnership. First, LAs were required to 
establish a HWB, and second, public health duties were to transfer 
from the NHS into LAs. 
The health of a population is not determined by its healthcare 
system; responsibilities for the health and wellbeing of a community 
fall within the remit of a number of organisations. Since the 1980s 
statutory cross-organisational partnerships have existed in an 
attempt to co-ordinate efforts (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Just as 
Castlefield CCGs had been established based on the architecture of 
the pre-existing PCT, the HWB was based on its predecessor. 
Castlefield, like all English cities, had previously put in place a Local 
Strategic Partnership (LSP) which brought together public, private, 
and voluntary organisations with the policy intention to improve the 
economic, social, and environmental conditions of an area. The work 
of Castlefield’s LSP had been organised into themes. One of these 
themes was public health, for which it had put in place an 
associated formal network called the Health and Wellbeing 
Partnership (HWP). This was a network of senior people who agreed 
an annual Health Needs Assessment and Health and Wellbeing 
Strategy. The last recorded meeting of the HWP took place in 
September 2010. A minute entitled “NHS and Public Health White 
Paper Updates” shows that the intention was to create the HWB by 
adding additional responsibilities to the HWP: 
A Health and Wellbeing Board will be established as a statutory 
body. This board will have significant additional responsibilities to 
the HWP. It is likely that membership will be tweaked to include a 
much larger group than the HWP, however, it was recognised that 
there is a desire to maintain voluntary and community sector 
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representation. Structure and governance have not yet been 
developed. (HWB doc 1) 
The process of adaption started immediately, and as a result the 
HWP did not meet again. The September minutes end with the 
statement “Please note the December meeting has been cancelled” 
(HWB doc 1). 
HWBs are statutory partnerships. LAs were required to establish 
them as committees of full Council. A “task and finish group” 
including senior managers from the LA and the PCT was convened 
to make recommendations to be approved by the LA Executive 
Board. The Executive Board was made up of LA managers and 
senior councillors. The group’s report was presented in July 2011, 
and proposals to “rationalise existing governance structures around 
Health and Wellbeing, namely the Health and Wellbeing Theme 
Partnership and the Health and Social Care Commissioning Board” 
(HWB doc 2) were agreed. The incorporation of the business of the 
Health and Social Care Commissioning Board (HSCCB) which had a 
focus on service design and resource allocation meant that the new 
HWB had a wider remit than either of the predecessors. An inclusive 
approach was adopted; the recommended membership of the new 
HWB included every organisation that had been part of the two pre-
existing networks (HWB doc 2) and added in some others. The HWB 
in Castlefield had twenty-one members, compared to a statutory 
requirement of six. Castlefield HWB included representatives from 
the police, Jobcentre Plus, the housing provider, and the drug and 
alcohol partnership. 
The HWB first met in October 2011, over a year after the final 
meeting of the HWP. It was in shadow form right up to April 2013 
when the HSCA 2012 became a statute. On the website of the LSP 
the word Partnership was substituted by the word Board, and to the 
outside world the HWB appeared to be business as usual, an organic 
development of the HWP. The HWB was being packaged and 
presented as a replacement of the HWP, but the incorporation of the 
business of the HSCCB, and other changes impacted on how and 
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why business was enacted, and priorities were set. As will be 
described later, the interaction between members, and especially 
between doctors and councillors, had a major influence on why and 
how priorities were decided, and why and how spending decisions 
were made. 
Designers of the HWB presented it as a partnership of inclusivity, 
optimism and consensus. Castlefield was a concentrated urban area. 
Rates of crime, drug and alcohol abuse, and unemployment were 
high. Everyone articulated a commitment to address urban 
problems, and a belief that co-ordinated interagency effort was the 
best way to do this. 
The second rule change was the shift of the public health function 
from PCTs to LAs thus effectively redrawing the boundary between 
the NHS and local government. During the period of my 
observations the public health staff were “lifted and shifted”, in the 
words of one of the LA Directors when explaining the approach to 
the Peer Review Team (HWB fieldnote 3), from the outgoing PCT to 
Castlefield Council. In financial terms the transferred cost of the 
staff and the portfolio of service contracts that moved with them 
added up to circa 27 million pounds. Included were services that 
would have been considered mainstream healthcare by most 
people, for example: sexual health services including hospital 
services for genito-urinary medicine; drug and alcohol services such 
as needle exchanges and detoxification clinics; and all screening and 
immunisation programmes. Amongst these were a number of GP 
contracts for screening services, and other health promotion 
activities. These services would no longer be planned and paid for 
within the NHS; they would now be prioritised, or not as the case 
may be, within the context of the LA spending plan and budget 
constraints. 
Some thirty staff, including nurses, doctors, managers, and 
administrators were moved from the NHS to the LA. This transfer 
disrupted long standing networks. One such disruption was in the 
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relationship of GPs and public health doctors. In the predecessor 
PCT public health staff had led interagency planning, with a direct 
consequence that GPs had not taken lead roles in this area. Not just 
in Castlefield, GPs and public health doctors had intertwining roles. 
There are many instances of public health doctors doing sessional 
work as GPs, and vice versa. As a result of the new rule public 
health staff left the NHS and moved to the LA. The people might not 
have changed, but their relative positions and pay masters had. Not 
only had money and staff transferred to the LA, but so had decision 
making power. Councillors, with their democratic mandate, were 
now the ultimate authority on the public health function and its 
resources. 
The decision to build the new network as an extension of pre-
existing networks gave a sense of familiarity and continuity but in 
fact there were significant changes in statutory duties. The previous 
HWP had been a network where the shared focus of members had 
been public health as a science focused on disease prevention and 
health promotion. The merger of the HWP with the HSCCB to form 
the new HWB with an extended remit, had changed the network, 
and therefore the social relationships for sensemaking. 
The transfer of public health was a major structural field change 
with a redrawing of the boundary between the NHS and LAs. Public 
health services would now be prioritised, or not, in a LA context not 
a NHS one. This was a significant change to the GP role in inter-
agency commissioning, as in the past GPs had relied heavily on 
public health colleagues to lead the health side in interagency 
relationships. What would be the impact of shifting public health 
outside of the NHS Family? How would GPs respond in this new and 
unfamiliar context? How would councillors enact the new health 
duties that they had, especially in terms of prioritisation and 
resource allocation? These were areas of ambiguity which triggered 
sensemaking. I focused my observations to gain insight into these 
questions. 
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7.3 Sensemaking in the Health and Wellbeing Board 
7.3.1 Board members: differences and tensions 
The rule-change requiring the transfer of public health functions 
from PCTs to CCGs affected some people more directly than others.  
The GPs and others that remained in CCGs had sat on the side-lines 
whilst public health colleagues struggled emotionally with the fact 
that they were to be moved to the LA. When any business changes 
owner, including when a public function is transferred between 
organisations, employees are protected under the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) regulations which have 
the acronym TUPE. Because public sector staff are often moved 
under these arrangements, the acronym TUPE has been used as the 
basis of a new coinage. To be “tupe-ed” has become a colloquialism 
to describe when staff are to be moved from one organisation to 
another. Following the announcement of the changes the two most 
senior public health medical leaders left. The long serving highly 
respected Director of Public Health (DPH) left the public health 
speciality altogether and took up a medical management position in 
another organisation. The subsequent acting DPH took time off with 
poor health before retiring. Both of these doctors had parallel roles 
as GPs. James, the senior public health manager responsible for the 
transition also left after securing a job in another part of the 
country. Others stayed, possibly because they had no alternative, 
and began to work on interpreting and implementing the new rules. 
It was one thing moving desks and changing pay rolls; shifting 
emotionally based identities is quite another matter (Duncan and 
Barrett, 2007). The uncertainty and ambiguity associated with new 
rules triggered sensemaking more widely than the directly affected 
public health staff. Councillors and officers of the LA felt unsure 
what the acquisition of public health duties meant for them. Those 
who remained in the CCG were left to commission without familiar 
corridor-conversations to access the advice and skills of public 
health specialists. GPs were especially affected as they were left as 
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the only medical input into commissioning still working within the 
NHS. 
The GP members of the HWB were Dr Poona from the Gurus; Dr 
Whitbread from NW, and Dr Strong from PC. Cat was also a 
member. Dr Strong held the executive lead for interagency matters, 
and tended to be the spokesman for the GPs at meetings. Dr Poona 
attended but rarely contributed, and often seemed disengaged – on 
one occasion he was observed to sleep through most of the 
meeting. Dr Whitbread would act as the figurehead for the CCG 
when required, presenting plans and strategies, but other than this 
tended to leave active contributions to Dr Strong. 
The people who remained to form the new CCG and the transferring 
public health staff coped with this disruption by agreeing a formal 
“memorandum of understanding” (HWB doc 3) setting out 
arrangements for the continued technical public health advice to 
support GPs in their commissioning role. I first met Lizzie Gordon, a 
public health consultant who became my key contact, as she sat in 
a CCG open plan office that she and other public health staff had 
until recently occupied. She was drafting this memorandum 
surrounded by disconnected phones and computers and the things 
that had been left behind: personal notes; pictures on notice 
boards; and a battered Christmas chocolate tin labelled “tea 
money”. Lizzie, a nurse by background, was in a state of 
preoccupation with her move and felt that the future of public health 
in a LA was uncertain. There was a shared feeling in the public 
health team of being lost and adrift. The early days of the Board 
and its business reflected this preoccupation; an early analysis of 
papers showed that with the exception of one issue, priority 
families, the work of the board was concerned with its own 
establishment or with routine reporting (HWB doc 4). 
It was shortly after the public health team had moved to Bevin 
House that I began to observe the HWB meetings. Following the 
departure of the DPH and his deputy, a temporary appointment had 
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been made, but when I arrived this too had finished. Eventually a 
new DPH was appointed. Dr Klein was well known to the people of 
Castlefield. He was already the DPH for the surrounding suburban 
and rural shire county and now he was to incorporate the city into 
his remit. I had known him since the late 1980s when he had been 
a public health trainee in Castlefield. He had lived through the 
development of GP commissioning since fundholding days. He 
understood the legacies and sensemaking styles of the key GP 
leaders in the area. His arrival appeared to have a settling effect in 
the network, being welcomed, by some at least, as a sensegiver. In 
Lizzie’s words:  
“……it was a turning point because it was substantive or it, it wasn’t 
but it felt more permanent than anything that had happened 
before, we’d had somebody in on contract for one to two days a 
week for three months before that and she only stayed for three 
months until Dr Klein took up the post and it was, what it did it was 
just somebody’s got an arm on the rudder and could steer the ship 
and it was just that sense of having somebody that was there and 
engaged and steering the ship.” (GordonInterview) 
After Dr Klein’s arrival, there was an observable change in the 
shape of discussions as initial inertia gave way to puzzlement, and 
attempts to puzzle solve. Whilst Dr Klein was accepted as a 
sensegiver by the “health” people, this was not the case for other 
HWB members, as increasingly became apparent. Actors grappled 
with ambiguities arising from the complexity of interagency working. 
Members were representatives from a diverse set of organisations. 
This impacted on sensemaking especially when actors identified 
different cues in relation to a topic under discussion. Often a 
councillor would use examples from his or her own experiences to 
illustrate the failures of interagency coordination. The nature of the 
resulting fragmentation would be discussed. A plea to connect 
things would be made, often by the same councillor. For a while 
people would wrestle with how to make connections, before being 
beaten by the complexity. 
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In the extended extract below from an early HWB development 
session (HWB fieldnote 2), a councillor shows frustration at the 
inadequacies of approaches to address problems associated with 
harmful drinking. 
Cllr Blunt animatedly posed a fundamental question: “How do you 
sort it? All my life alcohol has been around. How do you quantify it? 
How do you analyse it? 
“There are a lot of older people drinking at home – the saga louts” 
said Dr Strong. 
The two doctors, Dr Klein and Dr Strong then tried to give definite 
answers rather than discuss the problem. Dr Klein said something 
technical which I, and probably others, didn’t understand. His 
expert tone was intended to close down Cllr Blunt’s question. 
Following Dr Klein’s cue, no one asked Cllr Blunt to elaborate, but 
she did anyway. 
“We’ve got hardly any provision. I’ve listened to so many of these 
[professional and managerial discussions], I’ve listened to them for 
years……I went to a meeting…..they all stood up…..twelve groups. 
We’ve got all these groups doing the same things. There’s no joined 
up writing.” 
Dr Klein answered: “This is what we’re here to do today” 
PC Warner, the enthusiastic policeman, interspersed to talk about 
an initiative called e-viper. “We need to get every plan. It’s 
something I see as a priority across all organisations.” He explained 
that the police were trying to restrict dangerous drinking through 
licensing, currently targeted at the city centre only. “We’ve shifted 
our tactics, to early evening, it’s no point talking to someone at 2 in 
the morning, you just arrest them.” 
Dr Strong shifted the conversation back to one that used health 
service language. “We are absolutely right to speak about the wider 
determinants. Health interventions should also be there.” 
Cllr Blunt spoke up again: “I don’t want to sound defeatist – how do 
we change people’s lives so they don’t need to be addicted to 
something. I live on an estate. A middle class lady stood on a 
podium and said the answer is education. These 14 year olds are 
Chemists! Are you going to give him a job? The old lady is lonely 
and gets the sherry out.” 
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Cllr Blunt spoke from personal experience. She described repeated 
failures of professionals to solve a problem. From her perspective 
people drank because of a lack of opportunity to work and to 
belong. PC Warner had a different point of view; from the 
sensemaking perspective of a policeman the problem was street 
drinking and social disorder. Dr Strong, the GP, was concerned 
about individual patients. He saw the effect of alcohol on elderly 
people. Dr Klein and Dr Strong together attempted to come over as 
experts, and to give others the impression that the doctors had 
things under control. There were tensions between these 
approaches to sensemaking. For instance, there was a tension 
between the desire for an open discussion about the social problems 
for which Cllr Blunt was asking, and the authoritative closure by the 
doctors who, for good reasons, were used to giving reassurance and 
appearing certain that they knew what was best to do. Patients, 
after all, like to feel their doctors are experts in their craft; 
presenting with confidence is part of what doctors’ feel is expected 
of them. 
Differences in perspectives leading to ambiguity as a trigger for 
sensemaking were also evident in this next example (HWB fieldnote 
7). This was a discussion about unequal life expectancies across 
Castlefield. A graphic was presented that visually represented 
Castlefield in the form of a bus map. It showed that those who lived 
in one affluent leafy suburb could expect to live to 77 years, 
whereas up the road, in a deprived area, the average life 
expectancy was 69. Overall Castlefield’s average life expectancy 
was approximately five years less that the national average. Dr 
Klein attributed the cause of this to smoking rates. Dr Piaget, a 
psychiatrist, made the point that high levels of smoking amongst 
people with mental health problems meant that they were dying 
earlier than others. Cllr Blackstone asked “was something deeper 
going on with respect to poverty?” Cllr Lennon picked up this thread 
“Poverty is the main cause, so why don’t we do something about 
poverty… a lot of male hostel accommodation”. Anita, the Chief 
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Officer of Castlecare tried to think of another angle. “Are there 
research gaps?” she asked. At this point Dr Klein and Dr Strong 
returned to the issue of smoking and smoking cessation. Cllr 
Blackstone resisted, asking why the discussion had shifted back to 
health interventions.  
“If we are a true partnership, then surely we need to do something 
that’s wider than health……All the interventions are health.”  
Dr Klein attempted to identify and address life style issues. This was 
being challenged by his new masters, the councillors, and also by 
the psychiatrist. Dr Piaget and Cllr Lennon saw their role as one of 
advocacy and representation. The people dying younger than others 
were poor, and also possibly mentally ill and vulnerable. They 
wanted to prioritise root causes. Others cast around for other 
explanations. Cllr Blackstone challenged the dominance of public 
health in the context of a network that brought together a wider 
range of perspectives. As a group they were trying to identify a 
plausible sensible reality, but this remained intangible; there was no 
mechanism by which to reconcile or align the ambiguities that arose 
from the different perspectives of the members. 
The issue of smoking became the focus of differences on other 
occasions. At a later meeting (HWB fieldnote 6) Dr Klein gave a 
presentation on his DPH duty to reduce smoking rates. His 
overriding message was ‘smoking is a bad thing’. He began with 
data from a 2011 government survey that showed a high level of 
public support for clamping down further on tobacco use. He talked 
about the economic costs of smoking, including time off work, and 
enforcement of the laws on illicit tobacco. Dr Piaget clearly felt 
uncomfortable with this single message approach, and she put up 
her hand to point out that forty percent of tobacco is smoked by 
people who were mentally ill. She didn’t say it in so many words, 
but the implication of her contribution was that kindness and 
tolerance were required, and that she did not see much of that in 
the purist public health approach to the problem. This change in 
tone gave Cllr Lennon the trigger to express his view. 
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Cllr Lennon: “People in [my ward] think they keep their weight 
down by smoking”  
Dr Klein: “The gains outweigh this one bad effect”  
Cllr Lennon: “yes, but that’s what they think”  
 Dr Klein “Some companies don’t appoint smokers, we [Castlefield 
LA] could think about this”  
The rules were unambiguous as far as Dr Klein was concerned. 
Smoking rates should be reduced. However to agree a strategy to 
achieve this would require members of the HWB to find a way to 
either align their currently opposed positions, or to make one 
dominant over others. There was the psychiatrist’s view that being 
too draconian would affect mental wellbeing. The councillors 
believed they should represent the views of their constituents, 
including their opinions about smoking. It would certainly not be a 
quick win to agree that the Castlefield Council would stop employing 
smokers. Cllr Lennon himself was severely over-weight, and would 
usually remain silent, or talk in loud asides when life style issues 
such as obesity, alcohol, and smoking were discussed. 
The social basis for sensemaking was not in place. Perspectives 
were different and were likely to continue to be different. If, as 
argued in Chapters six and seven, the NHS Family network had a 
shared prosocial sensemaking type, then in the HWB network this 
was only one type amongst several. The next section explores 
attempts to shed light on the nature of these differences when 
attempts are made to create the conditions for sensemaking to 
enable enactment. 
7.3.2 Attempts to align sensemaking 
There were OD interventions to respond to the differences in 
sensemaking types in the HWB network as it implemented the rules 
from the HSCA 2012. The first was an external “peer challenge” 
(Local Government Association, 2014). The second was a series of 
in-house development sessions. Both of these interventions were 
designed to allow members an opportunity to voice their individual 
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perspectives, which would serve to differentiate their approaches to 
sensemaking in the context of this statutory partnership network. 
Both were designed to bring to the surface underlying tensions, and 
to reinforce the rules. 
The Local Government Association (LGA), on its website, is 
described as “the national voice” of LAs (2014). Its role is to 
represent rather than govern LAs which are independent. A national 
programme of support was put in place to implement the HSCA 
2012, and as part of this the LGA organised optional “peer 
challenge” reviews, for which Castlefield LA volunteered. Even 
though the review was entered into voluntarily, it was organised 
and enacted with the same formality as an external audit or 
inspection visit, operating as a reinforcement mechanism for rule 
compliance. This type of outside intervention customarily 
accompanies public sector reforms and, however gently it is done, 
participants are aware that they are being assessed with regard to 
rule compliance. The intervention was designed to identify and 
address underlying resistance within the network. A team of peer 
reviewers, made up of a DPH, a LA director, and two LGA officials, 
visited Castlefield for two days and conducted a series of interviews 
with HWB “stakeholders”. The process was to be hosted and led by 
the Public Health team who were now in the employment of the LA.  
The opening of the peer challenge took place in Bevin House, at 
nine o’clock on a grey Tuesday morning (HWB fieldnote 3). I arrived 
in reception at the same time as the Peer Review Team and we 
were shown upstairs together The Team was taken into an office 
that was to be its base for the next two days. I was shown into the 
meeting room, which was little bigger than the twenty seated table 
that it housed. One side of the room was a huge window that looked 
out over the City-scape which somehow added context to the 
business that was enacted in there. People began to arrive. Cllr 
Lennon arrived first and we had a chat, I wrote in my notes: 
I found myself waiting with Cllr Lennon. He told me he’d been 
poorly. He’d gone to the hospital at the weekend with chest pain. 
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The GP hadn’t been informed. He’d been given a spray for angina, 
and told that nothing was really wrong. He thinks it might be his 
oesophagus. Cllr Lennon is a big man. I’ve known him years. He is 
a nice, gentle, straight talking person. He has always been big, and 
as a result absents himself from many social activities; he 
understands how isolation feels, and doesn’t think being told what 
to do by doctors is helpful. 
No one from the NHS had been invited to this opening meeting. 
James, the public health manager with responsibility for organising 
the “transition”, opened the review with a presentation. One of the 
slides was a complicated diagram that attempted to illustrate the 
new system. The room we were in was what could be described as 
cosy which had the effect of magnifying the nonverbal behaviour. 
Cllr Lennon made his feelings clear using his face and his silence to 
let others know he felt a mixture of disgruntlement and cynicism. I 
did not know it at the time, but he intended to use this review 
process to express some strongly held views regarding the tension 
between the doctors and councillors. People from Castlefield were 
invited to describe any issues of which they were aware. When 
pressed, Cllr Lennon said ominously: 
“There’s something I want to talk to you about this afternoon.” 
Eventually the Chair drew the meeting to a close, at which point Cllr 
Lennon spoke one sentence with great feeling:  
“Rather than a clinical solution, get a social one. Most of the 
problems are to do with loneliness.” 
The doctors might be present themselves as expert scientists, but, 
in the view of Cllr Lennon, the medical model did not necessarily 
make for happier people. 
After this initial meeting the review process started. There was to be 
a series of interviews with groups over the rest of the day and the 
following morning. A meeting of the HWB was scheduled for the 
following afternoon, after which the team would present their 
advice. I observed the interviews with “key partners”, and with “LA 
Members”. These were interviews in confidence, and people were 
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asked to speak honestly .The interview with the councillors took 
place in a small windowless meeting room (HWB fieldnote 4). Cllrs 
Blackstone and Lennon described the NHS as protected from the 
harsh realities of austerity, with professionals that did not listen to 
or understand real people in the way that democratically elected 
councillors did. 
Cllr Blackstone: “The danger with partnerships is you just spend a 
lot of time with the same people, just on different 
agendas……health and the council are not the same……health stands 
far away from politics on the side-lines waving…….. [Integration] 
will be a bumpy ride…….We need to listen to the experts……they 
need to listen to our ability to represent the constituency.” 
Cllr Lennon: “When people go to the doctor, doctors take a clinical 
view, “me arms ‘urting.” It may not be the best response to give 
them drugs…… I tend to look at the community good rather than 
the individual good. People come to us as individuals not 
communities. We then go to communities. There is no connection 
between the two.” 
The councillors were grappling with ambiguities associated with 
differences in political structures and funding regimes; between 
expert and representative functions. They were also balancing 
individual versus community perspectives, and medical versus social 
interventions. At one point during the interview Cllr Lennon 
remarked.  
“That might be me just because I’m thick; the big issues are 
loneliness and poverty.” 
The review could never solve these conundrums, but it did serve to 
declare them, they would form part of the “feedback”. In the “key 
partners” interview (HWB fieldnote 5) the view that the agenda was 
dominated by health was also expressed by a director of housing  
Reviewer: “Does the Board really understand the role housing can 
play?” 
Housing director: “Looking at the broader impact regarding welfare 
reform….. impact of indebtedness…… Castlefield on-call service, 
tele-care, alarms, tele-health, tenant sustainment services. There is 
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an underestimation of the role housing has. The Board is quite 
health professional focused.”  
The peer challenge visit ended by feedback being given to HWB 
members following one of their meetings (HWB fieldnote 6). The 
issues that I had heard raised during the interviews formed the 
main substance of the feedback. The reviewers told HWB members 
to: 
“Balance clinical evidence with the democratic mandate.”  
This point was given emphasis. The review team advised that 
evidence should only be a starting point, there were other 
perspectives and elected members “understood the context very 
deeply”. This was a clear enhancement of legitimacy for the 
councillors’ democratic sensemaking type, and as a corollary a 
reduction in influence of the doctors’ expert approach. 
The second OD intervention was a series of in-house development 
sessions. Following the peer challenge review, I was asked to 
facilitate two of these sessions to help members reach a better 
understanding of each other. Each of these sessions lasted for an 
afternoon. 
Earlier in this chapter I analysed an extract of dialogue about a 
report on life expectancy where differences in sensemaking had 
been apparent. At the first development session (HWB fieldnote 8), 
I presented the Board members the same extract on a PowerPoint 
slide. The attendees appeared to become intensely thoughtful. 
When they began to talk, there was animated agreement regarding 
the fact that they had different “agendas”, in other words they 
recognised their differences in sensemaking type. They also 
recognised that they had no techniques to integrate these 
differences. They seemed to be relieved that this difficulty had been 
captured. Guards dropped and they decided to focus the next 
session on exploring their different points of view together, and the 
ambiguities that arose as a result. I entitled the second session 
(HWB fieldnote 9) “Understanding each Other”, and developed a 
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programme which allowed actors to describe their histories, 
feelings, and perceptions of the purpose of their current 
organisations. I divided people into groups based on the likelihood 
of them having similar perspectives and shared networks. Groups 
were: public health staff; LA councillors; representatives of service 
providers (including social care); GPs; Healthwatch; and 
commissioning managers. Each group was asked to develop a 
PowerPoint slide which described recent changes, their legacy, their 
feelings, and their perception of the raison d’etre of their current 
organisation. By organising the distribution of the actors in this way, 
I drew differences to the attention of the group as a whole. 
The GPs described their past in terms of changes to the 
infrastructure of the Health Service going back to the 1974 
reorganisations, and the development of Family Practitioner 
Committees. Cycles of change were understood in terms of decades, 
rather than on the basis of the latest policy shift. They described the 
latest changes by developing a diagram that not only drew current 
structures, but anticipated future reorganisations such as the shift 
of further health responsibilities to LAs. For the GPs, their profession 
was affected by a process of continuous evolution. They expected 
current arrangements to change again. When asked to describe 
their emotions, they described feeling “neutral and resigned”, whilst 
expressing a worry for the future of the NHS. 
Only one councillor was present, Cllr Peace was the new Chair of the 
HWB. He described feeling like an anchor point with a personal 
responsibility for success of the Board. He described himself as 
“fixed civic point”; there to give the HWB a “democratic mandate”. 
He recognised that established networks had been disrupted, and 
the new structures required nurturing. He also warned that nothing 
in the LA was sacred, given the unavoidable budget reductions that 
were required. He described the frustration fellow councillors felt 
with the health system. Councillors based their perceptions of health 
care on stories and experiences that they heard from the electorate. 
Some felt that medical power should be curtailed. He described 
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feeling a degree of personal compromise, saying “We come into 
public office to change things; but we have to deliver a balanced 
budget”. 
Provider managers described their situation and feelings in terms of 
the gap between rhetoric and reality. Whilst the language described 
better provision, and more person centred care, in fact eligibility 
criteria were being tightened in order to save money and reduce 
staff which they described as “rationing”. The concept of early 
intervention was espoused in rhetoric, but in practice immediate or 
urgent requirements took priority. A further issue for providers was 
that contracting and competition rules had shifted their focus to 
tendering and reputation management. Income streams could not 
be taken for granted. 
Commissioning managers were present from both the CCG and the 
LA. They separately described their situation and feelings, across a 
set of common points. The managers did not express their personal 
feelings. The LA manager described a legacy of stability in terms of 
political control by labour, the geographical boundary, and the 
organisational structure. The changes had been to the finances, with 
a massive reduction in budgets, and ring-fencing of grants being 
removed. There was also an increase in the level of demand. In the 
CCG boundaries had remained stable, and this in turn had limited 
the changes to staffing. Catrina, and other CCG colleagues had 
wanted to retain a strong focus on inequalities and public health, 
and clearly felt a sense of loss. A nervousness was expressed 
regarding the implications of national proposals to transfer further 
health monies to the LA budget regime. Catrina implied, but did not 
say directly, that she worried that health monies would disappear in 
the LA’s budget which was under severe pressure as a consequence 
of national austerity policies. 
Public health professionals described a change in the nature of their 
role in health commissioning. Whereas previously they had directly 
commissioned health care, they were now part of a wider function. 
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They described the old health system as “fractured”. Their focus had 
shifted from epidemiology to the integration of health and local 
authority priorities. They emphasised the cultural differences that 
existed between them and the LA, but didn’t detail what these were. 
They described feelings of being “overwhelmed, frustrated and 
vulnerable”. Public health was an unknown quantity in the LA. 
Would their skills be recognised or valued? There was a fear that 
the portfolio of services that had been developed over years would 
be lost in LA budget cuts. Despite these fears, a feeling of optimism 
based on an increased scope of influence was described. 
The Healthwatch representative was upbeat. His was a new 
organisation. He commented that partnerships were embraced in 
theory, but in reality players retained their individual organisational 
perspective. He expressed scepticism about whether budget sharing 
would ever really happen. 
The overall picture was one of multiple perspectives meaning that 
the social basis for sensemaking including enactment was difficult to 
achieve. It was likely that perspectives would continue to be 
different, since each member had his or her own organisational 
legacy and priorities. The rules relating to the new HWB network 
were not bound to affect all member organisations beneficially, this 
was a time of post-recession austerity, and new competitive 
markets were being introduced. There was a tension between the 
medical sensemaking and its cue extraction based on a reliance on 
science, evidence, and expertise, and that of elected members who 
took their cues from the democratic process and the understanding 
that their legitimacy depended on the reflection of constituents’ 
ongoing concerns and values. A shift in the balance influence 
between sensemaking types away from doctors towards councillors 
was given further momentum by the LGA peer challenge team. 
If the balance of influence was shifting in this network then how 
would this affect business? One way to explore this is to consider 
how the network made decisions about what its priorities would be, 
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and why it chose to prioritise certain aspects of shared interest. This 
is the focus of the next section. 
7.3.3 Setting priorities and making decisions 
Castlefield HWB was an inclusive network, and as a consequence its 
span of potential areas of work was broad and complex. Each 
member of the HWB was there to represent the priorities and 
interests of his or her organisation with its own substructures. One 
purpose of the HWB was to be a point of intersection; a place where 
relative organisational responsibilities and interests could be 
integrated and balanced, and work programmes initiated and 
monitored. In order to have a manageable work plan four priority 
areas were agreed. According to reports and minutes from before 
my fieldwork began, HWB members had agreed a list of criteria by 
brainstorming at a development session. The criteria were broad, 
allowing plenty of scope for interpretation. Priority areas must 
consist of interventions to improve quality of life, reduce 
inequalities, involve more than one partner agency, to potentially 
reduce costs, and to be aligned with targets. 
There were four agreed priority areas. The first was Troubled 
Families. Castlefield had around 2,000 families that were receiving 
support from multiple agencies, and was a pilot site for the national 
Troubled Families Programme (Department for Communities and 
Local Government, 2012). To qualify, a family would need to meet 
certain criteria including school absenteeism, inter-generational 
unemployment, mental health diagnoses, and repeat offending. 
When targeted families achieved bespoke goals agreed in a multi-
worker interagency plan then the LA would receive incentive 
payments. There was a strong impetus from the police to prioritise 
this area. Before my arrival, the Chief Superintendent had made a 
special presentation to the HWB to request that the work be 
adopted as a priority. There was already an active network in 
existence with responsibility to undertake this work. This 
programme chimed with HWB members’ shared moral purpose of 
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addressing inner-city problems such deprivation and crime. Rules, 
networks, and sensemaking on this matter were complementary 
and aligned. The second priority area was mental health. The HWB 
adopted two aspects from the national strategy ‘No Health without 
Mental Health’ (Department of Health Centre for Mental Health 
2012). One related to early intervention in the lives of those 
considered likely to develop conduct disorders, and one related to 
the improvement of employment opportunities for people with 
mental health issues. For both areas objectives were set, but they 
were aspirational due to the length of time between intervention 
and impact. There was general agreement on the importance of the 
goals, but there was no sub network charged with their delivery and 
no measurable actions. The objectives were not monitored, and the 
priority area seemed to be largely overlooked. Harmful drinking was 
the third priority. The misuse of alcohol had the widest cross partner 
relevance of all the priority areas. There were underlying differences 
of view about how this should be addressed. Health professionals 
had a treatment and prevention focus. Councillors and the police 
were responding to the public’s concern about street drinking. 
Nonetheless, it had been possible to share agreement on a 
reduction target. A pre-existing network, the Crime and Drugs 
Partnership, was already working to a plan. Although there was no 
specific national rule, local objectives, networks, and sensemaking 
were aligned and as a consequence progress was being made. The 
final priority area was integrated care for the frail elderly. Prior to 
my arrival, and inherited by the HWB, the ICP had been initiated by 
the HSCCB in July 2012. A programme team had been put in place, 
so a sub network was already in existence. I joined this sub network 
as a participant observer during the middle phase of the study. 
There was no stated national rule requiring the integration of 
services. Nonetheless, a strong assertion from academia and NHS 
England regarding its desirability meant there was an expectation 
that integrated care would be developed across England. Whilst 
there was agreement on the non-specific desire to “integrate” there 
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was not a shared view about how this should be achieved across 
general practice, community health services, social care services, 
the hospitals, and to a lesser extent the housing and voluntary 
sector providers. Disagreements within the ICP, reflected the 
tensions between sensemaking types at the HWB. An important role 
of the project manager programme manager was to broker 
disagreements by acting as a boundary-spanner (Bartunek et al., 
2006, Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002) as well as a sensegiver. The ICP 
is considered in more depth later in this chapter, since it gives 
insight into GP sensemaking in relation to interagency planning and 
operational delivery of services. 
Looking across the four priorities, differences in the pattern of 
dynamics between rules, networks, and sensemaking can be 
extrapolated. These affected the way that business was conducted. 
In the case of priority families where all three forces were aligned, 
then work progressed well and achievements were easily won. In 
integrated care, networks existed, rules were in place, but there 
were sensemaking differences. In this case then a socially skilled 
boundary spanner brokered alignment at various stages in order for 
progress to continue to be made. In the case of mental health there 
was agreement that pursuit of this area was desirable but there was 
neither a network nor a set of rules; as a consequence this priority 
did not appear to be actively progressing. In the case of the alcohol 
strategy there was a pre-existing network and shared commitment; 
despite the fact that there were no specific external rules, progress 
continued to be made. 
Choosing priorities is a process of selection. In all of the examples 
above this choice was influenced by what the partners thought 
about it. The evidence suggests that significant commitment from a 
number of members of the network was a prerequisite. In three of 
the four priority areas a sub network already existed. In the area 
(mental health) were a network did not exist, even though the area 
was prioritised, progress towards the goals was not in evidence. An 
explicit set of external rules existed in the area of Priority Families, 
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but for the other areas rules were locally determined. Progress was 
made on those priorities without associated external rules. It would 
appear that, for an area to be chosen as a priority, commitment 
needs to exist but beyond being chosen its progress will depend on 
the existence of an effective network, especially if no external rules 
are in existence. For business to progress, it seemed essential that 
a network is in place, and that there was an aligned social basis for 
sensemaking or a process to broker alignment. Formal rules were 
not essential, but some form of directive, even if locally devised, 
also appeared to be necessary. 
If prioritisation is a selection process with a pre-requisite of 
commitment, then those areas that are not selected give an insight 
into relative levels of influence. Dr Klein attended the CCG GB (GB 
fieldnote 5). Back on NHS territory, he shared his opinion of the 
priority areas that the HWB had adopted. If he had been in post at 
the time they were set he would have pushed for the focus to be on 
smoking and obesity. He explained that problem drinking was 
selected to meet the agenda of the “politicians”. He explained that 
priority families were included because “the police have asked for 
this to be in”. The councillors had reasons to be seen to address 
concerns of the communities and voting public; they depended on 
being re-elected. It would seem that in Dr Klein’s opinion the 
political considerations had trumped public health concerns. 
HWB priority setting was only part of the picture. The public health 
grant, NHS monies that had transferred to the LA, by the second 
year (2013-14) was worth 27 million pounds. Initially the public 
health function had been protected by the “lift and shift” principle. 
However Castlefield Council faced a budget reduction of 55 million 
pounds over two years, and was making cuts to balance the books. 
At the second development session (HWB fieldnote 9) one of the 
councillors provoked my curiosity. During the session, I had been 
touched by his sensitivity to the public health team and had made a 
point of telling him that his kindness was having an important 
soothing effect. He replied by saying “I hope they still think that 
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tomorrow when I tell them what is happening to their budgets” 
(HWB fieldnote 9). An exploration of the LA’s website eventually 
yielded the Council-wide proposals to achieve budget reductions. 
Public health was identified as a “Big Ticket Item” meaning that its 
“transformation” would make a significant contribution to the overall 
spending plans of the Council: 
The responsibility for public health transferred to Local Authorities 
as part of the health and social care reforms initiated in April 2013. 
Government considered that councils have greater responsibility 
and power to shape the locality in a healthy direction, and public 
health would have the ability to shape services to meet local need, 
and better influence wider social determinants of health and tackle 
health inequalities. For Castlefield, a grant of £27m was provided to 
deliver this function, including commissioning a range of public 
health services to be used to meet the specific needs of citizens. 
Achieving greater efficiency and cost effectiveness across services 
will enable investment into the wider social determinants and public 
health responsibilities of the council. (HWB doc 5) 
The detail of the plan included an intention to redirect spending of 
the public health grant by more than a third over a three year 
period. The Councillors and officers who made up the Executive 
Board of the Castlefield LA decided to shift the balance from health 
promotion and prevention activity to services that were traditionally 
provided by LAs such as parks and sports facilities, services that 
were otherwise in danger of being lost as a consequence of budget 
reductions associated with the Coalition Government’s programme 
of austerity. This plan was never brought to the HWB; instead it was 
agreed by the LA in its own Executive Board. This was part of a 
national pattern which received media coverage. 
The difference in sensemaking type between LA councillors and 
doctors helps to understand how and why this happened in the way 
it did. Councillors now had ultimate control of public health and the 
HWB, and their sensemaking type with its orientation towards the 
democratic system was proving to be dominant in this context. 
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7.4 GPs and the interagency environment 
7.4.1 The role of the GP in the Health and Wellbeing Board 
The most striking observation of GPs at the HWB was that, 
compared to what I had seen in the CCG environment, they were 
distinctly quiet, deferring to public health colleagues to lead and 
shape the content of discussions. As already noted, Dr Strong, the 
lead GP for interagency matters, contributed most in HWB 
discussions, but even his contributions usually served to echo and 
reinforce those of Dr Klein, rather than provide a distinct GP 
perspective. Dr Whitbread’s contributions tended to be confined to 
instances where a CCG figurehead was needed for the purposes of 
committee etiquette, for example the presentation of a CCG 
strategy document. Dr Poona tended not to contribute. The data in 
the previous two chapters, in contrast, showed the GPs as active 
leaders within CCG and wider-NHS networks. So why was their 
contribution in the HWB minimised, and sometimes absent?  
In an interview with Dr Strong, I explored how he saw his role in 
relation to the LA. The following truncated extract from an interview 
(StrongInterview) includes his views: 
Adele: “Can I ask around inter-agency working, more generally, 
and the Health and Wellbeing Board…..what’s it like to be the lead 
GP with the Local Authority?” 
Dr Strong: “I’ve really found it interesting…….my first introduction 
ever to the Local Authority was [c.2000]…….. knew absolutely 
nothing about Castlefield Council, didn’t even know where they 
were or what they did…….nothing…….nothing at all, so that was the 
beginning of my learning curve, which is still continuing. I still don’t 
fully understand how they work, but it’s been a really interesting 
dimension, I’ve been talking about influencing things at scale, I’ve 
done that at national level, but working within the local is different, 
very.” 
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He continued to describe the impact of the Better Care Fund4 on LA 
officers and members, who for the first time were experiencing 
typical centralised management of NHS national initiatives with 
“templates that must be filled in and dictated timescales and exact 
prescriptive instructions about what you’ve got to do”. He described 
how this “shocked” councillors because “effectively they’ve done 
what they liked for years, never had to do this…” He also 
commented on the effect that the transfer of public health had on 
the CCG’s ability to perform its commissioning duties  
Adele: “Do you want to comment at all on the implications of a 
public health transfer to the Local Authority, does that impact …” 
Dr Strong (interjecting): “Disaster [emphatic]. You can’t 
underestimate the value of public health and all, and some people 
just think of them as the drains doctors and people who chase us 
up about our vacs and imms, you actually need to have worked in a 
health commissioning environment to understand how important it 
is to have that technical expertise and what your needs are. What 
sort of service, you should be planning, the evidence base around 
what you’re trying to do rather than simply anecdotal evidence 
from practising and have that balance is crucial, and whilst we do 
theoretically have access to public health still, within this 
organisation, it has effectively vanished and commissioning is going 
to be much more poorer for that, in my view.” 
This revealed an anxiety about the feasibility of CCG commissioning 
in the future. GPs were clinical practitioners and could advise based 
on clinical experience, but not on the basis of epidemiology that was 
at the core of the public health speciality. In the “Understanding 
each other development session” Dr Strong had expressed an 
opinion that further health functions would move to the LA, and 
later in the interview he commented that in his opinion primary care 
services should be “nationalised” and the independent contractor 
business model abandoned. Putting this together, the implication of 
                                       
4 This was an arrangement to transfer funds from the NHS to the LA. It 
was a new name for an arrangement that had previously been known as 
the Integration Transformation Fund. 
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Dr Strong’s analysis was that this shift of public health to the LA 
signalled the end of an era, if not the end altogether, for GP 
commissioning. This was coupled with an anxiety regarding the 
process of healthcare prioritisation and spending in a LA context. He 
commented on the re-allocation of the public health grant to 
traditional LA areas, like parks and gardens: 
“………and we have determined that this year these are our priorities 
within the public health, it’s going to be different to last year’s 
priorities, but that’s not taking the money out, is what they’ll say to 
you.” 
In his view, regardless of the reasons people gave, the unavoidable 
reality was that there had been a net reduction in the budget 
available to spend on health priorities. It is likely that this insecurity 
about the direction for the NHS and GP commissioning was part of 
the reason that the doctors were relatively quiet at the HWB. 
Clinical practice, and the CCG, for GPs were separate from civic 
planning and LA business. These were unfamiliar networks, without 
access to the important embedded shared sensemaking legacies of 
the NHS Family, and the medical profession. Doctors did not have a 
feeling of belonging in this environment. The GPs were not the only 
quiet people at the HWB table. In fact, there were only two 
consistently prominent voices – public health and the councillors. 
Even though GPs were now the medical representatives from the 
NHS side, they continued to abdicate commissioning medical-lead 
responsibility to public health doctors continuing the historically-
derived distribution of responsibilities established when all the 
doctors worked in the NHS. One way of understanding this is that 
the integrated nature of the medical network is so embedded that 
organisational boundaries are not relevant.  
Another possible explanation for the relative absence of the GP 
voice is that they were simply showing a graceful sensitivity to the 
position of their “tupe-ed” public health colleagues. The doctors at 
the HWB have known each other for many years and are friends as 
well as colleagues. Two senior public health leaders had, after all, 
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left in less than happy circumstances. The move to the NHS had 
disrupted very long-term working relationships, the longest of which 
was the GPs’ professionally based network with public health 
physicians. There had been distinct emotional responses to this 
change. Public health specialists were attempting to transpose 
epidemiologically evidence-based sensemaking into the LA 
environment with its democratically-based sensemaking type. It 
could be that Dr Strong, Dr Poona, and Dr Whitbread, were standing 
back in order to allow their friends and colleagues to establish their 
new position in the field’s networks. 
It could be that GPs felt vulnerable as service providers.. Public 
health services would now be prioritised, or not, in a LA context, 
including a number of GP provided contracts for screening and 
vaccinations and immunisations. It could be that GPs were 
conscious that not only were they commissioners, but also they 
were providers of services for which the LA was the paymaster. 
Perhaps it was just that GPs didn’t expect this partnership to last. At 
the “Understanding Each Other” (fieldnote 9) development session, 
the GPs had understood cycles of change in terms of decades, 
rather than the last policy directive. They had described a still 
shifting health landscape. More than any other group, the GPs 
described the recent rule changes as just one more in a process of 
continuous evolution of their profession, and were not expecting the 
current arrangements to be enduring. Their description of their 
feelings as “neutral and resigned” was perhaps a way of expressing 
that they would side step the political world, whilst continuing to 
develop clinical services. 
New rules had created a change in role for GPs, and a shift in 
organisational boundaries had disrupted a key commissioning 
network putting some actors outside the NHS Family. There was 
also a need to incorporate the implication of a change in the degree 
of influence for the democratic sensemaking style. There were 
significant ambiguities and uncertainties associated with this 
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complex set of changes. GPs appeared to leave active sensemaking 
to the councillors and public health staff, becoming apparently 
passive as a consequence. 
Having noted the passive role of the GP in the strategic interagency 
environment of the HWB, in the following section I consider the 
position of GPs in the more operationally focused ICP, where by 
contrast they took a more active part. 
7.4.2 GPs and the Integrated Care Partnership 
This next section is a discussion of disparate sensemaking 
approaches within the ICP, with a particular focus on the GPs within 
the network. As already outlined earlier, integrated care was one of 
the four priorities agreed by Castlefield HWB. All partners had 
agreed that the pattern of Castlefield’s older people’s services was 
complicated, fragmented, and led to confusion and inappropriate 
use of services including avoidable hospital admissions. The 
interagency ICP had been initiated by the HSCCB in July 2012, and 
subsequently adopted by the HWB. A well-established interagency 
network was in place including GPs, Castlecare clinical managers, 
and social services managers, amongst others. It was coordinated 
by a CCG employed project manager. During the study, I was 
attached to this programme as a participant observer, assisting 
Sarah Tompkins, the ICP project manager, in areas where she 
needed help, usually by facilitating groups when inter-agency 
dynamics were proving to be difficult. She used me as a sounding 
board, and a source of emotional support. 
The case to integrate care was accepted by all. Dr Conary 
(ConaryInterview), in an interview, used the example of a patient of 
hers to explain the reasons why integration across the network of 
services was important:  
“…… I’ll go and check the medicines and the next day somebody 
goes and checks her feet, another day somebody checks her 
bowels, another day somebody does something else and she has 
lots of people going in and none of us talk to each other and none 
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of us know what each other are doing and we say you ought to 
walk a bit more and the next one goes you ought to walk a bit less 
and you ought to eat a bit of this, oh no you ought to eat a bit of 
that and the poor patient in the middle of it all sees all these 
professionals coming together to try to help them but they kind of 
like say it’s too much. I’ve got one in particular I can think of who 
her neighbour had to open the door for her every time and he said 
he had twelve different people come every day and he couldn’t go 
out because he had to open the door for all these people to come 
into see her and she was just, you know nobody was pulling it 
together and I was trying to pull it together to say she needs these 
four things doing and everybody who goes in should ask her about 
these four things but there wasn’t a system to be able to pull it 
together to do that they were all doing differently, she got over it in 
the end this illness she had but really it was longer than it could 
have been and she went into hospital once and she need not have 
done. So that’s the integration that we’re trying to work towards is 
trying to work together so there’s not only lots of services out there 
that we could refer one patient to but we’ve also got all these 
people going into the one patient and not talking to each other.” 
In this extract she is describing her own perception of fragmentation 
seen through a patients’ eyes. The King’s Fund5 had published a 
fictitious case study used in Torbay to illustrate the effect of 
fragmented services on the life of “Mrs Smith”, a vulnerable elderly 
person. The ICP, along with many other CCGs, had adopted this 
idea. An animated video had been produced in Castlefield called 
Elsie’s Journey which told the story of a white, elderly lady, 
navigating the complexities of the health and social care system. 
The video was in two parts, first how things were now, and second, 
how it was hoped they would be when services were integrated. It 
was based on the real life experiences of Sarah’s grandmother. 
Project management is a widely used approach to the 
implementation of change in NHS organisations. It is a way of 
proactively managing a network, the members of which will have 
                                       
5 The King’s Fund is a high profile independent research focused charity 
whose publications are aimed at improving health and social care. 
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different perspectives. It is often used when a disparate network 
needs to be co-ordinated. Individuals are made accountable for the 
delivery of the programme overall, as well as sub tasks within it. 
The project management model requires the identification of senior 
sponsors who ensure the project maintains momentum. Castlefield’s 
ICP had two project sponsors – Maggie Smith, the Director of 
Primary Care from the CCG, and Vicky Brown, a LA senior manager 
responsible for social care. These two shared the leadership of an 
interagency project board. Below this was a project team made up 
of people responsible for contributing to the overall delivery of the 
programme. The project team included people from different 
organisations represented at the HWB. Castlecare community 
services, General Practice, and the LA’s social services duties were 
the three main elements of services to be integrated. 
Sarah was an occupational therapist by background. She was a 
quietly spoken, logical person. These personal qualities along with 
her own professional background appeared to be the basis of her 
legitimacy. She gathered a supportive inner circle around her. She 
was prominently supported in her task by two lead managers from 
Castlecare, Simon (a social worker by profession who had moved 
into the NHS) and Jayne (a physiotherapist). These three together, 
formed the inner core of the project, and acted as sensegivers, 
never wavering from the challenge to keep things moving forward. 
Sarah’s role depended on maintaining alignment as people made 
sense of the future distributed across multiple organisations. This 
depended on brokering agreements on a continuous basis. The 
alignment of this distributed group of sensemakers was a slippery 
thing which needed constant attention and repeated intervention to 
maintain. 
When I arrived on the scene, the plan for integrated care was in 
place. Locality based operational teams were to be established 
called Care Provision Groups (CPGs). Each CPG would have co-
located health and social care staff and would serve a number of 
general practices, grouped in localities. Each CPG would have its 
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own care co-ordinator, nurses, occupational therapists, 
physiotherapists, and social work input. The project team’s job was 
to put these arrangements in place. The work was organised into 
subcategories called workstreams. 
Dr Kerala, an executive GP from Chamber network, was the lead 
doctor in the project team. Other GP members were Dr Poona (the 
Gurus Chair) and Dr Milligan (a member of the PC GP network and a 
partner at Dr Strong’s practice). Dr Kerala described how he 
conceptualised his own role in an interview (KeralaInterview): 
“I think there are two roles which I have; one is there in a 
professional capacity as a GP, there are two roles I have, what is it 
as a GP, what do I think, and how am I helping a person navigate 
the system. Secondly, as the exec lead, which is trying to link 
various fragments of the system and if anything, clinically where 
there are duplications and to remove those duplications, because I 
hate a person being fobbed off from one part of the system to 
another and another, going around in circles. But sometimes, 
reminding people to put the patient back into the pathway, because 
quite often the pathway is very much convenient and we all look 
through our own views and mind-sets, so we design it based on our 
own experiences, and trying to bring a patient back into that, how 
would a patient navigate, can you describe, and I think that’s what 
my role is.”  
In this extract he is describing a situation where his clinical 
experience as a GP is informing the commissioning task that he is 
undertaking. He is clearly aware of the interrelationship, going so 
far as to describe them as different roles. As was seen in the 
Chapter 6: Sensemaking, networks and rules at Strategic 
Collaboration Level, Executive GPs interpreted commissioning to 
mean the design of clinical services, pathways, and referral 
mechanisms within wider systems. In the context of the ICP the 
system was wider than healthcare, but the same systems based 
approach needed to be taken, and Dr Kerala understood his role to 
be about designing clinical processes, and to bring an understanding 
of the operational implications for GPs. 
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As a participant observer, I was asked to facilitate sessions for the 
“processes and protocols” workstream. Our aim was to produce a 
set of operational policies for use in the new multi-disciplinary 
teams. The meetings were attended by Dr Kerala, Dr Poona, and Dr 
Milligan, as well as Jayne, from Castlecare, and a LA social work 
manager. In contrast to the reserved approach of the GPs at the 
HWB, these doctors led discussions and were the main creators of 
the new operational system that was ultimately adopted. It would 
be based on an electronic “risk stratification” tool already in use in 
Castlefield practices. This was a locally designed interactive 
database that was shared between hospitals, community services, 
and GP practices. It included visual alerts to changes in the health 
or social circumstances of patients who were near to death, or had 
significant and/or complex needs. This was especially useful for 
patients who were unstable because those accessing the database 
could see a simple up or down arrow that would act as an alert if 
someone was deteriorating () or improving (). All staff in the 
CPGs would have access to this database. Those patients that the 
system flagged would be reviewed in regular meetings. There were 
reservations and scepticism. The doctors had serious doubts about 
whether GPs would be able to attend multi-disciplinary meetings in 
practice, and the social work manager was certain that social work 
cover would be limited given extent of austerity measures. 
Nevertheless, everyone did remain committed. Dr Kerala agreed to 
pilot this approach in his practice. There were high hopes for the 
positive impact that the care co-ordinators would have, of which 
there would be eight. GPs would be formed into eight new networks 
called locality groups. Those practices that were close to a boundary 
would have a choice of locality, but by and large these would be 
imposed groupings, based on geographical location. Eight lists were 
drawn up, allocating practices to groups. Evening meetings were 
held in order for GPs to ask questions. 
At the same time as the ICP was dividing practices into geographical 
groups, there was a swell of national interest in the idea of GP 
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“federations”. The idea was that networks of practices would share 
functions in order to be of an appropriate scale for 21st century 
medicine. I discussed this with Jim Wood from the LMC in an 
interview (WoodInterview): 
The difference, the real challenge is what is entirely new is the idea 
of GP practices working in groups  
Whilst GP practices had been organised into groups for various 
bureaucratic reasons in the past, this had not involved any real 
pooling of resources or patients. Changes in medical practice, and 
initiatives such as integrated care, were now driving the need for 
GPs to develop new inter-practice networks which were given the 
name “federations”, although there was no exact blueprint as to 
what this meant. The new leader of the General Medical Council6 
was leading the profession towards an acceptance of forming 
federations in response to the changing environment of medicine. 
Again, in Jim’s words: 
“………he’s an influencer, he’s far sighted, he’s been involved with 
the college, he’s been involved with the NHS alliance and 
organisations like that so he’s got a lot of broad interests…… he’s 
brought a change of attitude and he’s brought in an attitude which 
is that you know whether we like it or not general practice is going 
to change……and they do buy into this concept of federation.”  
Sensegivers within the profession were future-orientated, 
suggesting that the model of general practice would need to change 
and a vehicle for this was the development of federations. Jim 
described this as follows: 
“So having analysed that the Government appears to favour the 
idea or practices working at collaborations as being you know, I 
mean that’s making a virtue of necessity. And I think within the 
profession itself, ourselves included we also believe that that’s the 
                                       
6 The General Medical Council is the body with responsibility for setting 
standards of performance and conduct for doctors, and for maintaining the 
register of doctors deemed fit to practice. Its statutory duties are 
enshrined in the 1983 Medical Act. 
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way forward. Even if things weren’t in crisis we would say it seems 
intuitively to be the way forward because the traditional model of 
General Practice as the kind of corner shop small practice model 
and particularly the single-handed practice model is past its sell by, 
there's no question……..So change is inevitable.” 
Whilst there was emerging consensus that GPs would by necessity 
form new interdependent networks, what was not clear is what form 
these networks would take. If a new more networked model of 
general practice was an inevitable and seemingly desirable 
development then how would this shift to a more future-orientated 
sensemaking happen? Managers would prefer new networks to form 
in tidy alignment to bureaucratic delineations. In an extract from an 
interview (SmithInterview) below, Maggie explains why GPs should, 
in her view, form geographically based networks: 
“We’re trying to create federations and I know I’m still looking at 
federations about like-minded GPs working together, that’s not 
going to work. They’ve got to geographically work together, they 
see the same patients and the same area, if you’re a single-handed 
GP and you go off ill, you need to know that your patients could 
walk up the road to the next practice, or somebody could walk 
down to you, or, you’re seeing those geographical patients. They’ve 
got to put aside their personal preference for professionally what 
works and for the patient what works. And they’re starting to see 
that, reluctantly.” 
A principal driver for this was the formation of CPGs, and, to a 
manager, it seems to make obvious sense that GPs are grouped in 
the easiest way to provide cross cover. The Executive GPs however 
were not of this mind. A geographical arrangement could work, but 
only in situations where good relationships existed between 
practices. Dr Kerala described this in an interview (KeralaInterview)  
“…So the CPGs, although they have become a reality from the point 
of view of the contract, I can see that the teams, the community 
teams are not becoming the neighbourhood teams, in effect that 
they’re not working together. And GPs are looking at them, that 
this is the work being done around them, rather than being a part 
of it. So for the next year, it is a priority in itself that no, how do we 
make this into a networking or neighbourhood…… I think it will 
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happen in a fair few, but for it to happen in all units, it will have to, 
there will have to be significant gains and we will need far more 
medical leadership for that to happen………” 
When I exited the study site, where good relationships existed 
between GPs then CPGs were working well, but where relationships 
were strained then CPGs were succeeding in name only. In these 
cases the GPs were simply letting the CPGs happen around them - 
not resistant, but neither were they actively engaged. This prompts 
a further question. Why did some practices have such reluctance to 
work with their neighbours? Dr Lovett described in more depth the 
reason why practices would not cooperate with one another. 
Dr Lovett: “Well it’s exactly the same argument. I think federations 
will work if they’re like minded people…….federations work if the 
practices themselves think it’s in their interest to be federated with 
it and they like the people, they respect the people or they think 
they can work with those people, I think that works.” 
Adele: “It’s trust then?” 
Dr Lovett: “Yeah, it is. But don’t for God’s sake make them go to 
somebody that they really don’t like and they don’t trust them 
because they… and that’s the problem with CPG group.” 
Adele: “That’s in the abstract, you’ve talked about in the abstract, 
in reality how many practices couldn’t get on and how often does it 
really happen? I know there’s the odd one.” 
Dr Lovett: “Well I can give you an example because of course… a 
family example for you because my dad worked with a guy called 
Dr X for years and he… my brother was joining the practice and Dr 
X then up and left with half the patients so that… and the X practice 
are still next door to my practice… I mean I don’t have a problem 
with them but they were two brothers, we were two brothers in 
ours, a father and two brothers and my dad would have had war 
with them at any time he possibly could. It’s not my style.” 
Adele: “So it’s about all those businesses poaching and in 
competition.” 
Dr Lovett: “It is. It is. You see in small business… well it’s two 
things, one is that… yeah, and again it’s a bit about the… do you 
have the same principles and most people have the same principles 
but not completely so… I know that in Castlefield there’s some 
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people that I could work with very easily and some people that I 
would probably need more time……So if you have a group practice, 
you go to any group practice there are tensions between the 
partners within a practice, you multiply that by distance and a 
different set of rules and it gets worse and worse and worse so it’s 
difficult.” 
In Dr Lovett’s analysis, based on his own personal experience of 
being a clinician, a CCG leader, and a leader in the regionally based 
Local Education and Training Board, GPs would only work in groups 
if they had commercial, professional, and personal trust. It was 
possible to organise GP practices into groupings for various 
purposes, but any more sophisticated network that required sharing 
of resources or staff would only be feasible where personal and 
financial trust existed. 
7.5 Discussion: Interagency Strategic Partnership 
Level  
7.5.1 Introduction 
In the sections below I draw on the findings presented in the 
preceding parts of this chapter in order to discuss how and why GPs 
commissioned in the way that they did at the ISPL. The discussion is 
organised into three sections: wider context; temporality; and 
distributed sensemaking. Each of these sections draws on the 
thematic analysis using the codes: establishment of new 
organisations; legacies; changes to the profession; competition; and 
integration. In each section I first discuss the relevant findings to 
the heading and draw out the theoretical implications, focusing on 
sensemaking within the context of networks and rules. I conclude 
by presenting a summary in the form of a tabular matrix.  
7.5.2 Wider context 
Whereas at OPL and SCL the wider sensemaking context appeared 
to be the vertical relationships within the NHS, at the IPSL the wide 
context was a horizontal relationship between the partner 
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organisations. The HWB was an exercise in the management of a 
wide context. The ostensible national policy ambition was to align 
otherwise largely unconnected organisations. I observed multiple 
attempts by representatives to find connections and to identify 
common ground. These attempts appeared to comprise of broad 
statements. The one thing that all held in common was that they 
had responsibilities in Castlefield. They agreed that issues relating 
to urban deprivation were best achieved through co-ordinated 
efforts of Castlefield agencies. This broad agreement meant that the 
membership was extended even more widely further expanding the 
context and increasing the difficulty of achieving alignment.  
In order to manage this complexity, two main business mechanisms 
were created. Firstly specific inter-sector priorities were identified 
which were pursued and monitored, some more successfully than 
others. Secondly, a significant degree of attention was paid to 
routine uni-agency reporting. 
HWBs were inter-organisational public partnerships put into place 
for two main policy purposes. The first was to increase the 
democratic accountability of healthcare commissioning by giving the 
lead responsibility for HWBs to elected local authorities. The second 
was to integrate the operational delivery of services. Interpretation 
of these national expectations was left to local areas. As part of the 
intention to increase democratic influence on healthcare, public 
health duties were transferred from the NHS to the LA, resulting in 
a redistribution of actors at national and local levels. Another impact 
was that the balance of influence shifted towards the democratic 
sensemaking of the elected representatives, and away from the bio-
medical expert approach of the doctors. 
There was a national programme to support implementation of 
HWBs, including a series of external peer reviews. 
7.5.3 Temporality 
Two pre-existing groups, the HWP and the HSCCB, were merged to 
form the new HWB. Outwardly, this gave the impression of a 
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process of natural evolution. This seeming continuity detracted from 
the scale of change and disruption of legacies introduced by the new 
rules.  
The transfer of the public health duty from the NHS to the LA and to 
establish HWBs as committees of the LA was a structural change 
that put an organisational divide through the previous 
commissioning network and its legacy. Retrospective sensemaking 
was difficult as a consequence. Prospective sensemaking also 
appeared difficult. Public health staff were no longer part of the NHS 
Family. As a consequence they felt vulnerable and their close 
colleagues in the CCG felt bereft. There was a sense of 
fragmentation and confusion and sensemaking appeared stalled, 
commencing only on the arrival of an established public health 
leader as the new DPH. He made a working assumption that 
business should carry on as usual, acting as if the DPH position had 
equivalent status and role to that which had existed prior to the rule 
change. This signalled to others to extract cues from what they had 
known in the past. It seems likely that this continuation exacerbated 
the apparent tension that existed between the doctors and the 
councillors, although this was never voiced so cannot be directly 
evidenced.  
One impact of this business-as-usual approach was to stymie the 
creation of potential new roles that could have resulting from the 
redistribution of responsibilities. It is likely that the GPs felt 
sensitive to the position of public health colleagues, and did not 
want to step into the established roles of their displaced friends and 
colleagues. GPs followed the lead of the DPH who continued as the 
main medical input to the HWB. GPs were relatively subdued in 
HWB meetings, in contrast to the roles they enacted in the CCG. 
Their chief concerns were elsewhere. They were otherwise occupied 
in establishing CCG networks. GPs appeared to have a longer time 
horizon than other members of the HWB. This was evidenced at a 
development session. The GPs described this latest change as just 
one further stage in a continuum of change to the profession which 
243 
 
they traced back to fundholding and non-fundholding. They 
anticipated further change in inter-agency arrangements with more 
transfers from the NHS to the LA. 
7.5.4 Distributed sensemaking  
This type of inter-sector public partnership is put into place in an 
attempt to co-ordinate activities in areas where more than one 
organisation has a responsibility. The raison d’etre of the 
partnership was to solve a sensemaking distribution problem. It 
should not therefore be a surprise to find unaligned perspectives in 
public partnerships. The partner organisations had different rules, 
and core duties, and by extension their respective actors had 
different perspectives when it came to sensemaking. During the 
HWB meetings members often talked at cross-purposes reflecting 
their different perspectives which I conceptualise as different 
sensemaking types. Some differences had a more significant impact 
on business than others. 
The transfer of public health duties from the NHS to the LA was a 
redistribution of responsibilities at national level. Councillors now 
had ultimate responsibility for public health and the HWB. This 
redistribution of responsibilities was evident in the decisions that 
were made, including those regarding the allocation of the public 
health grant. The relative influence of expert doctors versus 
democratically accountable councillors became a matter of regular 
contention. 
As at the SCL, OD was a mechanism used to facilitate sensemaking 
at a time of rule change. The OD interventions at the partnership 
level were distinct from those discussed in the previous two 
chapters. OD in the healthcare sector emphasised the alignment of 
sensemaking especially of rank-and-file GPs. In this context of 
multiple organisations with multiple sensemaking types, OD 
processes were used to explore and expose tensions. 
The peer review was an example of an external intervention. During 
the review, councillors and other partners expressed a view that 
244 
 
doctors were dominant in the HWB. In response, the review team 
recommended that greater weight be given to the “democratic 
mandate”. HWB members’ followed up the review with in-house OD 
activity designed to better understand their different perspectives. 
OD at this level served to help actors articulate and understand 
differences. The impact was to give added legitimacy and influence 
to the democratic sensemaking type of the councillors (external 
peer review), and to aid greater awareness of the differences in 
sensemaking types (internal development sessions). Because the 
actors were not ready, or simply it was not possible, to align 
sensemaking types, this left a gap for the councillors, and their 
democratic sensemaking type, to become dominant, and as a 
corollary others became passive, including the GPs. 
In this context the focus was on understanding differences and 
tensions. The overall picture was one of multiple sensemaking types 
that would continue to be different. It is not always possible to align 
sensemaking processes, or resolve tensions. In these circumstances 
it is more difficult to identify critical individuals from within the 
ranks who have legitimacy to influence across the network. External 
interventions were used to align work with the rules. Internal 
processes were externally facilitated, and were focused on 
understanding differences. 
At the ISPL, the focus was on integration, not competition. The term 
integration was used in two distinct ways. First was the creation of a 
HWB strategy, involving the integration of partners’ strategies. 
Because the partnership was a collectivity involving different 
sensemaking types this integration was elusive. Instead of 
comprehensive integrated strategies, priority areas were identified. 
Second was the integration of community health, GP, and social 
services. This became one of the agreed priority areas identified. 
Work on priority areas was executed in sub-networks. Like the 
HWB, sub-networks comprised of actors that were usually 
distributed throughout a number of separate organisations. By 
bringing those together in one network it was intended that widely 
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distributed responsibilities could be brought into alignment. The ICP 
was organised using a mechanism known as Project Management. A 
related set of networks was created to co-ordinate distributed 
sensemaking. Workstreams were accountable to a project team, 
and the project team to a project board. The ICP was co-ordinated 
by a project manager whose ostensible role was to monitor 
timescales and tasks, but who also appeared to invest significant 
time in brokering disagreements between actors distributed in 
member organisations. 
GPs took an active role in the ICP, in contrast to their relative 
disengagement in strategy discussions at the HWB. At the SCL GPs 
preferred interpretation of their commissioning role was to design 
and improve clinical services and processes. Their role in the ICP 
was to contribute to clinical service design, thus extending their 
work at the SCL into social care. The integration of health and social 
care involved the creation of a new infrastructure for referrals, 
discharges and case management of older people. The building 
block was to be locality based teams, each with its own care co-
ordinator. Each Practice would be allocated to a locality based team 
that did not correlate to existing GP-groupings. CCG managers 
strongly supported the concept of bureaucratically determined 
geographical groups; this would fit tidily with other agencies’ 
bureaucratic boundaries. The GPs however, were hesitant about 
how far this geographical approach could be imposed. At the same 
time as the ICP groupings were put into place, GP federations were 
increasingly talked about at national levels. GP practices were 
businesses. Commercial, professional and personal trust would need 
to be in place before GPs would federate in anything other than a 
loose arrangement. GPs somewhat reluctantly complied with this 
allocation, whilst also retaining the four existing groups for 
commissioning purposes. 
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7.5.5 Summary matrix of theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications identified in 7.5.1-7.5.4 are presented 
in a summary matrix in table 24. The matrix structure is a map of 
the main thematic categories (side headings) and the SP co-
ordinates (top headings). Contents of the matrix are articulated 
using concepts from BF and SP. 
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Table 25 Interagency Strategic Partnership Level summary matrix 
 Wider Contexts Temporality Distributed Sensemaking 
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HWBs were inter-organisational public partnerships put 
into place in an attempt to coordinate service delivery. 
The transfer of public health duties from the NHS to 
the LA was a redistribution of responsibilities at 
national level, intended to increase democratic 
influence in the NHS. There was a national programme 
to support implementation including external peer 
reviews. 
Two pre-existing groups were merged to form one new 
organisation. Outwardly, this gave the impression of a 
process of natural evolution. This seeming continuity 
detracted from the scale of change and disruption of 
legacies introduced by the new rules. 
The HWB was a network of representatives with The 
different sensemaking types. OD processes were used 
to support establishment of the HWB. The effect was 
to give added legitimacy and influence to the 
democratic sensemaking type of the councillors 
(external peer review), and to aid greater awareness 
of the differences in sensemaking types (internal 
development sessions). L
e
g
a
c
y
  
The shift of Public Health from to the LA was a 
significant change in field rules. Public Health was a 
distinct speciality within medicine (as well as other 
professions such as nursing). A corollary impact was 
that GPs became the NHS medical representatives in 
the inter-agency partnerships. 
The rule change disrupted the shared legacy of Public 
Health and NHS commissioners. Actors were confused, 
and sensemaking was stalled. Sensemaking 
recommenced when a past leader was appointed, 
extracting cues from the old shared legacy taking a 
“business as usual” stance. Thus, potential new roles 
resulting from the repositioning were not created. GPs 
followed the lead of the DPH who continued as the 
main medical input to the HWB.  
Each HWB represented a partner organisation that had 
its own rules, duties, and legacies. This meant that 
different sensemaking types were attempting to 
sensemake together. The difference between doctor 
(expertise and evidence) and councillors (democratic 
mandate) became a matter of regular contention. 
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The rule change was intended to add democratic 
legitimacy to the NHS. This had the effect of 
rebalancing the relative influence of expert doctor and 
democratic councillor. .  
GPs saw the rule change as the latest stage in a 
continuum, anticipating further transfers from the NHS 
to the LA.  
GPs were relatively subdued in HWB meetings, in 
contrast to the roles they enacted in the CCG. Their 
chief concerns were elsewhere. They were otherwise 
occupied in establishing CCG networks. 
The ICP included new geographically based 
arrangements to deliver integrated health and social 
care services. As a result GP practices would be 
allocated to new networks that did not correlate to 
existing GP-groupings. 
GPs complied with this allocation, but also retained the 
four existing groups. This was a source of tension 
between managers and doctors C
o
m
p
e
titio
n
 
Not apparent in the data  Not apparent in the data Not apparent in the data 
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 Wider Contexts Temporality Distributed Sensemaking 
In
te
g
ra
tio
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Integration of health and social care services was a 
national expectation, although this was not stated in 
formal rules or policies. Interpretation of the national 
expectation was left to local areas.  
No implications Integration appeared to mean two things. First was 
the integration of partners’ strategies. Because the 
partnership was a collectivity with different 
sensemaking types this integration was elusive. 
Instead of comprehensive integrated strategies, 
priority areas were agreed. One of these priority areas 
was the integration of community services. This was 
the second meaning of integration. A project called the 
ICP was established, delivered through a sub-network 
with workstreams. 
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Chapter Eight: Discussion and theoretical 
implications 
8.1 Revisiting the research questions 
In section 1.1, I set out my aims in relation to this thesis, along 
with two related research questions: 
 Why and how did GPs enact their commissioning duties in 
the ways that they did? 
 How does sensemaking influence field change within the 
context of networks and rules? 
The first of these questions relates to my aim to add depth and 
nuance to our understanding of why and how General Medical 
Practitioners (GPs) commission services in the way that they do. 
The second relates to my aim to contribute definitional clarity to the 
term cognitive frame in BF by using SP concepts. In addition I aim 
to contribute to SP in the areas of wider contexts, temporality and 
distributed networks. Whilst my empirical findings are drawn from a 
study of a health and care economy, the theoretical contributions 
are intended to be equally useful in other organisations and 
industries. 
In the three preceding empirical chapters I have presented data, in 
the form of stories. In order to clearly link the contents of those 
stories back to the data-analysis process (see Chapter 3: 
Methodology and Methods) each chapter concluded with a summary 
matrix of the main empirical thematic categories (establishment of 
new organisations; history and legacy; changes to the profession; 
integration; and competition) and SP analytic co-ordinates (wider 
context, temporality, and distributed sensemaking). Each matrix 
contained an analysis of the relationship between sensemaking 
(cognitive frame), networks and rules.  
In this chapter I discuss the implications for the field as a whole, by 
aggregating the findings associated with each of the separate levels. 
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The chapter is organised as three discussions: wider context; 
temporality, and distributed sensemaking. Whilst these analytic co-
ordinates are useful as headings, the content of each section is not 
distinct and discrete. The impact of distributed sensemaking, 
temporality, and wider context is interwoven, each embedded within 
the others.  Next I present a distillation of the theoretical 
implications for BF and SP, and finally conclude with a statement of 
my theoretical contributions. 
8.2 Wider context 
8.2.1 Introduction 
As outlined in 2.5.2, scholars agreed that the focus of the extant SP 
literature was limited to micro-level enactment, and one-off events. 
Maitlis and Christianson (2014) identified macro social structures, 
and collective enactment in these, as an area for further 
development. Brown, Colville, and Pye (2014) noted a lack of 
attention to culture and institutional contexts. Sandberg and 
Tsoukas (2015) similarly noted that sensemaking in wider contexts 
was overlooked. This three-levelled case study over an 18 month 
period provided an opportunity to consider organisational processes 
in an established industry. Castlefield’s health system was part of a 
national industry with cultural and institutional dimensions. 
Additionally, the multi-levelled nature of the field provided the 
opportunity to make observations within and between those levels. 
In the following paragraphs I discuss the implications for 
sensemaking in a wider context, introduce the concept of a 
sensemaking type associated with an industry, and consider the 
implications of rules that imply changes in sensemaking types, and 
contexts of multiple sensemaking types. 
8.2.2 NHS Family network 
The historically-rooted NHS was the context for actors at both the 
OPL and the SCL (Coleman et al., 2010, Davies and Harrison, 2003, 
Harrison and Ahmad, 2000). An associated shared NHS identity 
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(Segar et al., 2014)was in evidence, for which I have used the term 
NHS Family. Belonging to the NHS Family appeared to have 
emotional resonance for many inner city doctors. The NHS Family 
operated as a tightly-coupled network, with shared problem solving 
and mutually supportive working practices. I conceptualise this as a 
prosocial sensemaking type (Grant et al., 2008). The empirical 
chapters contain a number of examples to evidence this. In PC GP-
group the attempt of GP practice staff to relate to Castlecare nurses 
as commissioners was abandoned in favour of colleagueship.  
Another example was that Castlecare staff agreed to provide a 
phlebotomy service when the AQP exercise resulted in a loss of 
provision. The interface between doctors from primary and 
secondary care at the FLEs was a further example of a cross-NHS 
network co-operating to provide shared services to patients. 
8.2.3 Professional context  
The wider professional context, and developments in the GP 
profession, was also a prominent influence on sensemaking in the 
field. National developments in medicine included restratification 
(McDonald et al., 2009b, Sheaff et al., 2002), hybridisation 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 2009, McGivern et al., 2015, Noordegraaf, 2007, 
Waring and Currie, 2009), and limitations to medical autonomy 
(Harrison and Ahmad, 2000, Numerato et al., 2012). These were in 
evidence in the GP-groups at OPL, and between leaders and the 
wider GP community at SCL. Each GP-group had its own pattern of 
adoption of changes to the profession, which reflected its history 
and legacy, and future orientation (see 8.3). These variations 
resulted in different communication and leadership styles with 
corresponding differences in the distribution of actors (see 8.4). I 
conceptualise these variations as distinct sensemaking styles within 
the overall sensemaking type. 
8.2.4 GP dual role as commissioner and provider 
The HSCA 2012 introduced an increased emphasis on competition at 
national level, with the implication that commissioning and provision 
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roles should be distinct. National competition rules were enacted at 
the SCL. The new rule extending the use of commercial competition 
had inherent ambiguities which triggered sensemaking. NHS and 
commercial organisations have different approaches to 
sensemaking; there is evidence to support this in a study of a 
public-private partnership where issues of difference and 
incompatibility regarding strategic orientation, management 
approach, and workforce practice were identified by NHS staff 
(Bishop and Waring, 2011, Waring and Bishop, 2012, Waring et al., 
2013). 
The interface between commissioners and providers was not a 
simple contractual relationship. Commissioners and providers were 
both part of NHS Family network. Actors working in different 
organisations had often trained together and were friends. 
Sometimes the commissioner and provider could be the same 
person in the case of GPs commissioning services provided by GPs. 
The competition rule implied a change of sensemaking type from 
the embedded and established prosocial sensemaking type (Grant 
et al., 2008) to a market sensemaking type (Kennedy, 2008). This 
rule was loosely specified. In the end, whilst competitive activities 
were incorporated into business practices, there was no evidence 
that a change in sensemaking type took place. The mechanism by 
which CCG leaders, from their NHS Family network perspective, 
attempted to make sense of the competition rule is discussed in 
more detail in 8.4 Distributed Sensemaking below. 
8.2.5 Interagency partnerships with multiple sensemaking 
types 
Of the three levels, the widest context was the ISPL. The HWB, 
introduced by the HSCA 2012, was formed on the policy assumption 
that the existence of a social network comprised of members from 
separate organisations would result in coordinated strategies across 
those organisations. This was not easy to operationalise. Not only 
where there multiple rules, but multiple organisations, networks, 
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professions, and budgets. Associated with this were differences in 
priorities and sensemaking types. Whilst my data did not allow for a 
full analysis of the sensemaking types in this arena, it was clear that 
the NHS prosocial type (Grant et al., 2008) was differentiated from, 
for example, the LA Councillors’ political democratic sensemaking 
type. Consequently there was no easily identifiable starting point for 
a collective sensemaking process through which to agree collective 
action. Sensemaking continued to be separated along organisational 
lines, and in this politically charged context, a combative 
relationship between sensemakers appeared to be the modus 
operandi. Tensions rose to the surface, and certain actors asserted 
their perspective more forcibly than others. Other actors appeared 
to be passive, even docile, in response. 
8.2.6 Theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications of the above discussions include the 
following points. A multi-levelled field consists of different contexts. 
In a single industry such as the NHS a unifying sensemaking type 
may exist. Within this, internal networks may have differentiated 
sensemaking styles reflecting differences in legacy, future-
orientation, and the distribution of actors. When the context of a 
field level is industry specific and that industry has a single 
sensemaking type then aligned sensemaking is easier to achieve 
when new rules are introduced. This is not the same as saying that 
the rule will be implemented as the rule-writers intended. Rather, 
interpretation of that rule will be through the lens of the industry 
sensemaking type, making interpretation more aligned. When a new 
rule implies a change in sensemaking type, then embedded 
sensemaking types that derive from an industry’s history are not 
easily displaced, even if the implication of rules is that this should 
be the case. Where multiple sensemaking types exist within a field 
level then aligned sensemaking is more difficult to achieve and rules 
more difficult to operationalise. In this situation, a dominant 
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sensemaking type may be established, with an associated docility of 
actors with other sensemaking types. 
8.3 Temporality 
8.3.1 Introduction 
As outlined in 2.5.2, in two recent reviews of SP scholars have 
identified the limitations of the extant SP literature in relation to the 
impact of time, especially prospective sensemaking (Sandberg and 
Tsoukas, 2015), and temporal work in multi-levelled contexts 
(Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). Maitlis and Christianson linked this 
observation with the potential to extend SP into wider and routine 
contexts where the time dimensions of sensemaking are different 
from those in micro-level and/or one-off events. In this next section 
I consider the relationship between sensemaking and time in a 
wider context with actors distributed in networks at the time of rule 
change. I discuss the preservation of historical arrangements; the 
impact of history and legacy; and the existence of different time 
horizons, sense pacing and sense suspension. 
8.3.1 The preservation of historical arrangements 
One very obvious way in which time had an impact was the 
preservation of historical arrangements through rule change. At all 
three levels, pre-existing formal organisational structures were 
preserved through rule changes wherever possible. This happened 
to a greater or lesser extent depending on the degree of flexibility in 
the rules. Thus, by default, pre-existing networks of actors were 
retained. At the OPL GP-group structures from the predecessor PCT 
were retained in the new CCG. The retention of PCT arrangements 
was such that, at the SCL, rank and file GPs found it difficult to 
differentiate present arrangements from the past. At the ISPL two 
pre-existing groups were merged to form one new organisation, 
giving an impression that the implementation of new rules was a 
process of natural evolution. This seeming continuity detracted from 
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the scale of change and disruption of legacies introduced by the new 
rules. 
8.3.2 The impact of history and legacy 
History and associated legacies (Coleman et al., 2010) were 
important influences on sensemaking in a wider distributed field. A 
consequence of the preservation of organisational arrangements 
through rule change was the retention of networks, with their 
established working arrangements and relationships, which can be 
said to constitute a legacy. Because this was a wider context in 
which sensemaking was a process involving interrelated networks, 
retrospective and prospective sensemaking mechanisms operated at 
network level, rather than individual level.  At all levels, actors in 
networks had a perspective on the future that depended on its 
shared past experiences. In other words, the plausibility and nature 
of an anticipated future was shaped by the nature of shared past 
experience. 
The historical nature of the NHS as an industry had resulted in a 
shared prosocial sensemaking type, discussed in section 8.2.2 
above. This was evident at both OPL and SCL. The NHS Family 
legacy endured rule change and problems continued to be solved 
together. One effect of the existence of a shared sensemaking type 
was to enable prospective sensemaking. Because the shared NHS 
identity was embedded it acted as a secure foundation for 
sensemaking. When the introduction of a new rule to increase 
competition created ambiguity, managers and doctors divided along 
occupational lines in order to explore the tensions between an 
integrated and a competitive commissioning system. A combination 
of retrospective and prospective sensemaking resulted in the 
incorporation of competition principles into the existing prosocial 
sensemaking type.  
Within this legacy-derived NHS sensemaking type, there were also 
other legacy-derived sensemaking styles. The origin of these styles 
appeared to lie in the existence of a shared network history even if 
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that history was short. These were in evidence at the OPL. The four 
GP-groups had individual histories of working together. Three 
groups had histories of more than a decade. Two of these three had 
legacies that were directly related to the commissioning rule and 
experience of fundholding and non-fundholding (Coleman et al., 
2010). The fundholding style was derived from a legacy of all 
practices adopting management strategies in order to contain 
demand and control costs. The non-fundholding group’s style was 
highly stratified with its leaders interpreting commissioning to mean 
that they should act as stewards for the NHS system. This style 
appeared to be adopted at the next tier; at the SCL; commissioning 
was interpreted as responsibility for maintaining the NHS system in 
the context of the Castlefield health and care economy. The third GP 
group had a multi-faceted legacy. They had in common the 
experience of migrating from India to work in the NHS, and then 
running small practices in deprived areas. The remaining network 
had only recently formed. The difference in legacies resulted in 
variations in the distribution of actors, and in how the enactment of 
commissioning business was focused. 
At OPL, retrospective and prospective sensemaking was linked to 
the nature of the GP-group legacies. Two groups in particular were 
future-focused for different reasons. The older group of small 
practice doctors in the Gurus, looking for cues about the future, 
found reason to be anxious, which in turn affected their ability to 
think optimistically. By contrast, the innovation and improvement 
focus in NW, was a source of optimism, and members of the 
network considered it plausible that the future would be one of 
improving and developing primary care.  
At the ISPL, rule changes altered the field structurally, and public 
health staff moved from the NHS to the LA, disrupting the NHS 
Family legacy and network. This appeared to impede both 
retrospective and prospective sensemaking. There was a sense of 
fragmentation and confusion. Sensemaking recommenced following 
the arrival of an established public health leader as the new DPH 
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who enacted a “business as usual” approach, accessing the old 
legacy sensemaking network, even though structural relationships 
had changed.  He did this as a sensegiver, thus signalling to others 
to extract similar sensemaking cues to those that they had before 
the implementation of HSCA 2012. GPs followed the lead of the 
DPH, allowing him to continue as the main medical voice in HWB 
discussions. 
8.3.3 Time horizons, sense-pacing, and sense suspension  
In a wider context with distributed networks of actors multiple 
sensemaking processes contribute to an overall field level 
interpretation of new rules. The role of sensegivers in this situation 
involves the co-ordination of paced sensemaking in a timeframe. 
Not all actors have the same time horizons, and not all make sense 
at the same time.  
At the SCL, hybrid-leaders were actively engaged in temporal work. 
These hybrid leaders faced in two directions. When facing the wider 
CCG GP-membership, socially skilled sensegivers paced 
sensemaking, including suspending sensemaking processes 
amongst the rank and file whilst they themselves considered how to 
interpret new rules. One way this suspension was achieved was by 
hybrid sensegivers indicated that to be professional was to comply 
with the rules.  
When facing CCG managers, there were differences in respective 
time horizons. Managers appeared to have a shorter time horizon, 
responding to external national deadlines. Executive GPs did support 
the managers in this, but took a more critical approach to the 
Centre and its rules. Their focus was on the impact rule changes 
would have on patients, GPs, and secondary care providers in the 
longer term. 
At the ISPL, GPs saw the rule change as the latest stage in a 
continuum of change in the profession which they traced back to 
fundholding and non-fundholding, anticipating further transfers from 
the NHS to the LA. GPs were relatively subdued in HWB meetings, in 
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contrast to the roles they enacted in the CCG. Their chief concerns 
were elsewhere. They were otherwise occupied in establishing CCG 
networks. GPs did not see a clear role for themselves in this 
environment now or in the future, and as a result were emotionally 
disengaged.  
8.3.6 Theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications of the above discussions include the 
following points. 
In any one context with multiple networks there will be different 
histories and anticipated futures which contribute to the differences 
in sensemaking styles within the overarching sensemaking type. 
Networks with shared legacies can endure rule change. These 
shared legacies impact on the interpretation of rules by networks. 
This is especially so when rules are loosely specified. Sometimes, 
but not always, legacies are directly relevant to the new rules. Very 
often a shared legacy will be based on factors that are unrelated to 
the rule that is affecting the network. Even where legacies are 
directly relevant to the rule, there will be differences between 
networks as a result of different interpretations of predecessor 
rules. 
The extent to which networks are retrospective or prospective in 
their sensemaking style reflects the extent to which a shared legacy 
is embedded, whether or not this legacy relates directly to the new 
rule, and also what emotions they feel about the future (for 
example, are they fearful or optimistic?).  
There are also differences in future time horizons. For example in 
the study managers were focused on deadlines associated with 
tasks directed from the center, whereas doctors were mindful of a 
longer timeframe associated with the development of the primary 
care. 
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8.4 Distributed sensemaking 
8.4.1 Introduction 
In the extant SP literature distributed sensemaking has been used 
to describe those situations where people with different parts of the 
“jigsaw” come together in order to respond to a crisis, or implement 
a project (Fisher et al., 2012, Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2006, 
Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012). As outlined in 2.5.2, Maitlis and 
Christianson (2014) and Brown et al. (2014) identified distributed 
sensemaking as an underdeveloped area in SP. A feature of wider 
contexts is that interconnected groups of individuals need to be 
included in sensemaking, and that therefore patterns of distribution 
need to be established. The analytic category of networks in BF is 
one way to understand the distribution of sensemakers in a wider 
context. I have already proposed that the concepts of sensemaking 
types and sensemaking styles are useful to understand 
sensemaking in a wider context and the impact of time on 
sensemaking. In this section I develop these ideas further by 
considering the relationships between styles and types in a 
distributed system.  
A description of the distribution across field levels is a useful place 
to start. To all intents and purposes, at the OPL business continued 
as usual throughout the implementation of HSCA 2012. The four 
groups were in existence prior to the rule-change and they 
continued to do business using their established sensemaking 
styles. This set of differences was in the background on a day to day 
basis, in so far as each group was left alone to its own methods of 
commissioning. The differences between the groups only came to 
the fore at times of inter-group negotiation such as the inter-group 
budget setting exercise. A shared style existed between PC and the 
SCL leadership. At the SCL a hierarchically distributed model was 
put in place. The wider body of GPs was treated as one network 
under the direction of the Executive Team. It would be impractical 
for all GPs to “front” commissioning so the CCG Executive GPs 
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operated as an elite leaders acting on their behalf. The Executive 
GPs faced outwards from the CCG to interact with professional 
leaders in other healthcare organisations, as well as leading and 
guiding rank-and-file GPs. SCL represented the CCG at the ISPL. 
The ISPL was a partnership of public organisations with differences 
in sense-making type. Priorities set at this level took effect at SCL 
and OPL. 
This distribution is summarised in the table 25 below.  
Table 26 Summary of network distribution 
OPL   GP-Groups with individual styles 
 Inter-group negotiation under direction of SCL leadership  
SCL   Single rank and file network is created, and is hierarchically influenced 
by GP Executives 
 GP Executives boundary span provider and commissioner 
organisations in a professional network 
 Executive Leaders divide on occupational grounds to debate 
competition/co-operation implications. 
 Rank and file group retreat to consider.  
ISPL  Multiple sectors at HWB with multiple sense-making types. 
 SCL leaders act as representatives in HWB.  
 HWB joint priorities have impact on SCL and OPL  
 Sub-networks comprised of multiple sectors take forward HWB 
priorities 
 
This pattern of distribution is analysed further below. Firstly, I 
consider the unifying effect of a sensemaking type. Secondly, I 
consider how ambiguity can cause tensions between sensemaking 
types. Thirdly, I consider how OD approaches are used to manage 
and manipulate sensemaking in a distributed field. I conclude by 
identifying theoretical implications. 
8.4.2 Distributed sensemaking: the unifying effect of a 
sensemaking type 
The NHS Family sensemaking type was a unifying factor across OPL 
and SCL. The impact of this sensemaking type on distributed 
sensemaking was various. 
Firstly the NHS sensemaking type was an enabler for aligned 
sensemaking across the distributed general practice businesses. 
When new rules were introduced, the implications were unclear. If 
the co-operation of rank-and- file GPs was to be maintained in order 
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for the system to remain stable, then a way to conceptualise the 
new rules was needed. The potential for the new rules to enable 
improvements in patient care by working at the interface of primary 
and secondary care was emphasised. The context for this would be 
the NHS Family network with its shared identity and sensemaking 
type. 
Secondly the NHS sensemaking type enabled prospective 
sensemaking (see 8.3.2). Because the shared NHS identity was 
embedded it acted as a secure foundation when managers and 
doctors divided along occupational lines in order to explore the 
tensions between an integrated and a competitive commissioning 
system. Managers adopted a pro-competition schema. This was 
challenged by doctors who adopted a pro co-operation schema 
taking the role of critic and patient advocate. Doctors highlighted 
errors, problems, and inconsistencies associated with attempts at 
competition. Through this dialogic interaction, a more nuanced 
approach was developed that incorporated competition whilst at the 
same time preserving the integrated NHS network and its 
sensemaking type. 
Thirdly, GP Executives acted as individual boundary spanners 
(Bartunek et al., 2006, Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002) across 
healthcare sectors that shared the NHS sensemaking type, forming 
networks with doctors in healthcare provider organisations such as 
hospitals. 
8.4.3 Ambiguity and tension in a distributed field 
Differences in sensemaking styles or types can be useful in 
understanding sensemaking tensions. 
At the OPL, the different sensemaking styles in the GP networks 
could result in ambiguity which caused tensions inter-network 
tensions, as was seen in the budget setting exercise where the 
over-spending behaviour of PC practices was rewarded rather than 
sanctioned. Whilst this caused a period of inter-network tension, it 
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did not result in changes in the approach to sensemaking. GP-group 
sensemaking styles were embedded and stable. 
There was interdependency, including a shared sensemaking style, 
between PC and the CCG leadership. One reason why the behaviour 
of GPs in the PC network was sanctioned was because its GP 
executives were the most active and influential at the SCL. The 
hierarchical systems-orientated sensemaking style shared by PC and 
the wider CCG at SCL was predicated on the importance of cross-
organisational relationships between NHS organisations. This was an 
anchor for sensemaking when ambiguities and associated tensions 
arose. I have discussed above the divergence of doctors and 
managers in order make sense of the coexistence of competition 
rule and the co-operative principle. It was the shared NHS Family 
sensemaking type across the CCG leadership network that enabled 
this divergence without network fragmentation. Co-operative 
commissioning arrangements where retained, alongside the 
incorporation of competition principles as a set of restraints to 
ensure actors remained alert to actual, potential, or perceived 
conflicts of interest, and avoided conferring competitive advantage 
on NHS organisations – including GP surgeries. 
By contrast, at the ISPL, the HWB was a public policy partnership 
wherein there were incompatibilities (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007) 
between world views of the actors resulting in ambiguities. The rule 
change that introduced HWBs required a structural reorganisation 
were actors with different sensemaking types were redistributed, 
and decision making powers were reallocated. This created 
ambiguity and the sensemaking processes that were subsequently 
triggered were unaligned and fraught with tensions. The public 
health sensemaking type, and the Councillors’ democratic 
sensemaking type were often in overt tension. Tensions rose to the 
surface, and meetings of the network became an arena for certain 
actors to dispute the value base of others’ sensemaking types. Over 
time, underpinned by structural statutory decision making power, 
and further reinforced by the intervention of the external Peer 
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Review team, the Councillors moved to achieve a dominant position 
in the ISPL. 
In the three-levelled distributed field, tensions could manifest 
between, as well as within, levels. At the ISPL, the HWB was not an 
end in itself, it was there to align the strategies and operations of 
the organisations represented in the network, with consequent 
impacts on other levels. Broad agreements regarding the priority of 
strategies were made at the ISPL. Plans to operationalise these 
were made at the SCL, and the operational delivery of the plans was 
affected at the OPL. Whilst the DPH was the lead doctor in the HWB, 
it was GPs that took a more active role in its subnetworks such as 
the ICP. The work of the ICP was to design new ways of working 
across professional disciplines including the combination of 
assessment, referral, and information systems. This planning and 
design focus corresponded closely to the role of Executive GPs’ at 
the SCL, and they engaged actively in the familiar task of creating 
new services and pathways. Despite these similarities the ICP 
specific networks were accountable to the HWB where LA rules were 
statutorily paramount despite the diversity of sensemaking types. A 
key difference between LAs and the NHS related to the definition of 
the populations that each served. LAs serve a resident population 
and they organise their services on a geographical basis. GPs serve 
a registered population and are not bound by geography. Moreover 
the CCG was established as an alliance of GP practices which were 
independent businesses. There were historical tensions and 
competitive rivalries between these businesses, and the existence of 
these contributed to the pattern of self-selecting membership of the 
GP networks at Practice Level. When it came to the ICP, 
community-based services, including general practice, were to be 
organised into geographically-based teams. This was a potential 
disruption to the existing pattern of GP-groups with their embedded 
shared legacy cognitive frames. At the time I completed my field 
work these teams were being established. In those instances where 
there was a high degree of mismatch between the existing GP 
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networks and the proposed community teams then tensions with 
the potential to undermine the new bureaucratically-driven 
geographical structures were beginning to show. These imposed 
arrangements were exposing tensions between sensemaking at 
OPL, SCL and ISPL. 
Tension could exist between networks, within networks, and even 
within individual people in those instances where a dualistic tension 
was part of the response to a rule. Networks were the arena where 
separate parties took different approaches to sensemaking as a 
precursor to reaching a more nuanced shared cognitive frame. If a 
network has multiple sensemaking types amongst its members then 
tension may be an ongoing feature. Differences between 
sensemaking types may account for varying degrees of 
assertiveness and passivity amongst the actors in the network. In a 
multi-levelled field the interpretation of a rule at one level may not 
resonate with sensemaking at the level at which the rule is 
operationalised. Where this is the case, ambiguity will arise, 
resulting in tensions with the potential to undermine or limit the 
implementation of the rule. 
8.4.4 Organisational Development in distributed 
sensemaking 
An important aspect of sensemaking in a distributed field was the 
use of OD. In the next sections I consider a range of interventions 
and the relationship these had to sensemaking. 
8.4.4.1 External intervention  
Across the three levels, there was only one example of an external 
OD intervention, and this was at the ISPL. The fact that an external 
intervention took place was indicative of the nature of the field 
change which shifted the boundary between the NHS and the LA.  
The national policy implementation process was coordinated by the 
LGA who had an “offer” to help LAs implement the HSCA in the form 
of a Peer Review. In Castlefield, the reviewers identified tension 
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between doctors and councillors. Councillors prioritised the 
democratic representation of public opinion, and the doctors 
prioritised “evidence” and the bio medical model. The peer review 
team gave a clear message that the sensemaking type of the 
councillors needed to be given more weight in the partnership. In 
this way, the national policy intention to make the NHS more 
democratically accountable was reinforced. This is an example of an 
external intervention affecting and delimiting local processes of 
implementation by enforcing national rules. This intervention served 
to identify tensions in sensemaking and recalibrate the dynamics in 
order that rules were implemented according to national intentions. 
Follow up development sessions, focused on developing 
understanding of different sensemaking types, were also externally 
facilitated. 
8.4.4.2 Time out to reconceptualise 
When rules change “time out” is a mechanism for members of a 
network to discuss the implications of rules in a process of 
interpretation. McDonald et al. (2015) identified the importance of 
protected time to learn about and reconceptualise change.  
Examples of protected time to reconceptualise were seen at both 
the SCL and ISPL. The Conflicts of Interest session and the HWB 
development afternoons both provided protected time for actors to 
conceptualise the implications of the rules that they were charged 
with implementing. Another example of protected time was the LMC 
event for rank and file GPs to reflect on the implications of 
competition on their own businesses.  
The Conflicts of Interest session was designed for members of the 
GB network to consider the ambiguities that arose as a result of GPs 
commissioning within a system in which they were also providers.  
This network comprised of actors that worked together often. The 
time out was held after a time of trial and error (Rerup and 
Feldman, 2011) and marked the point at which the distribution into 
doctors and managers ended. This protected time was an 
266 
 
opportunity to share perspectives about how to balance the 
competition rule into the co-operative NHS system in a nuanced 
way, and to ensure that GPs did not further their own interests in 
the process.  
By contrast, the HWB Development Session was designed to 
enhance mutual understanding of ongoing difference in what was a 
widely distributed network. Members of the HWB belonged to 
separate organisations and would continue to have different 
sensemaking types.  The focus was on unpacking the reasons why 
actors had different perspectives and feelings in order to enhance 
tolerance between members when tensions arose. The outcome was 
a more sophisticated recognition of these differences.  
Different again was the time out organised for the GPs by the LMC. 
In this case, the rule requiring GPs to compete to continue to 
provide certain services had caused a disruption in the embedded 
NHS Family network. GPs were a widely distributed group but were 
nonetheless connected by the NHS Family sensemaking type. When 
AQP was applied to their services they appeared to be shocked to 
find themselves on a “level playing field” with non-NHS providers in 
a competitive environment. This time out was designed to allow GPs 
to retreat and regroup, in a uni-professional network, in order to 
reflect upon the implications for how to make sense of what they 
were being required to do. They decided to co-operate, prioritising 
the quality of patient experience above their own financial interests. 
This had more significance and impact than had been intended 
originally, since the co-operative, even docile, reaction allayed fears 
of leaders regarding the risk of personal interests being pursued by 
rank-and-file doctors. 
8.4.4.3 The role of socially-skilled individuals 
At SCL, both All Members meetings and FLEs were organised using 
OD methods. Group development techniques such as breaking into 
small groups to consider issues were used to ensure active 
engagement of those in attendance. Trusted individuals with 
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established credentials (Fligstein, 2001, Fligstein and McAdam, 
2012, Lockett et al., 2014) were “placed” as facilitators in order to 
set the tone, and convey messages. In SP literature roles similar to 
these have been described variously as sensegiving (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991), or sense-demanding (Vlaar et al., 2008, Weick, 
1969:p40), and have tended to be attributed to middle managers 
(Balogun and Johnson, 2004, Balogun and Johnson, 2005, Huy, 
2002) or senior leaders (Gioia and Mehra, 1996, Gioia et al., 1994). 
In this wider context, large groups of professional staff needed to be 
influenced, and this required a different approach from those 
previously identified in the literature. The facilitator role varied 
between sensegiving, and pacing sensemaking including holding 
sense in suspension. The pacing and suspension of sense is a new 
sensemaking concept in addition to those identified by Maitlis and 
Christianson (2014:p69). The time-related aspects have been 
discussed in 8.3.3 above. Pacing and suspension of sense were also 
dependent on the distribution of actors and networks. 
Sense suspension was an active process. TM meetings took place 
before the leaders had chance to form their own thoughts regarding 
the new rules, meaning it was not possible to give sense to others 
about the implications, especially those aspects of the rules that 
related to extended competition. In the absence of sense, rank-and-
file GPs were encouraged to trust in their leaders, and not to reach 
conclusions about the rules per se. A doctor with an established 
reputation for encouraging and developing other members of his 
profession acted as a facilitator, giving clear messages that an 
attitude of positive engagement would best serve the interests of 
everyone – GPs and patients alike. Space was created for worries 
and resistance to be expressed. This appeared to be part of a 
process whereby resistance was absorbed. The message given by 
the facilitator was that General Practice was ever-evolving; and to 
be professional (Evetts, 2003, 2006) was to rise to the personal 
challenge of contributing to improvements in clinical care. He 
appealed to an enduring sense of professional motivation, 
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encouraging actors to refer to their vocation as doctors. He also 
steered actors to accept that being a doctor was ever-changing, and 
never-changing both at the same time. An important implication of 
this is that not all actors make sense at the same time, and that it is 
not necessary that they do so before actions commence. What was 
important, though, was to diminish resistance and to replace 
reluctance with an alternative reason for moving forward. 
If suspension of sense was to be sustained, and resistance to 
continue to be controlled, then constant reinforcement seemed to 
be required. FLEs was one mechanisms for enacting this 
reinforcement. In a similar way to TM, this approach depended on 
the legitimacy of critically placed individuals. This time, respected 
hospital consultants guided GPs to think about their role in shared 
pathways of care to look after shared patients. Here the focus was 
on demonstrating the success of GP leaders as agents for service 
improvement within the NHS Family network. This in turn 
established plausibility for the leaders’ argument that rank and file 
GPs should engage optimistically as commissioners (Coleman et al., 
2009:p18). In these FLEs, no attention was given to the 
requirement to extend competition into the NHS network. 
8.4.5 Theoretical implications 
Across an industry a shared sensemaking type can exist in networks 
that span organisational boundaries, and operational and strategic 
levels of action. Sometimes tensions can appear to exist when a 
more sensemaking type is becoming more nuanced.  This is a 
different form of sensemaking tension to that which exists when 
different, possibly opposing, sensemaking types or styles exist in 
the same network. Tensions between sensemaking types may be a 
feature of formal structural redistribution of actors and decision 
making power. If a network has multiple sensemaking types then 
actors of one type may be more assertive than actors of another 
depending on the nature of the rules that are being enacted. 
Tensions can also exist between levels, in a multi-levelled field.  
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In a wider context, networks change, and actors are redistributed in 
as part of an active sensemaking process. The nature of the 
distribution changes according to the sensemaking that is 
happening. In this respect OD is important. This can take various 
forms. When a national field change shifted the boundary between 
the NHS and the LA, an external OD intervention served to identify 
tensions in sensemaking and recalibrate the dynamics in order that 
rules were implemented according to national intentions. On other 
occasions “time out” sessions were organised in order that members 
of networks could discuss the implications of rules in a process of 
interpretation. These were used to support distributed sensemaking 
processes, which included a retreat into a uni-professional group; a 
reconciliation of distanciated positions into a more nuanced 
understanding across a network; and an enhancement of tolerance 
and understanding in a diverse network. 
OD in distributed sensemaking includes input from trusted socially –
skilled individuals with established credentials. These were “placed” 
as facilitators. Their role varied between sensegiving, and pacing 
sense including holding sense in suspension. These were active 
processes. In the absence of sense it was important that the body 
of rank-and-file workers continued to follow their leaders if the 
system were to continue to function. The potential for resistance 
was absorbed, by suspending sensemaking about the rule change 
per se, instead replacing it by a focus on the enduring nature of 
professional motivation emphasising the ever-changing, and never-
changing condition of being a doctor. All actors were not in a 
position to sense at the same time, so it was important that 
sensemaking was paced and that resistance was diminished in order 
that action could commence. 
8.5 Summary of theoretical implications 
BF was developed for application at the macro level. SP has been 
limited to the micro level. By considering sensemaking as the active 
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dimension of cognitive frame in BF, a research gap has been 
addressed in that this is has also been an exploration of 
sensemaking in wider contexts. Throughout the thesis, I have used 
the overlapping and inter-dependent analytic co-ordinates of wider 
context, temporality, and distributed sensemaking to do this. In the 
following paragraphs, I present the implications that my findings 
have for SP, before presenting a proposed definition for cognitive 
frame within BF. 
8.6 Contributions to sensemaking perspective 
8.6.1 Wider contexts: sensemaking types and sensemaking 
styles 
Within a wider context, in this case a multi-levelled field, then 
actors within an established industry are likely to share a 
sensemaking type. The concept of sensemaking type that I propose 
here is a shared idea about the nature of cues that workers in a 
particular organisational context will seek to identify when making 
sense of new rules or contexts. In the case of the NHS this was 
prosocial type linked to long-standing organisational and 
professional identities. Changes in the industry, and wider workforce 
changes were important outside influences. When a rule is 
introduced that implies a change in sensemaking type, in this case a 
change from prosocial to market sensemaking, it will not be simply 
adopted, but first it will be interpreted through the lens of the 
existing type.  
A shared type can act as a unifying force both within and between 
field levels. In any one industry or context where a sensemaking 
type is shared but where there are multiple networks each network 
will reflect its actors’ past experiences. The result will be different 
approaches to sensemaking within the overarching sensemaking 
type. I have used the term sensemaking styles to describe this. A 
style reflects the combination of a network’s shared legacy, shared 
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ideas about an anticipated future, and the associated distributed 
relationships that it has put in place.  
Where multiple sensemaking types exist within a field level then 
aligned sensemaking is more difficult to achieve and rules more 
difficult to operationalise. In these circumstances there is the 
potential for a dominant sensemaking type to be established, with 
an associated docility of actors with other sensemaking types. In a 
multi-levelled field the interpretation of a rule at one field level may 
not resonate with sensemaking at other field levels even though it 
will take effect at these levels. Where this is the case, there is 
further scope for the rule to be reinterpreted, including being bent 
or broken. 
8.6.2 Distributed sensemaking and distribution as an active 
process 
In order for sensemaking to take place in a wider context it needs to 
be orchestrated. In this respect OD appeared to be an important 
mechanism. This can take various forms depending on the 
distribution of actors and networks and the nature of sensemaking 
relationships. For example, in an industry with a shared 
sensemaking type actors can divide and regroup existing networks 
to consider the implications of rules without destabilising the overall 
sensemaking type. In this way the adoption of separate positions 
can be a prelude to a more nuanced shared position. Specific groups 
can separate or retreat in “timeout” sessions in order to 
conceptualise the implications of a rule for them. There were also 
examples of hierarchically managed events where leaders 
suspended sense amongst the wider group whilst they continued to 
consider the implications of a rule change that implied a change in 
that type. In an inter-agency environment with sensemaking types 
then the emphasis of OD interventions can be to promote a lead 
sensemaking type, or to promote understanding of differences 
between types. Where there is no shared type OD interventions may 
be externally facilitated. This may include interventions by rule-
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enforcement agencies in order to identify tensions in sensemaking 
and recalibrate the dynamics in order that rules are implemented. 
8.6.3 Role of critically placed socially-skilled individuals: 
sensegiving, sense-pacing, and the suspension of sense 
The role of trusted individuals with established credentials was 
important. Socially skilled leaders were “placed” as facilitators in 
order to set the tone, and convey messages. Their role varied 
between sensegiving, and pacing sense including holding sense in 
suspension. These were both active processes. Where leaders had 
not yet undergone their own process of sensemaking in relation to a 
rule change, they could not act as sensegiver to the wider 
professional community. Through the suggestion of an alternative 
focus, in this case the enduring motivation to work constructively as 
a doctor to improve services in a professional medical network that 
spanned boundaries, sense was suspended and resistance to change 
absorbed. An important implication of this is that not all actors 
make sense at the same time, and that it is not necessary that they 
do so before actions commence. What was important, though, was 
to diminish resistance and to replace reluctance with an alternative 
reason for moving forward. This needed continual reinforcement, 
which was again facilitated by critically placed individuals with social 
and professional legitimacy. 
8.7 Contribution to Beckert’s Framework 
The existing definition of cognitive frame is without sensitivity to the 
nature of human interaction whilst SP is too individualised and 
related to one-off events. Having considered sensemaking as an 
active process in a wider and more routine context I use this to 
develop a definition of cognitive frame within the dynamic 
relationship with rules and networks. 
Beckert originally devised his framework in order to examine the 
social dynamics of markets. This was at the macro level, concerned 
with identifying a new way of explaining market dynamics that was 
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not predicated on the pursuit of individual interest. As discussed in 
section 2.3, BF is vulnerable to analytic drift if the categories remain 
under theorised, and based on untested assumptions. These 
assumptions include that actors have “how-to” rules upon which to 
draw when implementing new rules, and that they will adopt these 
in an uncomplicated manner. Cognitive frames for Beckert were the 
“taken for granted scripts” (citing Freidson, 1983, Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) that correspond to prevailing scripts in the industry. 
He assumed that there would be a high degree of consensus 
regarding the direction of field change. Finally he assumed that by 
and large actors would pursue their own interests. These 
assumptions all relate to the analytic category cognitive frame. In 
this next section I address these assumptions before going further 
to extrapolate a description of cognitive frame within BF. 
The first assumption is that “how-to” rules would be available to 
actors. Based on the empirical finding from my study this does not 
always appear to be the case. When a rule was introduced that 
implied a field change from a prosocial to a market cognitive frame, 
it was first considered through the lens of the existing cognitive 
frame. The rule was followed, but the implied field change did not 
take place. Rules can be adapted, or even broken depending on the 
fit between the sensemaking type implied by the new rule, and the 
pre-existing type. The extent to which how-to behaviours were 
available to actors depended on the relevance of the new rule to the 
legacy of the network. Very often a shared legacy will be based on 
factors that bear no relation to the rule that is affecting the 
network. Legacies can stabilise, but can also constrain. This could 
delimit the interpretation of rule change especially when the rule is 
loosely specified, as cues extracted are derived from the legacy. The 
second assumption is that there would be consensus regarding the 
direction of a new field rules. The findings from my study suggest 
that this is only true when the pre-existing sensemaking type is in 
line with the direction of the new rule, such as in the example 
Beckert’s uses where capitalist markets supported a field change to 
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diversify which would result in increased profits. In my example 
where a prosocial non-profit sector is asked to adopt market 
behaviours this consensus was not achieved. Certain groups of 
actors made more attempts than others to adopt new rules, but in 
the end existing prosocial business behaviours were adjusted to 
accommodate the new principles of competition to a limited extent. 
Similarly at the level of a strategic partnership where groups with 
various sensemaking types were required by rules to co-ordinate 
strategies, this was difficult to operationalise. In such a situation, 
discrete areas for joint action were agreed, but these were limited in 
both scope and effective enactment. The third assumption that all 
actors will pursue their own interests was also found not to stand. 
In the complex healthcare industry, doctors had a legacy of 
interpreting new rules in terms of compliance. They continued to do 
this even when this resulted in financial cost to them, and disrupted 
services for their patients. This was evidenced at both the OPL and 
the SCL. By identifying every possible conflict of interest they on 
occasions acted against their own interests. This was the impact of 
a competitive model in a prosocial environment. 
So what are the implications of these challenges to assumptions and 
other findings for the definition of cognitive frame in BF?  
Firstly, it is not a static state of itself, within the interdependent 
dynamic with rules and networks. Rather it is an ongoing process of 
making sense in an active process of interpretation situated in the 
actors’ relationship to new rules and the networks to which they 
belong. 
Secondly, a cognitive frame at the level of an industry may be 
conceptualised as the industry’s established sensemaking type. This 
cognitive frame is drawn from organisational and professional 
identities. When a rule is introduced that implies a reframing is 
necessary (or a change in sensemaking type) then this will be 
initiated through the lens of the existing frame. Changes in the 
industry and wider workforce changes (such as restratification, 
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hybridisation, and the limitation of clinical autonomy) were 
important outside influences on how the industry is organised but 
did not alter the basic type. A shared type can be a unifying force 
both within and between field levels enabling resistance to or 
acceptance of the rule. 
Thirdly, in a context with multiple networks there will be differences 
in prior shared experiences. These result in differences in 
sensemaking within the overarching sensemaking type. These can 
be conceptualised as styles of cognitive frame associated with 
internal networks reflecting the legacy and future-orientation of the 
actors. This will also have an impact on how the network organises 
its communication and management systems. These styles also 
inform the distribution of actors within a network. 
Fourthly, in some contexts a variety of sensemaking types may be 
present. Where this is the case, such as in a public policy 
partnership, then the alignment of actors towards the goal of 
collective action is difficult to operationalise. In these circumstances, 
the emphasis may be on understanding and accommodating 
differences, or on legitimising a lead type. 
Fifthly, the distribution and/or redistribution of networks and/or 
actors within networks is in itself an active process. Patterns of 
distribution are created to interpret new rules. This could include 
separation into differentiated positons of actors within a network, 
sometimes resulting in the retreat of certain groups to consider and 
reconceptualise. 
Sixthly, in a distributed system at times of field change the 
developing nature of cognitive frames will be orchestrated. In these 
situations, OD is important. This can take various forms, depending 
on the nature of the field rule that was being interpreted. 
Seventhly, conflicts and tensions between sensemaking styles or 
types can exist as well as across field levels. This may be a stage in 
a process towards the development of a shared cognitive frame 
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within a field, or it may reflect a redistribution of power in a field 
change. 
8.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have established and argued the theoretical 
implications for SP and BF. I have discussed the importance of 
sensemaking types and styles in distributed sensemaking in a wider 
context, tensions in sensemaking especially in a multi-levelled field, 
the importance of different relationships of the past, present and 
future, and the importance of the role of critically placed socially 
skilled individuals. Associated with this I have argued that there is a 
new sensemaking concept of sense suspension. The implication of 
this is that actors do not all make sense at the same time, but that 
trusted legitimate individuals can help others to concentrate on 
another dimension of their role. I have extrapolated from this to 
describe cognitive frame in BF as having seven dimensions. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions  
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the conclusion of the thesis. I begin by summarising 
the contributions to SP and BF. Following this, I reflect on the 
practical implications for health research, policy and management. 
Next, I outline the limitations of this study and highlight areas for 
further research. I end with a final reflexive comment. If I have 
done nothing else, I hope that through the empirical chapters, I 
have shone a light on the lived experience of the GP as he or she 
goes about the business of commissioning. 
9.2 Theoretical contributions of this thesis 
The theoretical contributions to the thesis are at the intersection of 
SP and BF. By developing a reciprocal relationship between the two 
theories, I have faced SP towards the macro level, and BF towards 
the micro level. Although derived through this relationship, the 
theoretical contributions are to SP and BF individually. These 
contributions address underdeveloped areas of wider contexts, 
temporality, and distributed sensemaking in SP, and an under 
theorised concept of cognitive frame in BF. 
9.2.1 Contributions to Sensemaking Perspective 
Maitlis and Christianson (2014) identified that an ever-increasing 
number of specialised forms of sensemaking are identified in the 
literature, some of which are situation dependent (see appendix 2). 
I have replaced the word form with type. The concept of 
sensemaking type that I propose here is a shared idea about the 
nature of cues that workers in a particular organisational context 
will seek to identify when making sense of new rules or contexts.  
In some circumstances a new rule may imply a change in type. In 
others new rules are required to be interpreted in a field of multiple 
sensemaking types in the same network. The consequent ambiguity 
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can trigger sensemaking. Tensions in sensemaking may be a stage 
in resolving ambiguity, or may be ongoing especially in networks 
with multiple sensemaking types. The concept of sensemaking type 
is potentially useful in understanding how networks interpret rules, 
respond to tensions, and succeed or fail in achieving collective 
action. 
Even when an industry has a shared sensemaking type, there will 
be co-existent variances in how that industry’s sub-networks 
interpret rules. I have conceptualised these differences within an 
overall type as sensemaking styles. These styles reflect networks’ 
legacy and future-orientation, and influence the distribution of its 
actors. 
Sensemaking, in wider contexts, is an active distributing process. 
Networks are an adaptive mechanism which alter distribution 
patterns according to the implications of the sensemaking project. 
Various active processes were associated with distribution, including 
sensegivers spanning network boundaries; networks splitting to 
take differentiated positions; networks taking time-out to reflect; 
and a uni-professional network retreating to reflect. 
Sensemaking is paced over time. Not all actors have the same time 
horizon. It is not necessary for sense to be made by all actors 
before action can commence. Leaders, at times when they 
themselves are interpreting new rules, can suspend sensemaking 
amongst networks of followers. This is achieved by socially skilled 
leader-facilitators diminishing resistance by diverting the attention 
of the wider network onto, in this case, the call to professionalism. 
9.2.2 Contributions to Beckert’s Framework 
Where SP is extended by using BF to face the macro level, in a 
reciprocal relationship BF is extended by using SP to face the micro 
level. This extension is in the form of a description of the analytic 
category cognitive frame, and is summarised in the following points.  
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Cognitive frame is not a fixed entity. Rather it is an ongoing process 
of sensemaking situated in the actors’ context of rules and 
networks. 
Cognitive frame in an industry context is conceptualised as that 
industry’s established sensemaking type. This type is shared 
amongst actors and can be a unifying force both within and between 
field levels. When a rule is introduced that implies a change in 
sensemaking type then a reframing process will be initiated, and 
this will be enacted using the lens of the pre-existing frame.  
The concept of a cognitive frame as a sensemaking type at industry 
level does not explain how the networks that comprise that industry 
interpret rules. Within the overall cognitive frame of an industry 
with multiple networks there will be differences in sensemaking, 
which is conceptualised as differences in sensemaking style. Style is 
a combination derived from legacy, future-orientation, and the 
distribution of the actors. 
In fields with more than one industry or sector, multiple cognitive 
frames may mean that alignment of actors towards the goal of 
collective action is difficult to operationalise. In these circumstances, 
the emphasis may be on understanding and accommodating 
differences, or on legitimising a lead cognitive frame. 
Tensions between sensemaking styles or types can exist within or 
between field levels. This may be a stage in a process towards the 
development of a shared cognitive frame within a field, or it may 
reflect a redistribution of power in a field change. The distribution 
and/or redistribution of networks and actors within networks is in 
itself an active process which is triggered by cognitive reframing. 
Patterns of distribution are created by actors as they interpret new 
rules. In a field with distributed networks this cognitive reframing 
can be a managed process. In these situations, OD is important. 
This can take various forms, depending on the nature of the field 
rule that is being interpreted. 
 
280 
 
9.3 Limitations, implications for practice and 
suggestions for further research 
In the following paragraphs I discuss the limitations of the study, 
and identify areas where further research is indicated 
9.3.1 The limitations of a single site case study  
This was only ever a study of one CCG, in which I aimed for depth 
not generalisability, which I discussed in depth in 3.3.2 above. This 
was a story unfolding with no a priori assumptions. I have not 
attempted to solve a list of pre-determined problems, neither have I 
described a model of GP commissioning and evaluated it. What I 
hope I have done is build cumulative knowledge about how GP 
commissioning is organised. Despite this limitation, the depth 
afforded by studying GPs across the range of commissioning duties 
does, I hope, tell an enlightening story about GPs and their 
behaviour and motivations when enacting commissioning roles. 
Especially my findings add a dimension beyond the conflict theory 
model as called for by Medical Sociology scholars (Kuhlmann and 
Von Knorring, 2014, Numerato et al., 2012, Thomas and Hewitt, 
2011). 
9.3.2 Theoretical limitations 
Whilst I have identified the concepts of types and styles as a useful 
way to understand distributed sensemaking in a wider context, 
these are offered merely as a starting point. I do this on the 
premise that BF will develop further, and that the combination of 
sensemaking with rules and networks is a useful way to apply SP to 
a wider context. In terms of sensemaking types (Maitlis and 
Christianson, 2014) (Appendix 2) a more comprehensive typology 
could be developed. I have described styles as being a combination 
of history, future-orientation and distribution of actors, but there is 
scope to add further to this description. 
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9.3.3 Limitations and implications for practice and medical 
sociology 
In line with the purpose of a PhD, the primary contributions of this 
thesis are theoretical and are applicable more widely than the 
English NHS. However the theoretical contributions were derived 
using empirical codes and were guided by the question “Why and 
how did GPs enact their commissioning duties in the ways that they 
did?” There are associated contributions and limitations to Medical 
Sociology, and implications for public policy regarding GPs. I discuss 
these in the following paragraphs: 
9.3.3.1 The interpretation of changes to the profession 
The extant health policy and medical sociology literature includes 
three main strands to explain changes in the profession. These are 
hybridisation (Kirkpatrick et al., 2009, McGivern et al., 2015, 
Noordegraaf, 2007, Waring and Currie, 2009), restratification 
(McDonald et al., 2009b, Sheaff et al., 2002) and the delimitation of 
clinical autonomy (Allsop, 2006, Checkland and Harrison, 2010, 
Dixon-Woods et al., 2011, Harrison and Lim, 2003, Kuhlmann et al., 
2013, Salter, 2007). My study raises questions regarding the impact 
of these changes on GPs within the context of medicine more 
widely. This is especially relevant to the management role of 
commissioning which GPs are contractually obliged to enact. There 
was heterogeneity in the pattern of adoption of changes to the 
profession amongst GPs. Chamber, for example, had accepted 
hybridity but had interpreted this to apply to all GPs and did not 
therefore emphasise re-stratification. In this group all practices 
were encouraged to adopt management techniques in relation to 
their own practice. Associated with this was a delimitation of 
autonomy that extended across the group with significant sharing of 
information for scrutiny. By contrast PC were the highly-stratified 
with a differentiated elite who were hybridised, but this 
hybridisation was limited to the elite whilst the rank-and-file were 
left to work with continued autonomy. At the more strategic level 
282 
 
business was done through highly stratified arrangements. GP 
leaders were differentiated and hybridised. The varied adoption of 
changes to the profession by the profession may be contributing to 
an overall confusion for the GPs themselves about where their 
loyalties lie, and what is expected of them as “professionals”. More 
research is indicated on the effect of multiple developments within 
the profession and the variations that this creates as GPs adopt 
these changes. 
9.3.3.2 Compliance and the shift to professionalism 
More research is indicated to explain the passivity and compliance 
that the GPs in the study demonstrated. This may be linked to 9.3.2 
above in that multiple parallel changes have created a confused 
profession. Government rhetoric on the subject of GP 
commissioning is about empowering doctors as experts in 
healthcare. In Castlefield, commissioning meant that GPs were 
expected to manage demand by controlling the level of referrals and 
prescriptions, and to work with secondary care colleagues to design 
services. In my study, the GPs did not appear to engage critically 
with the role, resisting changes that would detrimentally affect 
them. Instead, despite some initial grumbling, doctors responded to 
new rules compliantly. Leaders synonymised compliance with 
professionalism (Evetts, 2003, Evetts, 2006). The rewards they 
sought were improvements to services, even when this was at 
personal cost to themselves. This should be caveated since my 
observations were limited to those GPs that engaged in CCG 
processes at some level even if only to attend TM meetings. 
Nonetheless, in my observations, GPs collectively appeared to be 
compliant, and orientated towards improvement and sustainability 
of services for patients, without a strategy to safeguard their own 
interests. There were numerous examples in the data where GPs 
appeared to be going to great lengths not to appear greedy. They 
declared conflicts of interest including those they had in the past, 
might have in the future, and those of their families and partners. 
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They agreed to provide services without payment. They were 
passive at the HWB when the public health budget was reallocated. 
They pointed out when there was a potential to be over-paid. Even 
when they were required to compete to continue to provide existing 
services, with all the potential knock on effects for their businesses, 
staff, and patients, they simply went along with it, trusting in their 
leaders to guide them through.  
Why was this? And what are the potential consequences of this 
attitude for the profession? At the time of submitting this thesis, 
there was an almost 40% vacancy rate on the GP vocational training 
scheme in the East Midlands area, and this difficulty in recruiting 
GPs is part of a national trend. Is this linked to misunderstandings 
regarding the motivation of GPs and how they make sense of their 
role? Are there specific issues for inner city GPs that need to be 
addressed if a primary care service is to be sustained? Whilst I can 
speculate, my thesis has not been focused directly on these 
questions. Again, I suggest it as an important area for further 
consideration. 
9.3.3.3 The commissioning role and the importance of 
the NHS Family 
One important finding was the impact of belonging to the NHS 
Family on how and why GPs enacted their commissioning role in the 
way that they did. The importance of colleagueship across 
organisational boundaries was repeatedly evidenced, and GP-
commissioning was a main vehicle for service pathway design 
across boundaries of primary and secondary care and health and 
social services. Doctors and other clinicians had shared patients and 
shared operational responsibility. Problems were repeatedly solved 
together outside of formal procurement processes. It was these 
relationships that were potentially destabilised by the implied shift 
in HSCA 2012 to a market approach to sensemaking. Despite the 
important unifying effect of the NHS Family network, it remains a 
fluid and undefined concept. Given its apparent importance in field 
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stability and limiting effect on the interpretation of new rules, I 
suggest its mechanisms are an important area for further research, 
the outcomes of which should be used to inform public policy as 
more traditional NHS organisations move into new business models, 
and more NHS functions transfer to LAs. 
9.3.3.4 Inner city GPs 
This was a study of inner city GPs with a population with relatively 
high deprivation. The sensemaking of these GPs is likely to be 
different from those in more affluent areas. Castlefield’s workforce 
had characteristics of ethnic heritage and vocation that were inner 
city specific and this inevitably affected how doctors made sense of 
their role. In addition to their own personal attitudes, inner-city GPs 
report feeling overwhelmed with the social problems of their 
patients meaning it is difficult to make the space and time to think 
proactively and critically. My study was not designed to enable me 
to draw conclusions regarding the specialised nature of inner-city 
general practice, but the evidence suggests that this is an important 
distinction about which more research is needed. 
9.4 A closing comment 
The above points have implications for public policy. Since the early 
1990s there have been policy frustrations regarding how GPs have 
or have not fulfilled the commissioning role. Despite these 
frustrations there have been increasingly more system-wide roles 
and structures that encapsulate the idea of GP engagement. It 
would be useful if future initiatives were grounded in a more 
sophisticated understanding of GP motivation and behaviour. 
Current policy linked to The NHS Five Year Forward View (NHS 
England and NHS primary care co-commissioning, 2014) and the 
associated programmes to introduce multi-speciality community 
provider organisations, and integrated primary and acute care 
systems could potentially provide a more fertile ground for the 
involvement of GPs more widely, however the inter-agency nature 
285 
 
of much of this work raises different challenges in the light of the 
evidence from my study regarding the passivity of GPs in the inter-
agency environment at strategic level, and the potential conflicts of 
sensemaking style between LAs and the NHS. Policy that places GPs 
at its heart needs to be informed by an in-depth understanding 
about GP behaviour. 
Whilst I have examined GPs and my opinions about them, my 
original feelings of gratitude and respect remain intact, even 
strengthened. I hope that in this thesis I have contributed evidence 
to help reach a better understanding of GPs’ motivation and 
experience. I also hope that I have helped explain why this is 
important, and that I have opened further questions that will help 
shape policy which has GPs at its heart.
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Appendix 1 Glossary 
Advancing Quality: A voluntary programme that provides financial 
incentives for improvement in the quality of care provided to 
patients. It has been implemented in the North West region of 
England since 2008. 
Any Qualified Provider: An initiative to open the NHS resources to 
competition from a range of providers. Potential providers must 
pass a standard qualification process to ensure they meet the 
appropriate quality requirements, and need to be registered with 
the Care Quality Commission where they are carrying out a service 
which is already regulated. If a provider does not need Care Quality 
Commission registration, then other equivalent assurance is 
required. Once deemed qualified that provider is entered on a 
register of Qualified Providers and patients can chose their service-
provider from that register.  
Better Care Fund: A single pooled budget, originally called the 
Integration Transformation Fund, with the objective to incentivise 
the NHS and local government to work more closely together and to 
shift resources into social care and community services. The fund is 
designated at national level, and in 2014/15 included a further 200 
million pounds transfer from the NHS to social care, in addition to a 
900 million pounds transfer already planned. The pooled budget was 
of the value of 3.8 billion pounds. 
Choice: A policy in the NHS designed to enable patients to make 
choices about the healthcare they receive. Originally (2002) it was 
introduced to allow patients on waiting lists opportunities to choose 
alternative providers. It has since been extended into other service 
areas. The Any Qualified Provider initiative is a mechanism by which 
choice is made available to patients in the form of a register of 
providers. 
Community Interest Company: A type of company designed for 
social enterprises. The legal form ensures that their profits and 
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assets are used for the public good. They were initially set up in 
2005 under the Companies (Audit, and Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) Act 2004. They are not charities, nor part of 
the public sector. They are companies in the private sector as far as 
legal status, including tax status, is concerned. 
Clinical Commissioning Group: An inter-disciplinary group of 
health clinicians and managers, led by GPs, which holds the health 
budget for patients in a local area. Membership of a CCG is not 
optional for GPs; these arrangements came legally into force on 1st 
April 2013. 
Enhanced Services: Primary medical services that can be either 
designated nationally or locally agreed to meet local priorities. 
These are described as enhancements to the essential services 
provided under the core GMS contract. Services included in the 
enhanced services categories vary from year to year, illustrative 
examples of national enhanced services include the Patient 
Participation Scheme, and the Extended Hours Access Scheme. 
Examples of Local enhanced services include intravenous antibiotics 
at home, and targeted cancer screening initiatives. 
Fundholding: A system that enabled GPs to receive a fixed budget 
from which to pay for primary care, drugs, and non-urgent hospital 
treatment for patients. The scheme commenced in 1990 and was 
abolished in 1997. 
General Practice and General Medical Practitioner: A General 
Medical Practitioner (GP) is a doctor who treats acute and non-acute 
illness, and provides preventative care for all ages and sexes 
through the mechanism of a registered list. GPs are based in the 
community, and employ a practice based team which usually 
includes nurses, practice managers, and receptionists, and 
sometimes salaried doctors. This team and the building out of which 
they operate is known as the General Practice. By definition GPs are 
generalists not specialists and illnesses often present to them in an 
undifferentiated way. They treat patients with minor or chronic 
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conditions, issuing prescriptions for medication and/or referring to 
other services as appropriate. 
Health (and care) Economy: A term that describes the 
combination of a local area’s population, and the organisations that 
provide health and social care in that area. It is intended to reflect 
that the population and the various providers are inter-linked and 
interdependent, and need to design services and allocate budgets 
with a view to the sustainability of the overall “economy”. 
General Medical Service Contract: The mechanism by which the 
core expectation of GPs as independent contractors is specified. The 
GMS contract is a UK-wide arrangement with minor differences 
across England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Health and Wellbeing Board: Statutory partnerships of the NHS, 
public health, adult social care and children's services, including 
elected representatives of LAs and Local Healthwatch. They are 
required to identify and meet the needs of their local population and 
to tackle local inequalities in health and wellbeing. 
Healthwatch: A consumer champion arrangement at both national 
and local level introduced by the HSCA 2012 and implemented in 
April 2013. National Healthwatch is a statutory committee of the 
national Care Quality Commission (the independent regulator of all 
health and social care services in England). Local Healthwatches are 
required in every single and upper tier local authority and are 
funded by the local authority. 
Joint Strategic Needs Assessment: An annual publication in 
which the health and wellbeing needs of a local area are described, 
providing a basis for the commissioning of local services and action 
to be taken by local partners working together. It is a Public Health 
framework to examine the factors that impact on health and 
wellbeing of local communities, including employment, education, 
housing, and environmental factors. It is supported by a joint health 
and wellbeing strategy. 
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Local Strategic Partnership: A partnership arrangement which 
included the public sector along with the business, community and 
voluntary sectors. These are non-statutory, non-executive 
organisations designed to facilitate co-ordinated strategic decisions 
at a level that is close to the community. These are aligned with 
local authority boundaries. 
Minimum Practice Income Guarantee: An extra payment to 
some General Medical Services (GMS) practices, introduced as part 
of the 2004 contract to smooth the transition to new funding 
arrangements and which is in the process of being phased out. 
General practices in deprived areas have been the main 
beneficiaries of the payment. 
Monitor: The sector regulator for healthcare, in the form of an 
executive non-departmental public body sponsored by the 
Department of Health. Monitor’s role is to ensure that independent 
NHS foundation trusts are well-led so that they can provide quality 
care on a sustainable basis, that essential services are maintained if 
a provider gets into serious difficulties, and that the NHS payment 
system promotes quality and efficiency. One way that this is 
undertaken is through the regulation of procurement, choice and 
competition operate in the best interests of patients. 
NHS Constitution: A statement that sets out the rights to which 
patients, public and staff are entitled, and pledges that the NHS is 
committed to achieving. It also sets out responsibilities which the 
public, patients and staff owe to one another to ensure that the NHS 
operates fairly and effectively. 
Payment by Results: A system of contractual payments to 
hospitals based on fixed tariffs per case to create, in theory, strong 
incentives for hospitals to raise income by attracting and treating 
more patients, via improvements in quality.The system covers the 
majority of acute healthcare in hospitals, with national tariffs for 
admitted patient care, outpatient attendances, accident and 
emergency (A&E), and some outpatient procedures.  
311 
 
Practice Based Commissioning:  A system by which GP Practices 
held indicative budgets, made commissioning decisions and 
allocated resources between competing priorities. Their associated 
Primary Care Trust placed contracts, and enacted administrative 
functions on their behalf. 
Primary Care 
Primary Care Groups/Trusts: Primary care groups (PCGs), 
established throughout England in 1999, operating as 
subcommittees of health authorities. PCGs were committees of GPs, 
nurses, other health professionals, managers, and others. From 
2001 onwards they migrated to Primary Care Trust status, with 
appointed boards. The former subcommittees migrated into 
Professional Executive Committees and where subordinate to the 
new Trust Boards. 
Quality and Outcomes Framework: A pay-for-performance 
scheme for GPs. introduced in April 2004, based on the delivery of 
clinical and organisational targets. 
Secondary Care:  
Single Tier Local Authority: Also known as unitary authority, a 
local authority that is responsible for all local government functions 
within its area. 
Upper Tier Local Authority: In most areas of England local 
government functions are divided between two tiers of local 
authority. County councils are the upper-tier and provide waste 
management, education, libraries, social services, transport, 
strategic planning, consumer protection, police, fire education and 
social care services for a county area. Borough or district councils 
form the lower-tier, and provide housing, waste collection, council 
tax collection, local planning, licensing, cemeteries and crematoria
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Appendix 2 Specific Forms of Sensemaking 
From Sensemaking in Organizations: Taking Stock and Moving 
Forward (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014:p68) 
Sensemaking Form Definition 
Constituent-minded 
sensemaking 
“the process by which an arbiter renders an assignment of blame, guided not 
only by the arbiter’s professional standards and rational analysis but also by 
his or her own biases and the anticipation of his or her constituents’ biases.” 
(Wiesenfeld et al., 2008:p235) 
Cultural 
sensemaking 
“how entrepreneurs or communities make sense of venture failures.”(Cardon 
et al., 2011:p79) 
Ecological 
sensemaking 
“the process used to make sense of material landscapes and ecological 
processes.” (Whiteman and Cooper, 2011:p889) 
“how actors notice and bracket ecologically material cues from a stream of 
experience and build connections and causal networks between various cues 
and with past enacted environments.” (Whiteman and Cooper, 2011:p890-
891) 
Environmental 
sensemaking 
“actors make sense not only of the event itself, but of the broader 
organizational field.” (Nigam and Ocasio, 2010:p826) 
Future-oriented 
sensemaking 
“sensemaking that seeks to construct intersubjective meanings, images, and 
schemes in conversation where these meanings and interpretations create or 
project images of future objects and phenomena.” (Gephart et al., 
2010:p285) 
Intercultural 
sensemaking 
 “the process involving the selection of scripts that reflect individuals’ cultural 
values and cultural history.” (Fisher, 2013:p796) 
“.. . can lead to various outcomes such as schema development and a higher 
level of cultural understanding.” (Fisher and Hutchings, 2013:p796)  
Interpersonal 
sensemaking 
“the role of interpersonal cues from others in helping employees make 
meaning from their jobs, roles, and selves at work.”(Wrzesniewski et al., 
2003:p103) 
Market 
sensemaking 
“a macro version of Weick’s approach to meaning construction in 
organizations.”(Kennedy, 2008:p272)  
Political 
sensemaking 
“how powerful social actors construct the relationship between multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and their multiple local contexts.” (Glasby et al., 
2004:p395) 
Prosocial 
sensemaking 
“process in which employees interpret personal and company actions and 
identities as caring.” (Grant et al., 2008:p898) 
Prospective 
sensemaking 
“the conscious and intentional consideration of the probable future impact of 
certain actions, and especially nonactions, on the meaning construction 
processes of themselves and others.” (Gioia et al., 1994:p378) 
Resourceful 
sensemaking 
“the ability to appreciate the perspectives of others and use this 
understanding to enact horizon-expanding discourse.” (Currie et al., 
2009:p807) 
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Appendix 3 Schedule of Interviews 
Pseudonym  Job role 
Conran Brown Finance Director 
Dr Conary Chamber Executive GP, and lead 
for CCG-wide practice visits 
programme 
Lisa Diggle  Commissioning Director 
Lizzie Gordon Consultant (non-medical) in public 
health 
Dr Kerala Chamber Executive GP, and lead 
GP for ICP 
Dr Lovett PC Executive GP, and lead for 
education, professional 
development, research, and safe-
guarding 
Dr Poona The Gurus Chairman 
Maggie Smith Director of Primary Care 
Dr Strong PC Executive GP and lead GP for 
Health and Wellbeing Board  
Sarah Tompkins Programme Manager (Integrated 
Care) 
Jim Wood  Local Medical Committee Chief 
Executive 
Primary Care Middle Manager Organisation of GP-groups 
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Appendix 4 Interview Topic Guide  
Topic 1: History and memories of the role of the GP in 
planning/commissioning services in partnerships 
Since the focus of the study is changes in role resulting from the 
introduction of GP Commissioning, interviews will explore the 
memories of individuals in order to capture what is different now 
from in the past.  This will include questions relating to the changes 
the individual has made in their own working life to introduce the 
recent changes, in order to explore whether established coping 
mechanisms and relationships are being used to implement new 
requirements.   
Topic 2: The effectiveness of GP commissioning  
This topic will include questions that examine how effective GP 
commissioning is considered to be. It will help to identify enablers 
and barriers to effective commissioning. Questions will explore what 
is good and what is bad about GP commissioning, including what 
factors make it work well (enablers) and what factors make it go 
badly (barriers). Specifically the interviews will contextualise these 
questions in an interagency/partnership. It will involve comparisons 
with non-GP commissioning models, in order to be able to identify 
contrasts and similarities. 
Topic 3: The impacts on the relationships between managers, 
doctors, other staff and patients. 
This topic area will focus on how commissioning requirements 
impact on managers, doctors, and other groups of staff. Changes in 
the role of the GP will have corollary changes in the role of other 
types of staff and on patients.  Understanding the impacts of the 
changes on managers, doctors, and other groups of staff will enable 
a more nuanced understanding to the impacts on the GP profession 
itself. It is important to note that the study will not include direct 
interviews with lay people.  The patient point of view will be 
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obtained by interviews with staff who are responsible for patient and 
public engagement.  
Topic 4: Impacts on General Practice as a profession. 
This topic will explore the nature and extent of changes in General 
Practice. It will include the exploration of whether changes have 
affected all GPs in the same way, or whether groups of GPs are 
forming to deliver commissioning responsibilities. 
Topic 5: What interests are being served or 
repressed/confounded? 
The theoretical basis for the study is Structural Interests Theory 
(Alford, 1975). The study will problematize the concept of interests. 
The interviews will include an exploration of the interviewees views 
of what interests are being served by the new system. They will also 
explore whether interests are being repressed or confounded by the 
new system.  What may constitute an “interest” is not defined or 
anticipated at this stage, as this will be a key contribution of the 
research to Structural Interests Theory.
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Appendix 5 Membership of Health and 
Wellbeing Board 
Voting Members 
 Three LA elected members 
 Two LA directors 
 The Director of Public Health; joint with CCG until formal 
transfer on 1st April 2013  
 Three CCG GPs 
 CCG Chief operating officer  
 Healthwatch representative  
Non-voting Members  
 Two further LA directors (Adult Provision and Health 
Integration and Families and communities)  
 Housing representative 
 Police representative 
 Jobcentre Plus representative 
 Crime and Drug Partnership representative 
 Three health provider representatives, including new 
Castlecare social enterprise as well as NHS trusts 
 Representative from third sector forum 
